Judge Richard Posner died this week at 87. A month ago I built a long essay, “The Alien Always Loses,” on a single sentence he wrote in 2006. He deserves more from me than a citation.
He graduated from Yale and from Harvard Law School in 1962. He clerked for Justice William Brennan and served as an assistant to Thurgood Marshall. He joined the University of Chicago faculty in 1969, and four years later Economic Analysis of Law founded a field. President Reagan put him on the Seventh Circuit in 1981. He served as chief judge from 1993 to 2000, wrote nearly 3,300 opinions and more than 60 books, and left the bench in 2017.
His politics moved over the decades, and nobody could predict them. He started out clerking for Brennan and working for Marshall, two pillars of the liberal Court. Law and economics then tied him to the conservative legal movement, and a Republican president put him on the bench. Later he wrote the Seventh Circuit opinion in Baskin v. Bogan striking down the same-sex marriage bans in Indiana and Wisconsin, and he publicly questioned his own earlier vote to uphold Indiana’s voter ID law. His biographer, William Domnarski, has said no president ever seriously considered him for the Supreme Court. My guess is that a judge no faction could count on was never going to get that call. I never read him along ideological lines.
Others will write about his economics, his books, and his famous cases. My tribute is narrower: how he handled the immigration agency, and what a working immigration lawyer learned from him.
I read in Posner an old Jewish idea about judging. In the biblical account, the judge came before the king. Deborah sat under a palm tree, and Israel brought its disputes to her. When the people demanded a king, Samuel warned them what royal power would take. The judges were no saints; Samuel’s own sons took bribes and perverted justice, and their corruption helped drive the demand for a king. The point was power. The Torah gives it a concrete test: do not pervert the justice due to the stranger or the fatherless. A person with no standing, no money, and no protector still has a claim on the law.
Posner held to that test through the end of his career. In 2017 he left the Seventh Circuit at 78, two years earlier than he had planned. He said he could not get along with his colleagues over how the court treated litigants without lawyers, people he believed deserved “a better shake.” Chief Judge Diane Wood defended the court’s judges and staff attorneys, so the charge remains his, not a settled finding. After he retired, he helped organize aid for people representing themselves and argued in an appeal that courts must not shut the door on them without a reasoned explanation. He lost that appeal. The principle is the one he had applied to the immigration agency for years.
What happened then
The Board of Immigration Appeals is not a court. The Attorney General created it by regulation in 1940, and it sits inside the Justice Department. In 2002 Attorney General John Ashcroft cut it from 23 authorized seats to 11, let a single member affirm an immigration judge without writing an opinion, and limited its review of a judge’s fact findings to clear error. The cases the Board stopped examining went to the federal courts. EOIR’s own figures showed the share of Board decisions taken to court rising from a historical 5 percent to about 30 percent.
The Seventh Circuit stepped in. In Benslimane v. Gonzales, Posner counted: in the preceding year his court had reversed the Board, in whole or in part, in 40 percent of the cases it decided on the merits. He rejected the idea that judges simply disliked the nation’s immigration policy. Adjudication at the administrative level, he wrote, “has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.” Then he placed the cure inside the executive branch: “[T]he power of correction lies in the Department of Homeland Security, which prosecutes removal cases, and the Department of Justice, which adjudicates them.” He expected the Justice Department to correct itself, and in 2006 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced reforms.
The opinions from those years show what the courts caught. Set them beside what the Board publishes as binding precedent today.
The tilt
In Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, the government argued that state law controlled when it produced an aggravated felony, and federal law controlled when that produced one instead. Posner named the pattern. The Supreme Court agreed with him nine months later in Lopez v. Gonzales.
The Board throws out a Georgia court’s clarification of a sentence in Matter of Boye, denies deference to a state bail ruling in Matter of Choc-Tut, and discounts a California vacatur in Matter of De Jesus-Platon. A state judgment counts when it condemns. It loses force when it helps.
“The only consistency that we can see in the government’s treatment of the meaning of ‘aggravated felony’ is that the alien always loses.”
The expert
In Niam v. Ashcroft, an immigration judge refused to consider a scholar’s affidavit while crediting anonymous State Department reports. Posner held that the spirit of Daubert reaches immigration court.
Matter of A-A-R- treats State Department reports as the best evidence of conditions abroad and faults a judge for relying on an expert witness. Matter of H-L-S-M- reverses a grant of protection built on expert testimony.
The torture claim
In Yi-Tu Lian v. Ashcroft, an immigration judge ignored a stack of torture evidence. Posner wrote that the judge “failed to give the issue a responsible analysis,” then added, “That is to put it mildly.”
In Matter of S-S-, an immigration judge did the analysis, heard an expert, and found that a Haitian man with schizophrenia would likely face torture in Haiti’s prisons. The Board reversed, requiring proof that officials kept those conditions for the specific purpose of inflicting pain. The old failure ignored the evidence. The new rule makes the evidence irrelevant.
The delay
In Benslimane v. Gonzales, Posner refused to let a man “be ground to bits in the bureaucratic mill against the will of Congress.”
Matter of Arevalo-Vargas holds a government appeal for more than six years and then rules that the respondent’s children, now past 21, no longer count. Matter of K-Y-V-R- waits more than six years on a torture claim, then reverses in part because the young man has grown into an able-bodied adult who could relocate.
My case
Posner did not decide cases by rooting for the noncitizen. I know firsthand: he ruled against my client.
I tried Wei Cong Mei’s case in Chicago before Immigration Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, who later became a federal district judge. It came a short time after my father died, and I remember all of it. Mei had come to Chicago as a lawful permanent resident in 1995. At its heart the case was about asylum. His family had lived under China’s one-child policy. The authorities forced his mother to abort two pregnancies and arrested his father, and Mei sought asylum as an opponent of the policy.
The removal charge came out of the traffic code. Mei fled a police officer at 105 miles per hour, and Illinois convicted him of aggravated fleeing under 625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1), which turns fleeing into a felony when the driver goes 21 miles per hour or more over the limit. The court gave him a year. The government used that one-year sentence to charge an aggravated felony and hold him without bond, and it added a charge that he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude.
My argument ran like this. Moral turpitude is the oldest and vaguest test in removal law. Congress wrote it into the immigration laws in 1891 and never defined it. Outside the familiar ground of fraud, theft, and violence, nobody can know in advance what counts; the noncitizen learns the answer when a tribunal announces it. Aggravated fleeing sits in the Illinois Vehicle Code, not the Criminal Code, and its text names no mental state. The only knowing act it requires is pressing the accelerator past a set speed. That makes it an offense against government authority, serious enough to put a man in jail, but not one that is base, vile, or depraved.
The Board, in the bond appeal, agreed that Mei would likely defeat the aggravated felony charge. It still held him on moral turpitude, and in the removal case it found willfulness implicit in the statute and ordered him removed. I worked every angle, and I was trying to slow the case down. The Board noticed. Its order denying reconsideration quoted the Supreme Court’s warning that every delay works to the advantage of a deportable alien who wants to remain here.
The case went to the Seventh Circuit, where Godfrey Muwonge argued it on briefing he and I built together. Posner wrote the opinion in Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004). He held against us: “We conclude, therefore, that aggravated fleeing is indeed a crime involving moral turpitude.” A driver who deliberately flees the police at high speed, he reasoned, knows he is raising the risk of an accident and chooses to defy a lawful order. The asylum claim fell on credibility findings the immigration judge made and the Board adopted. I disagreed then, and I disagree now.
Still, look at how he got there. He thought out loud on the page. He refused to wave the Board through, writing that its definition of moral turpitude merely parroted the standard criminal-law formula: “It is not deploying any insights that it might have obtained from adjudicating immigration cases.” He never got caught up in the fight over Chevron deference. He asked whether the Board deserved deference on which crimes qualify, answered, “We need not decide,” and explained that the Board’s ruling “must be upheld whether great or for that matter no deference is given to its judgment.” He conceded that the line between crimes wrong in themselves and crimes wrong only because a statute says so “turns out to be paper thin.” He said the term itself “may well have outlived its usefulness.” Then he did the analysis himself.
For a lawyer, that kind of opinion is worth more than a win you cannot explain. You can see every step and point to the exact place you part company with the court. You know what to argue the next time. Posner could rule against the alien and still explain why, in terms a losing lawyer could read, understand, and contest. Years later I heard him lecture at a Chicago Bar Association seminar.
The count
The Board has been rebuilt again. A 2025 rule cut it to 15 seats, and the members appointed during the Biden administration were removed. Its published precedents now run one way.
Professor Jason Cade of the University of Georgia catalogued the first 100 precedents the Board and the Attorney General published from January 31, 2025 through April 29, 2026, in the Yale Law Journal Forum. He found 98 against the noncitizen and two narrow procedural wins. I kept counting where he stopped, using his categories. Through November 12, 2026, the Board and the Attorney General published 80 more precedents, and none went to the noncitizen.
180 published precedents in cases between the government and noncitizens (as of November 12, 2026). The noncitizen won two, both on narrow procedural grounds. The Board keeps publishing, so this number will grow. For the current count, with every decision linked, see the record page.
Whether the federal courts step in again is an open question. Since Loper Bright in 2024, judges no longer defer to an agency’s reading of a statute; they decide its meaning themselves, the way Posner did in Mei without waiting for permission. The Supreme Court will hear the detention question and the third-country removal question this term. Those cases will show whether the courts once more demand reasons from the agency.
What he taught me
Posner did not take the government’s side, and he did not take the immigrant’s side. He was no rubber stamp in either direction. He ruled for noncitizens when the agency ignored the evidence, and he ruled against them, as he did in Mei’s case, when he concluded the law required it.
For years I read his asylum opinions as they came down, and they shaped how I practice. Case after case, he sent removal orders back to the agency with the same message: look at the evidence, explain the decision, and meet a minimum standard of justice before you send a person out of the country. He wanted clearer findings and better opinions, and he said so in plain English.
He did the hard work of the job. He read the record. He weighed both sides with an open mind and, I believe, an open heart. He had his inclinations, as every judge does, and he never pretended otherwise. He still let the record and the law decide, and he showed his reasoning so the losing side could follow every step.
When he retired, he said judges should write opinions people can understand and should focus on the right and wrong in every case. That sentence describes his whole method. What mattered to him was the justice of the case in front of him.
He won’t write those opinions now. The rest of us can still read the record, count the outcomes, and demand reasons. I’ll keep the count current on the record page. The justice of the case was his standard, and holding myself to it is the best tribute I can pay him.
This post is legal commentary, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. If you or someone you know faces removal proceedings, consult a licensed immigration attorney about your own case. Law Offices of Michael D. Baker.
