The Judge Dugan Case: Examining the Legal and Procedural Questions in the FBI’s Obstruction Charges

The Judge Dugan Case: Examining the Legal and Procedural Questions in the FBI’s Obstruction Charges

The recent arrest of Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Hannah Dugan by the FBI has raised significant questions about judicial authority, immigration enforcement in courthouses, and the distinction between administrative and judicial warrants. Before forming any conclusions, a thorough examination of the criminal complaint and the relevant legal framework is essential.
The Criminal Complaint: Key Elements and Allegations

The criminal complaint against Judge Dugan, filed by FBI Special Agent Lindsay Schloemer in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, charges her with two federal offenses: obstructing a proceeding before a federal agency (18 U.S.C. § 1505) and concealing a person from arrest (18 U.S.C. § 1071)

. These charges stem from events on April 18, 2025, when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents attempted to arrest Eduardo Flores-Ruiz, an undocumented immigrant with a pending domestic violence case, in Judge Dugan’s courtroom.

According to the complaint, ICE agents arrived at the Milwaukee County Courthouse with an administrative warrant for Flores-Ruiz’s arrest. The complaint alleges that when Judge Dugan learned of ICE’s presence, she became “visibly angry,” confronted the agents, questioned their authority without a judicial warrant, directed them to speak with the Chief Judge, and then escorted Flores-Ruiz through a “jury door” to a non-public area of the courthouse
. Flores-Ruiz was ultimately arrested outside the courthouse after a brief foot chase, approximately 22 minutes after being first spotted in the building

.
Witness Statements and Characterizations

The complaint relies heavily on characterizations of Judge Dugan’s demeanor as “visibly angry” and “confrontational,” drawing on statements from courthouse staff and other witnesses
. It portrays her actions as deliberately obstructive rather than procedurally motivated. Her attorney, Craig Mastantuono, has stated that “Judge Dugan wholeheartedly regrets and protests her arrest. It was not made in the interest of public safety”

.
Administrative vs. Judicial Warrants: A Critical Distinction

Central to understanding this case is the distinction between administrative and judicial warrants, which the FBI complaint acknowledges was at issue during Judge Dugan’s confrontation with ICE agents.

Administrative warrants are issued by federal agencies such as DHS or ICE and signed by immigration officers or immigration judges – not by federal or state court judges
. Crucially, administrative warrants do not authorize searches of non-public areas and do not grant ICE agents the authority to enter private spaces without consent

.

In contrast, judicial warrants are issued by courts, signed by judges or magistrates, and provide full legal authority for searches, arrests, or seizures

. The difference is not merely technical – it reflects fundamental constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

When Judge Dugan asked ICE agents if they had a judicial warrant and was told they only had an administrative warrant, her subsequent questioning of their authority aligns with this legal distinction

. Her direction that they speak with the Chief Judge could be viewed as following proper channels for resolving jurisdictional questions rather than obstruction.
Courthouses as Contested Enforcement Spaces

The enforcement of immigration laws in courthouses has been a contentious issue with changing policies. Until January 2025, the Biden administration had maintained policies limiting immigration enforcement in “protected areas” including courthouses
. The Trump administration rescinded these policies earlier this year

.

Prior to this policy change, the Department of Homeland Security had recognized that immigration enforcement in courthouses could have a “chilling effect on individuals’ willingness to come to court or work cooperatively with law enforcement”

. This concern reflects the tension between immigration enforcement and the judicial system’s need to ensure access to justice for all individuals regardless of immigration status.
Milwaukee’s Local Context

The complaint acknowledges that there had been “public attention” to two previous courthouse arrests in Milwaukee

. This suggests an existing tension around the practice in the local community. The Milwaukee ICE ERO Task Force was reportedly focusing its resources on apprehending charged defendants in criminal cases, but the decision to execute the arrest inside the courthouse rather than outside raises questions about necessity and proportionality.
Legal Elements of the Charges

To prove obstruction under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, prosecutors must establish that Judge Dugan acted “corruptly” to influence, obstruct, or impede a proceeding before a federal department or agency
. The term “corruptly” is defined as “acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information”

.

For the concealment charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1071, prosecutors must prove:

A federal warrant had been issued

The defendant knowingly harbored or concealed the person

The defendant knew about the warrant

The defendant intended to prevent discovery or arrest

A viable defense could argue that Judge Dugan lacked corrupt intent if she believed she was asserting legitimate judicial authority over her courtroom and properly questioning the basis for ICE’s enforcement action without a judicial warrant. Similarly, her actions in directing Flores-Ruiz through a non-public door might be characterized as routine courtroom management rather than intentional concealment.
Precedent and Similar Cases

This case bears some resemblance to that of Massachusetts Judge Shelley Joseph, who was indicted in April 2019 on obstruction of justice charges for allegedly preventing an ICE officer from taking custody of an immigrant defendant
. Notably, those charges were eventually dropped in 2022, with Judge Joseph admitting to certain facts in the case

. The resolution of that case could have implications for how Judge Dugan’s case might proceed.
The Political Context

The arrest of Judge Dugan comes amid significant changes at the FBI. In February 2025, Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Dick Durbin revealed allegations that FBI Director Kash Patel had been “personally directing the ongoing purge of senior law enforcement officials at the FBI”
. Patel, who was appointed by President Trump, publicly announced Judge Dugan’s arrest on social media

This political backdrop raises questions about whether the decision to pursue federal charges against a sitting state judge reflects neutral law enforcement priorities or signals a broader effort to enforce compliance with federal immigration policies at the local level.
Potential Defenses and Alternative Interpretations

Several arguments could be made in Judge Dugan’s defense:

Judicial authority: Judges have inherent authority to manage their courtrooms. Judge Dugan may have been acting within her authority to question the basis for ICE’s presence without a judicial warrant.

Lack of corrupt intent: If Judge Dugan believed she was following proper procedure by requiring a judicial warrant and referring the agents to the Chief Judge, this would undermine the claim that she acted “corruptly.”

Minimal impact: Flores-Ruiz was arrested just 22 minutes after being spotted in the courthouse. This minimal delay resulted in no significant harm to the enforcement action.

Proportionality concerns: The pursuit of federal felony charges against a sitting judge for actions that resulted in a brief delay raises questions about prosecutorial discretion and proportionality.

The criminal complaint against Judge Hannah Dugan presents serious allegations but leaves room for substantial legal and procedural questions. The distinction between administrative and judicial warrants, the evolving policies on courthouse enforcement, and the complex interplay between federal immigration authority and state judicial independence all merit careful consideration.

While the FBI characterizes Judge Dugan’s actions as deliberate obstruction, an alternative view could see them as a good-faith assertion of judicial authority in a contested enforcement space. As this case proceeds, it will likely raise important questions about the boundaries between federal immigration enforcement and the independence of state courts-questions that extend far beyond the specific circumstances of this case.

The resolution of these charges will have significant implications not only for Judge Dugan but for judges nationwide who must navigate the complex intersection of immigration enforcement and judicial proceedings. Regardless of the outcome, this case highlights the tension between federal enforcement priorities and local judicial autonomy that continues to shape our legal system.
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 25-M-397(SCD)