The Judge Who Demanded Reasons: Reflections on Judge Richard Posner, 1939 to 2026

Judge Richard Posner died this week at 87. A month ago I built a long essay, “The Alien Always Loses,” on a single sentence he wrote in 2006. He deserves more from me than a citation.

He graduated from Yale and from Harvard Law School in 1962. He clerked for Justice William Brennan and served as an assistant to Thurgood Marshall. He joined the University of Chicago faculty in 1969, and four years later Economic Analysis of Law founded a field. President Reagan put him on the Seventh Circuit in 1981. He served as chief judge from 1993 to 2000, wrote nearly 3,300 opinions and more than 60 books, and left the bench in 2017.

His politics moved over the decades, and nobody could predict them. He started out clerking for Brennan and working for Marshall, two pillars of the liberal Court. Law and economics then tied him to the conservative legal movement, and a Republican president put him on the bench. Later he wrote the Seventh Circuit opinion in Baskin v. Bogan striking down the same-sex marriage bans in Indiana and Wisconsin, and he publicly questioned his own earlier vote to uphold Indiana’s voter ID law. His biographer, William Domnarski, has said no president ever seriously considered him for the Supreme Court. My guess is that a judge no faction could count on was never going to get that call. I never read him along ideological lines.

Others will write about his economics, his books, and his famous cases. My tribute is narrower: how he handled the immigration agency, and what a working immigration lawyer learned from him.

I read in Posner an old Jewish idea about judging. In the biblical account, the judge came before the king. Deborah sat under a palm tree, and Israel brought its disputes to her. When the people demanded a king, Samuel warned them what royal power would take. The judges were no saints; Samuel’s own sons took bribes and perverted justice, and their corruption helped drive the demand for a king. The point was power. The Torah gives it a concrete test: do not pervert the justice due to the stranger or the fatherless. A person with no standing, no money, and no protector still has a claim on the law.

Posner held to that test through the end of his career. In 2017 he left the Seventh Circuit at 78, two years earlier than he had planned. He said he could not get along with his colleagues over how the court treated litigants without lawyers, people he believed deserved “a better shake.” Chief Judge Diane Wood defended the court’s judges and staff attorneys, so the charge remains his, not a settled finding. After he retired, he helped organize aid for people representing themselves and argued in an appeal that courts must not shut the door on them without a reasoned explanation. He lost that appeal. The principle is the one he had applied to the immigration agency for years.

What happened then

The Board of Immigration Appeals is not a court. The Attorney General created it by regulation in 1940, and it sits inside the Justice Department. In 2002 Attorney General John Ashcroft cut it from 23 authorized seats to 11, let a single member affirm an immigration judge without writing an opinion, and limited its review of a judge’s fact findings to clear error. The cases the Board stopped examining went to the federal courts. EOIR’s own figures showed the share of Board decisions taken to court rising from a historical 5 percent to about 30 percent.

The Seventh Circuit stepped in. In Benslimane v. Gonzales, Posner counted: in the preceding year his court had reversed the Board, in whole or in part, in 40 percent of the cases it decided on the merits. He rejected the idea that judges simply disliked the nation’s immigration policy. Adjudication at the administrative level, he wrote, “has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.” Then he placed the cure inside the executive branch: “[T]he power of correction lies in the Department of Homeland Security, which prosecutes removal cases, and the Department of Justice, which adjudicates them.” He expected the Justice Department to correct itself, and in 2006 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced reforms.

The opinions from those years show what the courts caught. Set them beside what the Board publishes as binding precedent today.

The tilt

What Posner’s court caught

In Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, the government argued that state law controlled when it produced an aggravated felony, and federal law controlled when that produced one instead. Posner named the pattern. The Supreme Court agreed with him nine months later in Lopez v. Gonzales.

What the Board publishes now

The Board throws out a Georgia court’s clarification of a sentence in Matter of Boye, denies deference to a state bail ruling in Matter of Choc-Tut, and discounts a California vacatur in Matter of De Jesus-Platon. A state judgment counts when it condemns. It loses force when it helps.

“The only consistency that we can see in the government’s treatment of the meaning of ‘aggravated felony’ is that the alien always loses.”

The expert

What Posner’s court caught

In Niam v. Ashcroft, an immigration judge refused to consider a scholar’s affidavit while crediting anonymous State Department reports. Posner held that the spirit of Daubert reaches immigration court.

What the Board publishes now

Matter of A-A-R- treats State Department reports as the best evidence of conditions abroad and faults a judge for relying on an expert witness. Matter of H-L-S-M- reverses a grant of protection built on expert testimony.

The torture claim

What Posner’s court caught

In Yi-Tu Lian v. Ashcroft, an immigration judge ignored a stack of torture evidence. Posner wrote that the judge “failed to give the issue a responsible analysis,” then added, “That is to put it mildly.”

What the Board publishes now

In Matter of S-S-, an immigration judge did the analysis, heard an expert, and found that a Haitian man with schizophrenia would likely face torture in Haiti’s prisons. The Board reversed, requiring proof that officials kept those conditions for the specific purpose of inflicting pain. The old failure ignored the evidence. The new rule makes the evidence irrelevant.

The delay

What Posner’s court caught

In Benslimane v. Gonzales, Posner refused to let a man “be ground to bits in the bureaucratic mill against the will of Congress.”

What the Board publishes now

Matter of Arevalo-Vargas holds a government appeal for more than six years and then rules that the respondent’s children, now past 21, no longer count. Matter of K-Y-V-R- waits more than six years on a torture claim, then reverses in part because the young man has grown into an able-bodied adult who could relocate.

My case

Posner did not decide cases by rooting for the noncitizen. I know firsthand: he ruled against my client.

I tried Wei Cong Mei’s case in Chicago before Immigration Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, who later became a federal district judge. It came a short time after my father died, and I remember all of it. Mei had come to Chicago as a lawful permanent resident in 1995. At its heart the case was about asylum. His family had lived under China’s one-child policy. The authorities forced his mother to abort two pregnancies and arrested his father, and Mei sought asylum as an opponent of the policy.

The removal charge came out of the traffic code. Mei fled a police officer at 105 miles per hour, and Illinois convicted him of aggravated fleeing under 625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1), which turns fleeing into a felony when the driver goes 21 miles per hour or more over the limit. The court gave him a year. The government used that one-year sentence to charge an aggravated felony and hold him without bond, and it added a charge that he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude.

My argument ran like this. Moral turpitude is the oldest and vaguest test in removal law. Congress wrote it into the immigration laws in 1891 and never defined it. Outside the familiar ground of fraud, theft, and violence, nobody can know in advance what counts; the noncitizen learns the answer when a tribunal announces it. Aggravated fleeing sits in the Illinois Vehicle Code, not the Criminal Code, and its text names no mental state. The only knowing act it requires is pressing the accelerator past a set speed. That makes it an offense against government authority, serious enough to put a man in jail, but not one that is base, vile, or depraved.

The Board, in the bond appeal, agreed that Mei would likely defeat the aggravated felony charge. It still held him on moral turpitude, and in the removal case it found willfulness implicit in the statute and ordered him removed. I worked every angle, and I was trying to slow the case down. The Board noticed. Its order denying reconsideration quoted the Supreme Court’s warning that every delay works to the advantage of a deportable alien who wants to remain here.

The case went to the Seventh Circuit, where Godfrey Muwonge argued it on briefing he and I built together. Posner wrote the opinion in Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004). He held against us: “We conclude, therefore, that aggravated fleeing is indeed a crime involving moral turpitude.” A driver who deliberately flees the police at high speed, he reasoned, knows he is raising the risk of an accident and chooses to defy a lawful order. The asylum claim fell on credibility findings the immigration judge made and the Board adopted. I disagreed then, and I disagree now.

Still, look at how he got there. He thought out loud on the page. He refused to wave the Board through, writing that its definition of moral turpitude merely parroted the standard criminal-law formula: “It is not deploying any insights that it might have obtained from adjudicating immigration cases.” He never got caught up in the fight over Chevron deference. He asked whether the Board deserved deference on which crimes qualify, answered, “We need not decide,” and explained that the Board’s ruling “must be upheld whether great or for that matter no deference is given to its judgment.” He conceded that the line between crimes wrong in themselves and crimes wrong only because a statute says so “turns out to be paper thin.” He said the term itself “may well have outlived its usefulness.” Then he did the analysis himself.

For a lawyer, that kind of opinion is worth more than a win you cannot explain. You can see every step and point to the exact place you part company with the court. You know what to argue the next time. Posner could rule against the alien and still explain why, in terms a losing lawyer could read, understand, and contest. Years later I heard him lecture at a Chicago Bar Association seminar.

The count

The Board has been rebuilt again. A 2025 rule cut it to 15 seats, and the members appointed during the Biden administration were removed. Its published precedents now run one way.

Professor Jason Cade of the University of Georgia catalogued the first 100 precedents the Board and the Attorney General published from January 31, 2025 through April 29, 2026, in the Yale Law Journal Forum. He found 98 against the noncitizen and two narrow procedural wins. I kept counting where he stopped, using his categories. Through November 12, 2026, the Board and the Attorney General published 80 more precedents, and none went to the noncitizen.

180 published precedents in cases between the government and noncitizens (as of November 12, 2026). The noncitizen won two, both on narrow procedural grounds. The Board keeps publishing, so this number will grow. For the current count, with every decision linked, see the record page.

Whether the federal courts step in again is an open question. Since Loper Bright in 2024, judges no longer defer to an agency’s reading of a statute; they decide its meaning themselves, the way Posner did in Mei without waiting for permission. The Supreme Court will hear the detention question and the third-country removal question this term. Those cases will show whether the courts once more demand reasons from the agency.

What he taught me

Posner did not take the government’s side, and he did not take the immigrant’s side. He was no rubber stamp in either direction. He ruled for noncitizens when the agency ignored the evidence, and he ruled against them, as he did in Mei’s case, when he concluded the law required it.

For years I read his asylum opinions as they came down, and they shaped how I practice. Case after case, he sent removal orders back to the agency with the same message: look at the evidence, explain the decision, and meet a minimum standard of justice before you send a person out of the country. He wanted clearer findings and better opinions, and he said so in plain English.

He did the hard work of the job. He read the record. He weighed both sides with an open mind and, I believe, an open heart. He had his inclinations, as every judge does, and he never pretended otherwise. He still let the record and the law decide, and he showed his reasoning so the losing side could follow every step.

When he retired, he said judges should write opinions people can understand and should focus on the right and wrong in every case. That sentence describes his whole method. What mattered to him was the justice of the case in front of him.

He won’t write those opinions now. The rest of us can still read the record, count the outcomes, and demand reasons. I’ll keep the count current on the record page. The justice of the case was his standard, and holding myself to it is the best tribute I can pay him.

This post is legal commentary, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. If you or someone you know faces removal proceedings, consult a licensed immigration attorney about your own case. Law Offices of Michael D. Baker.

Posted in 7th Circuit, 7th Circuit Cases- Aliens, BIA, Board of Immigration Appeals | Tagged , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Supreme Court Lets the Texas Consent Judgment Stand, and Immigration Judges Lose Administrative Closure

On October 27, 2026, the Supreme Court refused to stay the judgment that erased administrative closure from the immigration regulations. The order in City of Baltimore v. Texas, No. 26A500, runs a single sentence. It gives no reasons and records no dissent. It leaves in force a consent judgment that Texas and the Justice Department asked a federal judge to enter on the day Texas filed suit, and that the judge entered the same day.

The order decides far less than its effect suggests. The Court did not hold the 2024 rule unlawful, and it did not approve the way the rule died. It held only that three cities and a legal aid group could not freeze the judgment while they appeal. The practical consequence is still severe. An immigration judge can no longer rely on the 2024 rule to set a case aside over the government’s objection, and people waiting years for a visa have lost the device that kept them in the country while they waited.

What administrative closure does

Administrative closure takes a removal case off a judge’s active calendar without deciding it. The noncitizen remains here while USCIS adjudicates a U visa, a family petition, or another application the immigration court has no power to decide. Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals used the device for decades under general regulations. In 2024 the Justice Department codified it in Efficient Case and Docket Management in Immigration Proceedings, 89 Fed. Reg. 46,742 (May 29, 2024), which placed the standards at 8 C.F.R. 1003.18(c) for immigration judges and 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(l) for the Board. The same rule wrote termination standards into 8 C.F.R. 1003.18(d) and 1003.1(m).

The device has serious critics, and the government’s brief states their case well. Closed cases rose from about 172,000 in January 2013 to more than 268,000 in January 2017, and the government reports that a closed case stays closed an average of 15 years before an immigration judge and 29 years before the Board. The Sixth Circuit reduced the objection to one sentence: in hundreds of thousands of cases, “administrative closure has amounted to a decision not to apply the Nation’s immigration laws at all.” Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 2020). That objection deserves an answer. The answer is a rule with standards, which the 2024 rule supplied, and not a repeal that no court ever examined.

How the rule died

Texas filed suit on June 22, 2026, in the Wichita Falls Division of the Northern District of Texas, where Chief Judge Reed O’Connor is the only district judge. Its theory rested on 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(1)(A), which provides that at the conclusion of the proceeding the immigration judge “shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United States.” The Justice Department did not contest the complaint. It joined Texas that same day in a motion for a consent judgment, and Judge O’Connor entered final judgment. Texas v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 7:26-cv-00070-O (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2026).

The judgment does three things. It declares that no statute authorizes immigration judges to close cases indefinitely. It vacates the 2024 rule nationwide under 5 U.S.C. 706. And it permanently enjoins the Department from enforcing the rule or promulgating a new one that permits closure “absent an express statutory basis.” In a later opinion, Judge O’Connor described the judgment as vacating the entire Final Rule, which also governed termination, briefing schedules, background checks, and sua sponte reopening.

On August 7, Baltimore, New Haven, Columbus, and Centro Legal de la Raza moved to intervene so that someone could defend the rule on appeal. On August 21, Judge O’Connor denied the motion for lack of standing. He held that the cities’ lost tax revenue depended on a chain of later decisions by judges and enforcement officers, and that Centro Legal’s heavier caseload was no injury under Fifth Circuit precedent. The Fifth Circuit, in No. 26-10794, refused a stay. The Supreme Court has now done the same.

What the order does

The 2024 rule stays vacated while the appeal proceeds. Immigration judges cannot rely on it to close new cases. Cases already closed remain closed until DHS moves to recalendar them.

Question Where it stands
Is the 2024 closure rule in effect? No. Judge O’Connor vacated it on June 22, 2026.
Did the termination standards survive? Probably not. The judgment reaches the whole 2024 rule.
Did the Supreme Court hold the rule unlawful? No. It denied a stay and gave no reasons.
Does the judgment reopen closed cases? No. DHS must file a motion to recalendar each one.
Can a judge still grant a continuance? Yes, for good cause under 8 C.F.R. 1003.29.
Did the judgment overrule Meza Morales? No. A district court cannot overrule the Seventh Circuit.

Green rows favor the noncitizen. Red rows favor the government.

Where the judgment goes wrong

These are my views, strongest first.

  1. No adversary, no adjudication. Federal courts decide disputes. Here the defendant agreed with the plaintiff before any answer was due, and the judge entered judgment the day the complaint arrived. The rule passed through notice and comment, and its repeal passed through nothing. The challengers named the danger: if this works, any agency can shed a regulation by announcing that it will not defend it and consenting to nationwide relief. The next administration can use that tool as easily as this one.
  2. A remedy the government calls unlawful. The Justice Department maintains that the Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize universal vacatur. It agreed to universal vacatur anyway, citing Data Marketing Partnership, LP v. U.S. Department of Labor, 45 F.4th 846 (5th Cir. 2022), and it has asked the Supreme Court to reject that remedy in HHS v. Texas Medical Ass’n, No. 26-491. The Solicitor General conceded that a ruling for the government in that case could expose this judgment to collateral attack.
  3. An injunction aimed at the future. The judgment forbids the Department to write any rule permitting closure without express statutory authority. A future Attorney General who wants closure back must first persuade a court to modify a decree that nobody ever litigated.
  4. Standing that runs one way. Texas claimed injury because immigrants stay. The cities claimed injury because immigrants leave. The courts accepted the first theory without contest and rejected the second. The government answers that standing is not reciprocal, and as doctrine it is right. The asymmetry still shows how a consent judgment can shield itself from review.

The Seventh Circuit and Meza Morales

Yeison Meza Morales came to the United States as a child in 2002. In 2013, as he ran from a group of men, one of them shot him in the ankle. He cooperated with the police and applied for a U visa in 2017. Before USCIS acted, ICE charged him as removable. Appearing without a lawyer, he asked the judge to continue his case or close it. The judge refused closure, holding himself bound by Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), and ordered him removed. USCIS later found him eligible and placed him on the waiting list.

The Seventh Circuit reversed. Meza Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2020). Judge Amy Coney Barrett, now Justice Barrett, wrote for the panel. The court read 8 C.F.R. 1003.10(b), which lets an immigration judge “take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases,” and held that administrative closure is “plainly within an immigration judge’s authority.” The Third and Fourth Circuits agree. Arcos Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2021); Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019). The Sixth Circuit does not. Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d 459.

Meza Morales rests on a regulation. It depends on no statute, and it predates the 2024 rule by four years. The Texas judgment declares that no statute authorizes closure. It says nothing about 1003.10(b), and a district court in Texas has no power to overrule the Seventh Circuit. The Solicitor General also told the Supreme Court that noncitizens denied closure “may be able to collaterally challenge the consent judgment” in their own cases. Nonparties are not bound by a consent decree. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).

The limits

The Attorney General may amend the regulations, and the government tried in 2020 when it added language to 1003.10(b) denying any general closure power. 85 Fed. Reg. 81,588 (Dec. 16, 2020). A federal court in California preliminarily enjoined that rule, Centro Legal de la Raza v. EOIR, 524 F. Supp. 3d 919 (N.D. Cal. 2021), and the 2024 rule rescinded it. Expect the government to argue that vacating the 2024 rule revived the 2020 text. U visa petitioners face a further limit. In Matter of Ibarra-Vega, 29 I&N Dec. 476 (BIA 2026), the Board held closure over DHS objection inappropriate when no U visa is available and none is likely in the reasonably near future.

What changes for motions to recalendar

DHS began filing motions to recalendar closed cases by the thousands in May 2025, as I described last August. Lawyers answered with the eight factors in 8 C.F.R. 1003.18(c) and 1003.1(l), and clients with a pending waiver could seek termination under 1003.18(d). The Texas judgment took all of it. In that post I predicted the 2024 regulations would make closure “more difficult for future administrations to eliminate this discretionary tool.” It took one afternoon in Wichita Falls. Any opposition built on the 2024 text needs rewriting before it is filed.

What survives is older, and in this circuit it is sturdier. Meza Morales found the judge’s authority in 1003.10(b), not in the 2024 rule. The Board then supplied the standard by accident. In Matter of Cahuec Tzalam, 29 I&N Dec. 300 (BIA 2025), decided last November, it wrote that Avetisyan “has been superseded by the regulations.” Seven months later a federal court vacated those regulations, and a rule that no longer exists supersedes nothing. The test Attorney General Garland restored in Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326 (A.G. 2021), governs again. Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), asks the judge to weigh the reason for closure, the basis for the opposition, the likelihood of success on the outside application, the expected length of the closure, each side’s responsibility for delay, and the likely outcome of the case. Most of the analysis survives. Only the regulation that housed it is gone. Expect a fight over even that much: a footnote in Cahuec Tzalam calls Avetisyan vague and invites DHS to argue that closure trespasses on its enforcement authority.

The Board will judge these motions on proof and time. Matter of B-N-K-, 29 I&N Dec. 96 (BIA 2025), made the reason for a case to proceed the primary consideration and demanded a foreseeable end within a reasonably short period. Cahuec Tzalam reversed closure for a young man who filed nothing but a receipt notice and stood five years back in the visa line. Ibarra-Vega did the same for U visa applicants with no visa in sight. Think of Juan Carlos, the hypothetical landscaper in that August post: an approved I-130, a business with six employees, thirteen years of roots. That is the record these decisions demand. A bare receipt notice no longer carries a motion.

The procedural objections never depended on the 2024 rule, and they still hold. DHS still files template motions with no individual facts, defective service, and no attempt to confer. Object to each defect, and ask for more time when service arrives late. Consider strategic non-opposition, too. When a client has accrued ten years of presence under Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021), and has a qualifying relative, recalendaring may open the door to cancellation of removal.

Where closure fails, ask for a continuance in the alternative under 8 C.F.R. 1003.29. In this circuit, prima facie eligibility for a U visa is the most important factor in that decision. Guerra Rocha v. Barr, 951 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2020).

Then build the record for appeal. Get a written decision. Preserve the point that your client was never a party to the Texas case, and quote the government’s own concession that such clients “may be able to collaterally challenge” the judgment. Preserve the universal vacatur objection while No. 26-491 is pending. A denial in Chicago goes to the Seventh Circuit, which has answered the authority question once already.

Where this goes next

The Supreme Court has not blessed what happened in Wichita Falls. It has declined, for now, to stop it. Three roads remain open: the Fifth Circuit appeal on intervention, the universal vacatur question in No. 26-491, and petitions for review brought by the people the judgment actually affects.

My prediction is that the Justice Department will propose a rule, through notice and comment, that forbids closure outright. The injunction bars rules that permit closure and leaves the Department free to write one that prohibits it. That would be the lawful way to end administrative closure. A regulation that took notice and comment to write should take notice and comment to repeal.

This post provides general information, not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney client relationship. If you face removal proceedings, consult a lawyer about your own case.

Posted in Administrative closure, Motion to Recalendar | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The BIA Stops Following the Ninth Circuit: Matter of J-E-D-C- and an Agency That Overrules a Court

On October 19, the Board of Immigration Appeals told immigration judges in the Ninth Circuit to stop following a rule that the Ninth Circuit had reaffirmed forty-five days earlier. The decision is Matter of J-E-D-C-, 30 I&N Dec. 162 (BIA 2026). The rule governs motions to reopen. Since 1982 the Ninth Circuit has required the agency to accept the facts in a sworn affidavit supporting such a motion as true, unless those facts are inherently unbelievable. The Board now says the rule conflicts with two Supreme Court decisions, and it will no longer apply it.

The Board may be right about the rule. It is wrong about who gets to throw it out. An appeals board inside the Justice Department has no power to declare that a federal court of appeals has been overruled, and the Board’s own precedent says so.

The man who expected a second notice

The respondent first came through the Phoenix immigration court as an unaccompanied child. In April 2024, by then an adult, he was personally served with a notice to appear. It listed the date, time, and place of his hearing, and the officer explained it to him in Spanish. He did not appear on October 27, 2025, and the immigration judge ordered him removed in absentia.

Six months later he moved to reopen. His declaration said his conversation with the officer was limited, and that he understood he would “later receive a document with the date of a hearing.” As a child, he said, his hearing notices had always come by mail. His lawyer cited a 2015 Wall Street Journal article about immigration courts “parking” cases on placeholder dates years away. The Board was unmoved by a decade-old newspaper story.

The immigration judge found the declaration inherently unbelievable. The respondent was an adult, the notice was in his hand, and someone had explained it to him in his own language. The Board found no clear error.

That finding should have ended the matter. The Ninth Circuit’s rule gives way when the facts are inherently unbelievable, and the immigration judge made exactly that finding. The respondent loses under the circuit’s rule. The Board had no need to question the rule at all. It chose to.

The rule, and the dissent the Board adopted

The Ninth Circuit adopted the rule in Reyes v. INS (1982). That court reasoned that “common notions of fair play and substantial justice” require the Board to accept an alien’s affidavits as true. Maroufi v. INS (1985) put it more firmly. The court has applied the rule for four decades, including in Perez-Portillo v. Garland, 56 F.4th 788 (9th Cir. 2022), and on September 4, 2026, in Trigueros Quizar v. Blanche.

Trigueros Quizar is a hard case for the rule’s defenders. A man said a flat tire made him miss his hearing. His only exhibit was a receipt for four new tires, dated three weeks later. The panel majority held that the Board erred by holding the missing corroboration against him. Judge Lawrence VanDyke dissented. He called the rule “atextual, illogical,” and in conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Then he made a prediction: “The Supreme Court will someday overturn it.”

The Board did not wait. J-E-D-C- adopts the dissent almost point for point and announces its own rule. Immigration judges and the Board “are not required to accept as true facts set forth by the respondent, even when those statements are not inherently unbelievable.” They may instead test the affidavit against the same credibility standards that apply at a full merits hearing.

The best case for the Board

The Board deserves a fair hearing, and its argument on the merits is not weak.

In INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988), the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a case where that court had used this very standard. The Court wrote that it had “never suggested that all ambiguities in the factual averments must be resolved in the movant’s favor.” It compared a motion to reopen to a motion for a new trial, where the moving party bears “a heavy burden.” In Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021), the Court rejected a different Ninth Circuit presumption, which it called the “deemed-true-or-credible rule,” as one that “cannot be reconciled with the INA’s terms.” The statute itself requires only that a motion to reopen be “supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” It says nothing about presuming those affidavits true.

A careful reader could finish those two opinions convinced the Ninth Circuit’s rule is living on borrowed time. Judge VanDyke is one such reader.

What Abudu decided

Abudu gives the Board less than it claims. The Court listed three grounds on which the Board may deny reopening. The first is that the movant has failed to make a prima facie case for the relief he seeks. On that ground, the Court wrote, “The standard of review of such a denial is not before us today.” It decided the case on another ground entirely: Abudu had never reasonably explained why he passed up asylum the first time.

The Ninth Circuit read Abudu and kept its rule. The Board itself concedes that the circuit cited Abudu and the rule side by side in 1990. Ming Dai addressed something else: how a reviewing court treats the findings of a judge who actually heard testimony. The affidavit rule addresses how the agency treats a sworn paper when nobody testifies. The circuit kept applying that rule after Ming Dai, so it evidently sees a difference.

The Board may think the circuit has read those cases wrong. That is a reason to ask the circuit to go en banc, or to ask the Solicitor General to seek certiorari. It is not proof that the rule has been overruled.

Who decides

The Board concedes the general principle. It follows the law of the circuit where a case arises. The Seventh Circuit described this decades ago as the agency’s “policy of intracircuit acquiescence.” Rosendo-Ramirez v. INS, 32 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 1994).

For its exception, the Board cites a single case, Matter of Jauregui, 15 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 1975). The facts of that case show how narrow the exception is. The Ninth Circuit had reversed the Board and sent the case back. While it sat on remand, the Supreme Court decided Reid v. INS, which changed the governing law. The Board declined to act on the mandate and ordered the respondent deported to Mexico. It also noted that the Ninth Circuit “appears to be in accord” with its reading of Reid. That is an intervening change in the law, and the circuit was already moving the same direction.

J-E-D-C- has no such change. Abudu is thirty-eight years old, and Ming Dai is five. The Ninth Circuit applied its rule after both, and in Trigueros Quizar it spoke to this exact maneuver: “A BIA decision cannot displace our precedent.” The Board quotes that sentence and then does the thing it forbids.

The Board’s own precedent draws the line clearly. In Matter of Chairez, 27 I&N Dec. 21 (BIA 2017), the Board held that it may apply intervening Supreme Court precedent that supersedes circuit law, but it “may not extend the rationale of a Supreme Court decision in the face of contrary precedent from the controlling circuit.” The Board said it was obliged to follow circuit precedent “unless and until it is overruled by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Chairez relied on Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo (BIA 2007), which left it to the circuits to decide whether the Supreme Court had implicitly overruled their precedents. J-E-D-C- cites neither case.

The Board has refused to follow circuit precedent before. In Matter of Diaz and Lopez, 25 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 2010), a Portland case, it declared itself no longer bound by the Ninth Circuit’s reading of section 245(i). It had a legal basis for doing so: Brand X, which let an agency adopt its own reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute over a prior court reading. The en banc Ninth Circuit later deferred in Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012). That doctrine ran on Chevron deference, and Loper Bright ended Chevron in 2024.

Departures have run in the noncitizen’s favor too. In Matter of Marquez Conde, 27 I&N Dec. 251 (BIA 2018), a Fifth Circuit case, the Board refused to follow that court’s rule that a conviction vacated for legal defects still counts, relying again on Brand X. DHS joined the respondent’s brief. In Matter of Anyelo, 25 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 2010), after years of holding back in the Eleventh Circuit, the Board began applying its notice rule there, treating a contrary circuit decision as one that had never considered the Board’s precedent. Every departure, for the alien or against, came with a legal hook. This one has none.

The sharpest rebuke comes from this Board itself. On September 3, in Matter of Diji, 30 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2026), the Board overruled Anyelo and explained why. In 2010, it wrote, the Board “did not have the authority to decline to follow” the Eleventh Circuit, “as it was controlling precedent at that time.” The Board added: “The Board must follow and apply the law of the circuit in all cases arising in that jurisdiction.” Forty-six days later, in J-E-D-C-, it declined to follow the Ninth Circuit.

Year What happened
1975 Jauregui: an intervening Supreme Court case; the Board declines to follow a Ninth Circuit mandate
1982 Reyes: the Ninth Circuit adopts the affidavit rule
1988 Abudu: the Supreme Court reverses the Ninth Circuit on another ground
2004 Joshi: Judge Posner holds that an affidavit of nonreceipt is evidence the judge must weigh
2010 Anyelo: the Board applies its notice rule in the Eleventh Circuit despite a contrary circuit decision
2010 Diaz and Lopez: the Board relies on Brand X to depart from the Ninth Circuit
2017 Chairez: the Board says it may not stretch Supreme Court rationale against circuit law
2018 Marquez Conde: the Board relies on Brand X to depart from the Fifth Circuit, in the noncitizen’s favor
2021 Ming Dai: the Supreme Court rejects a different Ninth Circuit presumption
2022 Perez-Portillo: the Ninth Circuit applies the affidavit rule
Sept. 3, 2026 Diji: the Board says it lacked authority to depart from circuit law in Anyelo
Sept. 4, 2026 Trigueros Quizar: the rule reaffirmed; “A BIA decision cannot displace our precedent”
Oct. 13, 2026 Fajardo-Rivas: the Fourth Circuit vacates a reopening denial for the second time
Oct. 19, 2026 J-E-D-C-: the Board stops following the rule

Six days earlier, in Richmond

On October 13, six days before J-E-D-C-, the Fourth Circuit sent a reopening case back to the Board for the second time. Fajardo-Rivas v. Blanche, No. 25-1280 (4th Cir. Oct. 13, 2026), came from Honduras. In 2015 the petitioner’s brother-in-law, who had openly opposed the 18th Street Gang, was shot dead in the street. A month later four men posing as police officers forced their way into her home at night and took her husband at gunpoint. The family heard nothing more and came to assume he was dead. She fled with her three-year-old daughter. The immigration judge found her credible and denied asylum anyway, for lack of proof that the gang was behind the killings.

Then the threats came. Notes delivered to her mother in Honduras called her a “snitch” and promised to kill her and her daughter. The men who delivered them had 18th Street tattoos on their faces. She moved to reopen. The Board denied the motion in 2022, the Fourth Circuit vacated that order in 2023, and the Board denied it again in 2025, leaning on the judge’s earlier findings about who had committed the crimes. At oral argument the government conceded that the evidence “does suggest that a gang member actually left the notes.”

Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, a Reagan appointee, wrote for a unanimous panel. The Fourth Circuit has nothing like the Ninth Circuit’s rule. It reviews these denials for abuse of discretion, under what Judge Wilkinson called a strict standard, and he said the court would “in no way dilute” it. The Board lost anyway. It had placed “too much weight” on findings made before the threats existed and “too little weight” on the new evidence. In the court’s words, it “disregarded important aspects of the applicant’s claim.”

The two cases make an uncomfortable pair. J-E-D-C- gives immigration judges more room to weigh a sworn statement against the existing record. Fajardo-Rivas shows how the Board can use that room: by measuring new evidence against findings made before the evidence existed, and calling the matter closed. The governing test changes from one circuit to the next. In these two cases, the Board’s answer did not.

What happens now

In the Ninth Circuit, immigration judges now face two conflicting commands: one from the Board that reviews them, one from the court that reviews the Board. A respondent who loses under J-E-D-C- can petition for review. Unless the Ninth Circuit goes en banc or the Supreme Court steps in, Trigueros Quizar says the circuit will apply its own rule. My guess is that the Board wants exactly that fight. The opinion does not say so. But reaching out to decide a question the case did not require is how an agency builds a vehicle for review. Meanwhile, the people caught in the gap get detained and removed before any court sorts it out.

Outside the Ninth Circuit, the second holding is ordinary Board precedent. That includes Chicago. Immigration judges may now weigh a sworn declaration against the record, on paper, under the credibility standards Congress wrote for full hearings. J-E-D-C- is the 167th precedent on my record of the Board’s decisions since January 2025. The count stands at government 165, noncitizens 2. It joins a line of in absentia decisions that make removal orders easier to enter and harder to undo: Diji, Laurent Castro, K-K-U-J-, and M-K-.

In the Seventh Circuit, that may change less than it seems. This court never adopted a deem-true rule. Judge Posner took up the question in Joshi v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2004), a motion to reopen an in absentia order, and he refused both extremes. A sworn affidavit of nonreceipt, he wrote, “is evidence,” and the trier of fact “has to weigh the credibility of the denial.” He was no romantic about it either: “a bare, uncorroborated, self-serving denial of receipt, even if sworn, is weak evidence.” Joshi was about whether a mailed notice arrived, not about exceptional circumstances, but the reasoning carries over. Posner treated the affidavit as evidence the judge must weigh. J-E-D-C- lets the judge discount it under credibility rules written for live testimony. In Chicago the distance between those two positions is short, and corroboration covers most of it. I wrote about Joshi when the Board decided Matter of Diji.

I have clients in this posture right now. Here is what I am doing.

  1. Corroborate the declaration. Get third-party statements, phone logs, medical records, and mail history. The client’s word is now the spine of the motion, not the whole body. Joshi makes the same point.
  2. Answer the record before the judge reads it. J-E-D-C- lost on a notice to appear that was served in person and explained in Spanish. If your file contains a document like that, the declaration has to deal with it head on.
  3. Ask for a hearing when credibility is the real dispute. In the Seventh Circuit, Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2013), held that a new claim “could not be discredited without an evidentiary hearing.” That case involved changed country conditions, so argue it by analogy.
  4. Preserve the textual objection. The credibility provisions the Board borrowed, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) and 1229a(c)(4)(C), govern testimony on applications for relief. They say nothing about affidavits supporting a motion. After Loper Bright, no court owes the Board deference on that question.

The alien still loses

Twenty years ago, Judge Richard Posner looked at the government’s shifting positions and wrote that the only consistency was that the alien always loses. I wrote about that line here. J-E-D-C- adds a new wrinkle. When circuit law stands in the way, the Board now decides for itself that the law has expired.

Judge Wilkinson closed Fajardo-Rivas with a sentence that reads as a verdict on both cases: “Ms. Fajardo-Rivas and her daughter deserve the benefit of a more thorough look.” She got that look from an Article III court, after the Board had turned her away twice.

My view, and I label it as such: an agency that answers to the Attorney General may argue that a court is wrong, and it should make that argument where it belongs, before the Ninth Circuit en banc or the Supreme Court. It may not make itself the court of review. An immigration court independent of the Attorney General might have given Ms. Fajardo-Rivas her thorough look the first time.

Read Matter of J-E-D-C- (PDF)

This post is legal commentary, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. If you are in removal proceedings, talk to a licensed immigration attorney about your own case. Law Offices of Michael D. Baker.

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The Record: Every Board of Immigration Appeals Precedent Since January 2025

This page is the working record behind my essay on the Board of Immigration Appeals. It lists every precedent the Board and the Attorney General have published since January 31, 2025, links each one to the official decision, and marks the ones I analyzed in the week each one issued. It is current through November 12, 2026. I will update it each month.

Jason A. Cade, the J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law, catalogued the first 100 of these decisions in Welcome to the Trump Administration’s Board of Immigration Appeals. The Immigrant Always Loses., published September 25, 2026 in the Yale Law Journal Forum, the online section of the Yale Law Journal. His count stopped at Matter of Orozco Becerra, decided in late April 2026. The Board did not stop. Everything after his cutoff is listed here too.

The count

180precedents published in Volumes 29 and 30, through November 12, 2026
2decided for the noncitizen, both on narrow procedural grounds
80precedents after Cade’s cutoff; none decided for the noncitizen
How to read the count. A precedent is a decision the Board or the Attorney General publishes as binding on every immigration judge and on DHS. The Board publishes only a small share of the appeals it decides; these are the decisions that set the rules. “Against” means the government prevailed on the question the decision answers. “Narrow win” means the noncitizen prevailed on a procedural point without winning relief. “Against, with a limit” means the government prevailed, but the decision also states a rule that helps respondents. A loss for the noncitizen does not mean the Board decided the case wrongly; some of these respondents had serious criminal records or weak claims. The count measures something else: where the Board chose to make law, and in which direction. The total is a defined cohort of substantive precedents. It leaves out attorney-discipline cases, visa-petition decisions, Attorney General referral orders, and an Administrative Appeals Office ruling, all listed at the bottom of this page.
Outcomes for the noncitizen, January 2025 to November 2026
Against178Narrow win2

Cade coded his 100. I coded the 80 that followed from the official headnotes; four of those contain a limited statement favorable to respondents, shown in the tables below. Attorney-discipline and visa-petition decisions are not counted.

Where the precedents fall
Protection3633Detention1513Criminal and fraud1915Hardship31Procedure2718Cade's first 100The 80 that followed
How fast the Board is publishing (precedents per month, approximate)
Volume 272.6Volume 298.2

Volume 27 ran from April 2017 to May 2020 and holds 98 decisions over about 37 months, per EOIR’s own foreword. Volume 29 ran from January 2025 to August 2026 and used 155 decision numbers over about 19 months. Volume 30 opened in September 2026 and has published 34 decisions through November 12.

Who sits on the Board now, by the Attorney General who first appointed each member
Trump era16Bush era2Obama era1

Source: EOIR’s Board roster (updated July 27, 2026), 15 permanent and 4 temporary members. Seventeen of the nineteen biographies list prior service as government immigration counsel, a federal immigration litigator, or a prosecutor. One lists immigrant-side practice.

Then and now: the Seventh Circuit cases

Twenty years ago Judge Richard Posner and his colleagues in Chicago reviewed the Board and found the same failures this record shows. The left column links to the opinions. The right column links to the current precedents that raise the same problem.

Then What the court found Now
Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 441 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2006) The government read “aggravated felony” by state law when that hurt the noncitizen and by federal law when that hurt him. Posner: the only consistency was that the alien always loses. Boye (late state sentence clarification rejected), Choc-Tut (no deference to state bail), De Jesus-Platon (state vacatur discounted)
Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) The Supreme Court resolved the split Posner’s way and recorded that the Board had switched its position in 2002 to the one that removed people. After Loper Bright (2024), courts again decide statutory meaning themselves.
Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2004) An expert from Loyola University Chicago was excluded while anonymous State Department reports got great weight. The spirit of Daubert applies, but a stricter filter than the courts use would be odd. A-A-R-, D-J-L-, G-M-I-, H-L-S-M-
Yi-Tu Lian v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 2004) A CAT claim about Chinese detention camps was denied while a mass of torture evidence went unmentioned. The judge owed the claim a responsible analysis. S-S- and W-F- (Haitian prisons), and the third-country removals at issue in D.V.D., below
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005) The court had reversed the Board in 40 percent of 136 merits cases that year. A marriage-based route to status was defeated by procedure. Posner placed the power of correction in DHS and the Justice Department. Arevalo-Vargas (children aged out during a six-year appeal), Medina Madrid, Pinzon Rozo

How the Board got here

Year Event
1940 The Attorney General creates the Board by regulation. Congress never has. It sits inside the Justice Department.
1996 Congress passes, and President Clinton signs, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. They expand the list of aggravated felonies and apply it to old convictions, require detention for broad classes of people, and abolish the old section 212(c) waiver. My post IIRIRA at 28 traces that history.
1999 Attorney General Janet Reno’s streamlining rule lets a single Board member affirm an immigration judge without an opinion. 64 Fed. Reg. 56135 (Oct. 18, 1999).
2002 Attorney General Ashcroft cuts the Board from 23 authorized seats (19 sitting) to 11, expands single-member affirmances, and limits review of judges’ fact findings to clear error. 67 Fed. Reg. 54878 (Aug. 26, 2002).
2004 to 2006 The Seventh Circuit’s run of remands: Niam, Lian, Benslimane, Gonzales-Gomez. Other circuits say the same.
2006 Attorney General Gonzales announces reform measures for the immigration courts and the Board. The Supreme Court decides Lopez.
2008 The Justice Department’s Inspector General reports that political and ideological affiliations were weighed in hiring immigration judges and Board members.
2018 to 2020 Attorney General certifications reshape protection law: A-B-, L-E-A-, Negusie.
2021 Attorney General Garland vacates A-B- and L-E-A- and stays Negusie. By January 2025 the Board has 28 seats.
2025 The Board is cut to 15 seats (90 Fed. Reg. 15525) and its Biden appointees are removed. Volume 29 begins January 31. The Attorney General restores A-B-, L-E-A-, and Negusie.
2026 Cade’s essay, September 25. The Supreme Court’s D.V.D. order, September 29. Volume 30 begins in September.

In the federal courts

Third-country removals: D.V.D.

A class of people with final removal orders challenged DHS guidance that lets the government deport them to countries never named in their cases without notice or a chance to raise a fear of torture there. The district court ruled for the class. The First Circuit affirmed in substantial part on September 18, 2026 (No. 26-1212). On September 29, the Supreme Court stayed that judgment, granted certiorari, and set argument for December (No. 26-426). The order gives no reasons. Its fourth question presented reads: “Such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate.” For a sharp account of why the order troubles even those who find the merits difficult, see Steve Vladeck’s analysis. My earlier post on these removals is here.

Detention without bond

The Board’s ruling in Yajure Hurtado reaches people arrested in the interior who entered without inspection years or decades ago, whatever their family ties, work history, or record. The circuits have split over the statute it rests on, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026), the Second Circuit held that the statute requires both “applicant for admission” status and present “seeking admission,” so longtime interior residents get bond hearings under § 1226(a). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits side with the Board. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 1, 2026 in Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104. My analysis: Yajure Hurtado and Cunha.

Right to counsel and appellate review

In A-K-R- the Board adopted the dissent in the Fourth Circuit’s Rodriguez-Solis v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 266 (4th Cir. 2026), and applied it everywhere outside that circuit (my analysis). In Amica Center for Immigrant Rights v. EOIR (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2026), the district court vacated the core of the February 2026 appellate rule; EOIR is reissuing it through notice and comment.

The full record

Each decision name links to the official EOIR text. “My post” links to my analysis when I wrote one. Summaries are mine, drawn from the Board’s headnotes; read the decision before relying on it.

After Cade’s cutoff: 80 precedents, newest first

Protection claims (33)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of A-C-V-M-
30 I&N Dec. 236 (BIA 2026) · ID 4274
Asylum grant to a Guatemalan woman harassed and grabbed by men vacated; "Guatemalan women without partners" lacks particularity and social distinction, and an imputed opinion about social conventions with no tie to the government is not a political opinion. D-G-E-A- reaffirmed. Against
Matter of S-N-K-C-
30 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2026) · ID 4269
Asylum grant to a Turkish applicant vacated; amendments filed days before the hearing changed the claim itself, so the credibility finding was clearly erroneous. Asylum, withholding, and CAT denied. Against
Matter of K-Y-V-R-
30 I&N Dec. 203 (BIA 2026) · ID 4268
CAT grant to a Salvadoran who refused gang recruitment as a minor reversed; general country conditions do not show a particularized risk, and he can relocate. Against
Matter of B-S-A-N-
30 I&N Dec. 145 (BIA 2026) · ID 4259
Judges should generally deny asylum, withholding, and CAT to nationals of 40 listed safe countries; EU citizens presumptively ineligible for asylum in discretion. Against
Matter of M-R-I-
30 I&N Dec. 137 (BIA 2026) · ID 4258
Returning home on advance parole abandons asylum, withholding, and CAT protection absent compelling reasons. Against
Matter of G-R-B-
30 I&N Dec. 102 (BIA 2026) · ID 4252
A judge may pretermit asylum without any DHS motion. Against
Matter of V-S-A-
30 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2026) · ID 4244
Redacted declarations from other cases usable for credibility without cross-examination. Against
Matter of S-K-E-
30 I&N Dec. 27 (BIA 2026) · ID 4242
No prejudice shown on service, late filings, or expert scope; CAT denied. Against
Matter of A-E-V-M-
30 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 2026) · ID 4241
Maduro's removal is a change in Venezuelan country conditions; remand. Against
Matter of A-Q-R-K-
29 I&N Dec. 865 (BIA 2026) · ID 4239
Grant of asylum to an Afghan who feared the Taliban reversed on credibility. Against
Matter of H-I-A-H-
29 I&N Dec. 823 (BIA 2026) · ID 4231
Favorable credibility finding remanded; relocation to be reconsidered. Against
Matter of I-U-V-
29 I&N Dec. 816 (BIA 2026) · ID 4229
Harm to minors judged by age and cumulative effect; claim still fails. Against, with a limit
Matter of I-S-M-
29 I&N Dec. 811 (BIA 2026) · ID 4228
Adverse credibility on identity affirmed. Against
Matter of L-F-R-
29 I&N Dec. 787 (BIA 2026) · ID 4224
Unpaid annual asylum fee: asylum pretermitted, but not withholding or CAT. Against, with a limit
Matter of A-G-O-F-
29 I&N Dec. 772 (BIA 2026) · ID 4221
"Brazilian children" not cognizable; protection finding reversed. Against
Matter of H-L-S-M-
29 I&N Dec. 767 (BIA 2026) · ID 4220
CAT grant reversed despite expert testimony on corruption. Against
Matter of N-E-R-S-
29 I&N Dec. 753 (BIA 2026) · ID 4217
DHS need not produce the ACA's implementing instrument. Against
Matter of E-A-R-M-
29 I&N Dec. 746 (BIA 2026) · ID 4216
An oral DHS pretermission motion gives enough notice of third-country removal. Against
Matter of R-A-N-
29 I&N Dec. 739 (BIA 2026) · ID 4215
Russian conscription is not persecution without a protected-ground nexus. Against
Matter of T-D-E-
29 I&N Dec. 732 (BIA 2026) · ID 4213
Candor about past lies cannot alone support a credibility finding. Against
Matter of C-L-R-
29 I&N Dec. 726 (BIA 2026) · ID 4212
Safeguards for an incompetent applicant held adequate; claim denied. Against
Matter of G-L-C-
29 I&N Dec. 717 (BIA 2026) · ID 4210
Pennsylvania drug-delivery conviction particularly serious; CAT denied. Against
Matter of T-A-G-
29 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 2026) · ID 4209
Judge erred in refusing DHS's motion to pretermit over collateral relief. Against
Matter of P-A-C-
29 I&N Dec. 708 (BIA 2026) · ID 4208
A withholding grant can support denying asylum in discretion. Against
Matter of A-C-M-
29 I&N Dec. 703 (BIA 2026) · ID 4207
No evidentiary hearing on the safe-third-country bar absent individualized-risk evidence. Against My post
Matter of Y-H-L-
29 I&N Dec. 698 (BIA 2026) · ID 4206
Corroboration of a forced abortion required; reconsideration denied. Against
Matter of S-E-M-Z-
29 I&N Dec. 680 (BIA 2026) · ID 4203
Social distinction measured countrywide, not by neighborhood. Against
Matter of J-O-A-
29 I&N Dec. 672 (BIA 2026) · ID 4202
Health care fraud is particularly serious; CAT denied. Against
Matter of A-H-D-
29 I&N Dec. 642 (BIA 2026) · ID 4195
Three days' detention with one beating is not persecution. Against
Matter of L-A-D-
29 I&N Dec. 634 (BIA 2026) · ID 4194
A group defined by a schizoaffective diagnosis is not cognizable. Against
Matter of V-A-B-
29 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2026) · ID 4192
"Married Mexican women unable to leave their relationship" not cognizable. Against My post
Matter of C-P-Y-
29 I&N Dec. 610 (BIA 2026) · ID 4191
Serious nonpolitical crime bar measured from the most recent arrival. Against My post
Matter of J-E-L-
29 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 2026) · ID 4190
CAT denied; no clear probability of gang or cartel torture. Against
Detention and bond (13)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of G-M-T-
30 I&N Dec. 228 (BIA 2026) · ID 4273
$15,000 bond vacated and remanded; when DHS disputes a proffer as uncorroborated or offers a competing account, the judge must explain in the bond memo the weight given each account. Unproven claims of tax filings, a citizen child, and a pending withholding and CAT application went unexplained. Against
Matter of Cruz Aijiaco
30 I&N Dec. 218 (BIA 2026) · ID 4271
$8,000 bond vacated; repeatedly driving without a license shows he likely will not obey an order to appear. No clear fixed address and no prima facie cancellation eligibility: no amount of bond suffices. Against
Matter of N-L-U-
30 I&N Dec. 195 (BIA 2026) · ID 4266
Bond grant remanded: the judge skipped marriage viability, the missing I-130, scattered addresses, and the sponsor's means; a pending asylum application alone does not mitigate flight risk. Against
Matter of M-S-V-
30 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 2026) · ID 4257
Bond denied: driving a truck without a valid commercial license shows danger; an uncertain sponsor does not offset flight risk. Against
Matter of Morales Cuxun
30 I&N Dec. 121 (BIA 2026) · ID 4255
Bond denied on DUI history and a recent domestic arrest. Against
Matter of Y-M-B-
30 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2026) · ID 4251
Asylum fraud and an asylum denial establish flight risk. Against
Matter of Kamalov
30 I&N Dec. 34 (BIA 2026) · ID 4243
Judge erred in finding no danger. Against
Matter of W-F-D-
29 I&N Dec. 854 (BIA 2026) · ID 4237
No custody jurisdiction after a final removal order. Against
Matter of A-W-M-K-
29 I&N Dec. 805 (BIA 2026) · ID 4227
Bond denied; a USCIS denial is evidence of flight risk. Against
Matter of A-L-S-
29 I&N Dec. 794 (BIA 2026) · ID 4225
Flight risk includes likely noncompliance with future orders. Against
Matter of Vizcaino Aybar
29 I&N Dec. 736 (BIA 2026) · ID 4214
Bond venue lies with the court covering the place of detention. Against, with a limit
Matter of N-A-G-C-
29 I&N Dec. 662 (BIA 2026) · ID 4200
A former unaccompanied child with approved SIJ still gets no bond hearing. Against My post
Matter of Martinez-Rodriguez
29 I&N Dec. 656 (BIA 2026) · ID 4198
Bond denied on a false-imprisonment conviction and arrests. Against
Criminal history, discretion, and fraud (15)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of Yang
30 I&N Dec. 199 (BIA 2026) · ID 4267
Grant of permanent-resident cancellation reversed; two recent drug convictions and a pending domestic violence arrest outweigh work history, remorse, and family ties. Against
Matter of Mata Rodriguez
30 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 2026) · ID 4265
Grant of permanent-resident cancellation reversed; criminal history, including arrests without convictions, and no objective evidence of rehabilitation outweigh arrival as a child and family ties. Against
Matter of Mercader
30 I&N Dec. 185 (BIA 2026) · ID 4264
South Carolina second-degree assault and battery is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude; recklessness suffices. Termination vacated. Against
Matter of Ozuna Mendoza
30 I&N Dec. 177 (BIA 2026) · ID 4263
Judge's credibility finding reversed; 208 pounds of meth hidden in a returning resident's car give reason to believe she knew. Against
Matter of Cornejo-Aguilar
30 I&N Dec. 105 (BIA 2026) · ID 4253
Permanent-resident cancellation denied in discretion. Against
Matter of Mendez Maldonado
30 I&N Dec. 62 (BIA 2026) · ID 4247
Admitted cocaine use bars adjustment; 1945 and 1957 precedents overruled. Against
Matter of A-V-O-
30 I&N Dec. 44 (BIA 2026) · ID 4245
An aggravated felon is ineligible to citizenship and inadmissible; Kanga overruled. Against My post
Matter of Boye
29 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2026) · ID 4232
A Georgia sentence clarification entered six years later is not valid for immigration purposes. Against
Matter of L-L-R-
29 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2026) · ID 4226
Paying a smuggler to bring one's own child bars good moral character. Against
Matter of Lopez Rico
29 I&N Dec. 780 (BIA 2026) · ID 4223
Taking the Fifth allows adverse inferences; unlawful voting weighs heavily. Against My post
Matter of Y-S-P-T-
29 I&N Dec. 776 (BIA 2026) · ID 4222
Section 212(h) waiver and adjustment denied. Against
Matter of Best
29 I&N Dec. 723 (BIA 2026) · ID 4211
Section 212(h) grant reversed; family hardship not extreme. Against
Matter of Mills
29 I&N Dec. 668 (BIA 2026) · ID 4201
Grant of permanent-resident cancellation reversed for criminal history. Against
Matter of Richards
29 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 2026) · ID 4199
Lack of candor about criminal history weighs heavily against cancellation. Against
Matter of Germain
29 I&N Dec. 648 (BIA 2026) · ID 4196
Cancellation denied; uncharged arrests and minimizing weigh against relief. Against
Hardship (1)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of Lopez-Davila
29 I&N Dec. 763 (BIA 2026) · ID 4219
Leaving a citizen child in others' care is not itself exceptional hardship. Against
Procedure (18)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of Ontiveros-Diaz
30 I&N Dec. 222 (BIA 2026) · ID 4272
Missing a voluntary departure deadline bars cancellation for 10 years; a motion to reopen filed after the deadline with new hardship evidence does not lift the bar. Reopening denied. Against
Matter of Pierre-Louis
30 I&N Dec. 212 (BIA 2026) · ID 4270
No sua sponte reopening for an arriving alien to pursue adjustment before USCIS; Yauri reaffirmed, and the Board declines in discretion even where the Ninth Circuit's Singh lets it reopen. Against
Matter of Chamorro Castillo
30 I&N Dec. 170 (BIA 2026) · ID 4262
Mail returned undeliverable from the only address of record: no further steps required to give notice. Against
Matter of J-E-D-C-
30 I&N Dec. 162 (BIA 2026) · ID 4261
Judges need not accept a reopening affidavit as true; the Ninth Circuit's contrary rule declined under Abudu. Against
Matter of L. Ramirez
30 I&N Dec. 157 (BIA 2026) · ID 4260
No presumption of a continuance for a prima facie approvable U visa petition; Sanchez Sosa overruled, Quintero reaffirmed. Against
Matter of C-M-H-H-
30 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2026) · ID 4256
No retained Board jurisdiction after remand; new decision without a hearing allowed. Against
Matter of M-K-
30 I&N Dec. 84 (BIA 2026) · ID 4250
Reopening denied; due process claim called speculative. Against
Matter of K-K-U-J-
30 I&N Dec. 81 (BIA 2026) · ID 4249
Sua sponte reopening of an in absentia order reversed. Against
Matter of Diji
30 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2026) · ID 4240
Notice to the most recent address suffices; G-Y-R- overruled. Against My post
Matter of R-P-L-
29 I&N Dec. 859 (BIA 2026) · ID 4238
Civil penalty for failing to depart under voluntary departure upheld. Against
Matter of M-M-L-J-
29 I&N Dec. 843 (BIA 2026) · ID 4235
One motion to reopen in total; no tolling of the number bar. Against
Matter of A-K-R-
29 I&N Dec. 839 (BIA 2026) · ID 4234
Only the ten-day floor protects the privilege of counsel; C-B- modified. Against My post
Matter of Delcarmen-Lara
29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) · ID 4233
Travel on advance parole is a departure; Arrabally overruled. Against My post
Matter of Momplaisir
29 I&N Dec. 820 (BIA 2026) · ID 4230
A G-24 certification authenticates the I-213 and I-94. Against
Matter of L-R-M-C- & V-A-M-M-
29 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2026) · ID 4218
Ineffective-assistance reopening requires a bar complaint or explanation. Against
Matter of Herrera-Nunez
29 I&N Dec. 695 (BIA 2026) · ID 4205
Equities gained after a removal order do not warrant sua sponte reopening. Against
Matter of Herrera-Nunez
29 I&N Dec. 691 (BIA 2026) · ID 4204
Ask DHS for a stay before asking the Board. Against
Matter of I-B-M-S-
29 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 2026) · ID 4193
Late venue changes disfavored; judicial neutrality runs to both parties. Against, with a limit

Cade’s first 100, January 2025 to April 2026

Grouped by Cade’s five categories. His appendix gives his own account of each case.

Protection claims (36)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of C-A-R-R-
29 I&N Dec. 13 (BIA 2025) · ID 4087
An I-589 may not be deemed abandoned solely for lack of a declaration; incomplete applications may be. Narrow win
Matter of O-A-R-G-
29 I&N Dec. 30 (BIA 2025) · ID 4090
Former-member social groups narrowed; CAT acquiescence demands more than unable or unwilling. Against
Matter of A-A-R-
29 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 2025) · ID 4091
El Salvador state-of-exception detention not shown to be torture. Against
Matter of M-S-I-
29 I&N Dec. 61 (BIA 2025) · ID 4094
Private violence plus doubt that police will help does not prove CAT acquiescence. Against
Matter of N-N-B-
29 I&N Dec. 79 (BIA 2025) · ID 4098
CAT grant reversed: the judge asked whether torture could occur, not whether it was more likely than not. Against
Matter of C-I-R-H- & H-S-V-R-
29 I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 2025) · ID 4105
Nexus requires more than statistical likelihood or coincidence. Against
Matter of A-A-F-V-
29 I&N Dec. 118 (BIA 2025) · ID 4106
No individualized torture risk in Salvadoran detention for a bisexual deportee with gang tattoos. Against
Matter of E-Z-
29 I&N Dec. 123 (BIA 2025) · ID 4107
CAT grant reversed; predicted harm in Russia called speculative. Against
Matter of S-S-
29 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 2025) · ID 4109
CAT deferral reversed; Haitian prison conditions not shown to be intended as torture. Against
Matter of K-E-S-G-
29 I&N Dec. 145 (BIA 2025) · ID 4111
A social group defined by sex, or sex and nationality, alone is not cognizable. Against
Matter of G-C-I-
29 I&N Dec. 176 (BIA 2025) · ID 4116
Evasive testimony supports adverse credibility; missing corroboration can defeat a claim alone. Against My post
Matter of O-Y-A-E-
29 I&N Dec. 190 (BIA 2025) · ID 4118
Old threats do not establish an individualized risk of torture. Against
Matter of R-E-R-M- & J-D-R-M-
29 I&N Dec. 202 (A.G. 2025) · ID 4121
L-E-A- (2021) overruled; the 2019 restriction on family social groups restored. Against
Matter of S-S-F-M-
29 I&N Dec. 207 (A.G. 2025) · ID 4123
A-B- (2021) overruled, A-B- (2018) restored, A-R-C-G- overruled. Against
Matter of H-A-A-V-
29 I&N Dec. 233 (BIA 2025) · ID 4127
Judges may pretermit protection claims without a full evidentiary hearing. Against My post
Matter of J-A-
29 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 2025) · ID 4130
Uzbek prosecution and detention not shown to mean torture. Against
Matter of L-A-L-T-
29 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 2025) · ID 4133
Perceived membership fails when the underlying group is not cognizable. Against
Matter of Negusie
29 I&N Dec. 285 (A.G. 2025) · ID 4135
No duress exception to the persecutor bar. Against
Matter of C-I-G-M- & L-V-S-G-
29 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 2025) · ID 4137
Safe-third-country bar decided first; respondent carries the burden. Against My post
Matter of K-S-H-
29 I&N Dec. 307 (BIA 2025) · ID 4139
One police report does not show the government unable or unwilling to protect. Against
Matter of W-F-
29 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2025) · ID 4141
CAT grant reversed; Haitian prison reports called anecdotal. Against
Matter of J-C-A-G-
29 I&N Dec. 331 (BIA 2025) · ID 4143
A cartel cooperator did not show a clear probability of torture. Against
Matter of L-A-G-B-
29 I&N Dec. 343 (BIA 2025) · ID 4146
CAT predictions built on a series of suppositions are clearly erroneous. Against
Matter of N-P-A-
29 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2025) · ID 4147
Moldovan activist's fear held not well founded. Against
Matter of L-T-A-
29 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 2025) · ID 4151
A right to live and work indefinitely abroad is firm resettlement. Against
Matter of E-M-F-S-
29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026) · ID 4154
Death threats rarely amount to persecution without immediate ability to act. Against
Matter of D-G-B-L-
29 I&N Dec. 392 (BIA 2026) · ID 4156
No duress exception to the serious nonpolitical crime bar. Against
Matter of S-M-H-
29 I&N Dec. 412 (BIA 2026) · ID 4158
Written warnings on the I-589 suffice for a frivolousness finding. Against
Matter of G-M-I-
29 I&N Dec. 431 (BIA 2026) · ID 4161
Expert opinions resting on anecdotal facts lose weight. Against
Matter of F-B-A-
29 I&N Dec. 456 (BIA 2026) · ID 4165
Relocation finding reversed; children's reporting barriers do not extend to adults. Against
Matter of D-J-L-
29 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2026) · ID 4168
An expert seen as resistant to contrary evidence deserves little weight. Against
Matter of R-B-E-
29 I&N Dec. 499 (BIA 2026) · ID 4170
Changed circumstances rebut the presumption; access-device fraud is particularly serious. Against
Matter of Z-R-C-N-
29 I&N Dec. 523 (BIA 2026) · ID 4175
No ineffective-assistance claim against a non-lawyer; daughters' approved SIJ too speculative. Against
Matter of D-G-E-A- & N-G-G-E-
29 I&N Dec. 570 (BIA 2026) · ID 4183
Opposition to gangs is not a political opinion. Against
Matter of R-A-U-
29 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 2026) · ID 4184
Judge clearly erred in finding the applicant credible. Against
Matter of E-N-N-
29 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2026) · ID 4185
Credibility and pattern-or-practice findings reversed. Against My post
Detention and bond (15)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of Choc-Tut
29 I&N Dec. 48 (BIA 2025) · ID 4092
No deference owed to a state court's custody or bail order. Against
Matter of Q. Li
29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025) · ID 4095
Warrantless arrest on arrival means § 235(b) detention and no bond. Against
Matter of Beltrand-Rodriguez
29 I&N Dec. 76 (BIA 2025) · ID 4097
Bond denied as a danger to the community. Against
Matter of E-Y-F-G-
29 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2025) · ID 4102
A withholding grant pending on appeal does not require release on bond. Against
Matter of C-M-M-
29 I&N Dec. 141 (BIA 2025) · ID 4110
Immigration violation history shows a flight risk no bond can cure. Against
Matter of Akhmedov
29 I&N Dec. 166 (BIA 2025) · ID 4113
Address discrepancies and late address filings show flight risk. Against
Matter of Salas Pena
29 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2025) · ID 4115
A recent trafficking arrest, without conviction, shows danger. Against
Matter of Dobrotvorskii
29 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 2025) · ID 4124
A sponsor is relevant to flight risk; judges weigh all evidence on custody. Against
Matter of Yajure Hurtado
29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) · ID 4125
No bond jurisdiction for anyone present without admission. Against My post
Matter of Cotrufo
29 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 2025) · ID 4132
Recent sexual-offense convictions show danger. Against
Matter of Dubon Miranda
29 I&N Dec. 335 (BIA 2025) · ID 4144
Bond denied; danger not disproved. Against
Matter of Rodriguez Pena
29 I&N Dec. 358 (BIA 2025) · ID 4150
Judge erred in finding no danger. Against
Matter of Ghanbari
29 I&N Dec. 376 (BIA 2025) · ID 4153
Teenage leafleting counted as material support; mandatory detention. Against
Matter of Z-N-L-
29 I&N Dec. 511 (BIA 2026) · ID 4172
Residence discrepancy shows flight risk. Against
Matter of Shentu
29 I&N Dec. 595 (BIA 2026) · ID 4188
An FBI letterhead memorandum gets significant weight in bond. Against
Criminal history, discretion, and fraud (19)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of Baeza-Galindo
29 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2025) · ID 4085
Closeness in time alone does not make two moral-turpitude crimes a single scheme. Against
Matter of De Jesus-Platon
29 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 2025) · ID 4086
California § 1473.7 vacatur not shown to rest on a legal defect; remand denied. Against
Matter of Dor
29 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 2025) · ID 4088
Drug-schedule comparison runs at the time of conviction, not the time of removal. Against
Matter of Bain
29 I&N Dec. 72 (BIA 2025) · ID 4096
Cancellation denied in discretion for recent, repeated crimes. Against
Matter of Mayorga Ipina
29 I&N Dec. 110 (BIA 2025) · ID 4104
Virginia indecent exposure is a crime involving moral turpitude. Against
Matter of Gonzalez Jimenez
29 I&N Dec. 129 (BIA 2025) · ID 4108
False Social Security numbers and tax filings weigh against discretion. Against
Matter of Felix-Figueroa
29 I&N Dec. 157 (BIA 2025) · ID 4112
Respondent bears the realistic-probability burden on a drug-isomer mismatch. Against
Matter of Garcia-Flores
29 I&N Dec. 230 (BIA 2025) · ID 4126
Judge exceeded authority by effectively finding the respondent innocent. Against
Matter of McDonald
29 I&N Dec. 249 (BIA 2025) · ID 4129
Discretion denied for child-endangerment convictions. Against
Matter of Frias Ulloa
29 I&N Dec. 259 (BIA 2025) · ID 4131
New Jersey drug statute divisible; fentanyl conviction counts. Against
Matter of Jimenez-Ayala
29 I&N Dec. 325 (BIA 2025) · ID 4142
Cancellation denied for drug use and children's exposure. Against
Matter of Kim
29 I&N Dec. 339 (BIA 2025) · ID 4145
Cancellation grant reversed; remorse and prison rehabilitation insufficient. Against
Matter of Lema Mizhirumbay
29 I&N Dec. 351 (BIA 2025) · ID 4148
Safety violations causing two deaths weigh against cancellation. Against
Matter of Palma-Olvera
29 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2025) · ID 4149
Two DWIs; good moral character presumption not overcome. Against
Matter of M-C-C-
29 I&N Dec. 401 (BIA 2026) · ID 4157
Omitting Bosnian War service was material; fraud waiver denied. Against
Matter of E-A-S-O-
29 I&N Dec. 422 (BIA 2026) · ID 4160
Juarez overruled: no presumption that a single misdemeanor is not particularly serious. Against
Matter of Forjoe
29 I&N Dec. 463 (BIA 2026) · ID 4166
Agour overruled: fraud at adjustment cannot be waived under § 237(a)(1)(H). Against
Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo
29 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 2026) · ID 4178
California accessory conviction is an obstruction-of-justice aggravated felony. Against
Matter of M-K-
29 I&N Dec. 556 (BIA 2026) · ID 4182
Secretary of State letter suffices for removability; misrepresentation found; waiver denied. Against
Hardship (3)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of Buri Mora
29 I&N Dec. 186 (BIA 2025) · ID 4117
No exceptional hardship though the children have disabilities and will remain in the U.S. Against
Matter of Arevalo-Vargas
29 I&N Dec. 519 (BIA 2026) · ID 4174
Children aged out while the government's appeal sat for over six years; hardship also rejected. Against
Matter of Pelagio Mendoza
29 I&N Dec. 542 (BIA 2026) · ID 4179
Testimony on mental health generally insufficient when expert proof could be produced. Against
Procedure (27)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of Iskandarani
29 I&N Dec. 26 (BIA 2025) · ID 4089
The 30-day appeal clock runs from the oral decision, not a later memorandum. Against
Matter of F-B-G-M- & J-E-M-G-
29 I&N Dec. 52 (BIA 2025) · ID 4093
Email notice of a briefing schedule through ECAS is sufficient notice. Against
Matter of D-E-B-
29 I&N Dec. 83 (BIA 2025) · ID 4099
A supplement raising new claims counts as a separate motion to reopen. Against
Matter of Lopez-Ticas
29 I&N Dec. 90 (BIA 2025) · ID 4100
A defective notice to appear does not justify withdrawing pleadings. Against
Matter of B-N-K-
29 I&N Dec. 96 (BIA 2025) · ID 4101
Administrative closure: resolving the merits comes first; pending TPS generally not enough. Against
Matter of Roque-Izada
29 I&N Dec. 106 (BIA 2025) · ID 4103
No termination to pursue Cuban Adjustment Act relief on speculative parole. Against
Matter of Garcia Martinez
29 I&N Dec. 169 (BIA 2025) · ID 4114
A non-detained respondent with private counsel is presumed able to pay filing fees. Against
Matter of J-A-F-S-
29 I&N Dec. 195 (BIA 2025) · ID 4119
No continuance for speculative eligibility for new relief. Against
Matter of J-H-M-H-
29 I&N Dec. 278 (BIA 2025) · ID 4134
Judges are not bound by party stipulations, including a DHS concession on CAT. Against
Matter of J-A-N-M-
29 I&N Dec. 287 (BIA 2025) · ID 4136
No discretionary termination of withholding-only proceedings. Against
Matter of Cahuec Tzalam
29 I&N Dec. 300 (BIA 2025) · ID 4138
No administrative closure for a SIJ case facing visa delay. Against
Matter of B-S-H-
29 I&N Dec. 313 (BIA 2025) · ID 4140
The VAWA reopening waiver reaches time limits, not number limits. Against
Matter of Tepec-Garcia
29 I&N Dec. 371 (BIA 2025) · ID 4152
Termination without prejudice allowed when neither side appears and DHS offers no proof. Narrow win
Matter of Laparra-DeLeon
29 I&N Dec. 389 (BIA 2026) · ID 4155
Laparra reinstated in the First Circuit; in absentia orders on a compliant hearing notice. Against
Matter of Laurent Castro
29 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 2026) · ID 4159
Judge must order removal in absentia rather than continue. Against
Matter of Yadav
29 I&N Dec. 438 (BIA 2026) · ID 4162
Marriage to a citizen after a removal order does not warrant sua sponte reopening. Against
Matter of L-S-C-R-
29 I&N Dec. 451 (BIA 2026) · ID 4164
Background-check remands are limited; new relief needs a new motion and fee. Against
Matter of Ibarra-Vega
29 I&N Dec. 476 (BIA 2026) · ID 4167
No administrative closure for a U visa not available in the near future. Against
Matter of Pinzon Rozo
29 I&N Dec. 507 (BIA 2026) · ID 4171
No continuance for an approved SIJ petitioner waiting on a visa. Against
Matter of Medina Madrid
29 I&N Dec. 514 (BIA 2026) · ID 4173
Thirteen years of closure ended; a provisional waiver plan is not enough. Against
Matter of Mercado-Martinez
29 I&N Dec. 529 (BIA 2026) · ID 4176
To reject an I-213 the judge must cite specific contrary evidence. Against
Matter of Lopez-Orellana
29 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 2026) · ID 4177
Notice-to-appear objection forfeited if not raised; proceed in absentia. Against
Matter of Bolivar-Bolivar
29 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2026) · ID 4180
Neither side appears but alienage evidence is filed: proceed in absentia. Against
Matter of A-M-Z-F-
29 I&N Dec. 551 (BIA 2026) · ID 4181
No right to a closing argument absent a due process violation. Against
Matter of Santiago-Santiago
29 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 2026) · ID 4186
DACA alone does not support termination over DHS opposition. Against My post
Matter of Arana Castillo
29 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 2026) · ID 4187
Take pleadings when DHS counsel is absent; no termination. Against
Matter of Orozco Becerra
29 I&N Dec. 600 (BIA 2026) · ID 4189
Children who miss a hearing: no closure; proceed in absentia. Against
Published but not counted (4)
Decision What it holds Result for the noncitizen Analysis
Matter of Nwagwu
29 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 2026) · ID 4197
Visa petition approval revoked for prior marriage fraud. Not counted
Matter of Jones
29 I&N Dec. 850 (BIA 2026) · ID 4236
Attorney discipline. Not counted
Matter of Cuber
30 I&N Dec. 59 (BIA 2026) · ID 4246
Attorney discipline. Not counted
Matter of Sethi
30 I&N Dec. 112 (BIA 2026) · ID 4254
Attorney discipline (AI-fabricated citations). Not counted

Also published in Volume 29 and excluded from Cade’s count: two Attorney General referral orders (29 I&N Dec. 201 and 206), an attorney-discipline case (Landers), a visa-petition remand (Jin), and an Administrative Appeals Office decision (Texperts). Interim Decision 4248 does not appear on EOIR’s Volume 30 index.

Method

Cade defines his cohort as the substantive precedents published from January 31, 2025 to April 29, 2026, and codes 98 against the noncitizen and two narrow procedural wins. I follow his five categories for every later decision. “Against” means the holding resolves the question presented against the noncitizen; a remand that sends a favorable ruling back for more scrutiny counts as “Against.” Where a holding also states a rule that helps respondents, it is marked “Against, with a limit.” Counts of Board members come from EOIR’s published biographies.

Updates

November 12, 2026. Added Matter of A-C-V-M-, 30 I&N Dec. 236 (protection). It went against the noncitizen. Count now 180 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

November 10, 2026. Added Matter of Ontiveros-Diaz, 30 I&N Dec. 222 (procedure), and Matter of G-M-T-, 30 I&N Dec. 228 (detention). Both went against the noncitizen. Count now 179 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

November 2, 2026. Added Matter of Cruz Aijiaco, 30 I&N Dec. 218 (detention). It went against the noncitizen. Count now 177 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

October 30, 2026. Added Matter of Pierre-Louis, 30 I&N Dec. 212 (procedure). It went against the noncitizen. Count now 176 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

October 29, 2026. Added Matter of Yang, 30 I&N Dec. 199 (criminal history), Matter of K-Y-V-R-, 30 I&N Dec. 203 (protection), and Matter of S-N-K-C-, 30 I&N Dec. 207 (protection). All three went against the noncitizen. Count now 175 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

October 28, 2026. Added Matter of Mercader, 30 I&N Dec. 185 (criminal history), Matter of Mata Rodriguez, 30 I&N Dec. 191 (criminal history), and Matter of N-L-U-, 30 I&N Dec. 195 (detention). All three went against the noncitizen. Count now 172 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

October 26, 2026. Added Matter of Chamorro Castillo, 30 I&N Dec. 170 (procedure), and Matter of Ozuna Mendoza, 30 I&N Dec. 177 (criminal history). Both went against the noncitizen. Count now 169 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

October 19, 2026. Added Matter of J-E-D-C-, 30 I&N Dec. 162 (procedure). It went against the noncitizen. Count now 167 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

October 16, 2026. Added Matter of L. Ramirez, 30 I&N Dec. 157 (procedure). It went against the noncitizen. Count now 166 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

October 9, 2026. Added Matter of B-S-A-N-, 30 I&N Dec. 145 (protection). It went against the noncitizen. Count now 165 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

October 7, 2026. Added Matter of M-S-V-, 30 I&N Dec. 130 (detention), and Matter of M-R-I-, 30 I&N Dec. 137 (protection). Both went against the noncitizen. Count now 164 precedents, 2 narrow wins.

October 4, 2026. Page published. Volumes 29 and 30 current through 30 I&N Dec. 124 (Interim Decision 4256).

This page is legal commentary and a research reference, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Immigration law changes quickly. If you are in removal proceedings, consult a licensed immigration attorney about your own case. Law Offices of Michael D. Baker.

Posted in 7th Circuit, 7th Circuit Cases- Aliens, Asylum, BIA, Board of Immigration Appeals | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Trump Cut Legal Immigration 2.7 Times More Than Illegal Immigration. Now the Bill Comes Due

The administration claims to target illegal immigration, yet its own data show far deeper cuts to legal immigration.

David J. Bier of the Cato Institute ran the count through February 2026, comparing a recent month with a month before the policy changes. Legal entries in the major categories dropped by about 144,569, while illegal entries dropped by about 53,128. That works out to 2.7 legal entries cut for every illegal one. Nearly three of every four entries this administration eliminated came through a legal door.

Bier predicted this outcome in January 2025, and this is his second hard look at the government’s numbers. In August 2025 I summarized his first, a four part series titled Biden Didn’t Cause the Border Crisis. It showed that the surge began before Biden took office and had started to fade before he left. Enforcement never went slack, with removals and expulsions passing 3.3 million, yet migration climbed anyway, pulled by 12 million job openings and pushed by a system that offered no legal path. That series asked who caused the surge. This one asks who paid for the crackdown.

Bier directs immigration studies at Cato, a libertarian think tank, and he favors more legal immigration. He says so openly. He also carries water for neither party: in 2024 he criticized President Biden’s asylum order, and in his newest post he corrects his own April estimates in public. A partisan buries his misses. Bier publishes them. His figures come from the State Department, Customs and Border Protection, and the Department of Homeland Security, which is to say the government’s own books.

The ledger

For every illegal entry cut, 2.7 legal entries were cut

Legal entries144,569Illegal entries53,128

Drop in monthly entries, recent month compared with a month before the policy changes. Major legal categories only. Source: David J. Bier, Cato Institute, October 8, 2026, compiling State Department, CBP, and DHS data.

If anything, the ratio is conservative. Bier counts every Border Patrol arrest on the illegal side, including people expelled within hours, and he counts only the major legal categories. Add the rest, and the gap widens. Some baselines differ by category, which deserves a footnote, not a dismissal.

The border was already closing

Illegal crossings did not collapse on January 20, 2025. Monthly Border Patrol arrests at the southwest border fell 81 percent between the December 2023 peak and December 2024. Of the total drop from that peak through August 2026, 84 percent came under Biden. Releases tell the same story, with 96 percent of their decline coming before Trump took office.

Most of the border decline happened before Trump took office

Border arrests84%16%Border releases96%4%Under BidenUnder Trump

Share of the total decline from each peak, through August 2026. Source: Bier, Cato Institute, from CBP data.

The administration credits its asylum ban. Bier’s amicus brief answers that unaccompanied children, the one group exempt from the ban, dropped just as fast as everyone else.

The cuts landed on people who used the front door

How far each legal pathway dropped

Asylum at ports99.9%Refugeesabout 90%H-1B and H-478%K visas61%Immigrant visasabout 50%Students42%

Percent decline in monthly entries or visa issuances. Baselines vary by category (December 2024 or February 2024). K visas cover fiancés and spouses of U.S. citizens. Source: Bier, Cato Institute.

Asylum seekers who presented themselves at ports of entry, the lawful route, sank from almost 40,000 in December 2024 to 26 in February 2026. The Supreme Court upheld that closure in June 2026. Refugee arrivals went from 12,518 a month to 1,341.

Asylum seekers admitted at ports in one month, drawn to scale

Dec 2024: almost 40,000Feb 2026: 26(this dot)

Areas are proportional. Source: Bier, Cato Institute, from CBP data. The August 2026 figure was 31.

K visas for the fiancés and spouses of U.S. citizens dropped 61 percent between February 2024 and February 2026. Immigrant visas fell by about half after bans reached nationals of 92 countries. In August 2026 a federal judge in Manhattan set aside the 75 country pause. Four days later the State Department paused immigrant visa appointments worldwide, citing staff training, and named no date to resume. A $100,000 fee helped push H-1B and H-4 visas down 78 percent. Student visas declined 42 percent.

Spouses of Americans. Refugees screened overseas before they ever board a plane. Students admitted by American universities. Engineers recruited by American companies. None of them crossed a river at night.

Bier states the conclusion without decoration. The agenda, he writes, is “a broader assault on all types of immigration.”

The third rail

Immigration is not one issue. It is at least eight, and each carries its own body of law, its own data, and its own lobby.

Family unityWhich relatives may join a citizen, and how long must they wait?
Asylum and refugeesWho gets protection from persecution?
EmployersWho fills the jobs Americans leave open?
Labor and wagesWho competes for those jobs, and at what pay?
National securityWho gets screened out at the gate?
CrimeWho gets removed after a conviction?
Culture and identityWho belongs here?
Taxes and benefitsWho pays in, and who draws out?

Every square has a real constituency and a real argument, which is why the subject divides and conquers so easily. A politician picks one square, stands on it, and ignores the other seven. Nobody argues about the whole board.

The lines run through both parties, not between them. Republicans split between employers who want workers and a restrictionist base that wants fewer newcomers. Democrats split between immigrant advocates and a labor movement that opposed legalization until the AFL-CIO reversed course in 2000. Each party has its doves and its hawks, and reform bills die in the crossfire between them.

The hawkish strand is old. It stretches from the Know Nothings of the 1850s through the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the national origins quotas that lasted from 1924 to 1965. It surfaced again after 2008, when birther claims about Obama, which Trump promoted beginning in 2011, ran alongside the Tea Party revolt.

Rahm Emanuel understood this. As a Chicago congressman in 2007, he warned fellow Democrats that immigration had become the “third rail of American politics.”

Obama tried another route, enforcing hard while he pressed Congress for reform. The toughness bought him nothing. In December 2010 the DREAM Act fell five votes short of the 60 it needed in the Senate, with a few Democrats voting no and a few Republicans voting yes. The Senate passed a comprehensive bill in 2013, and the House never voted on it. By March 2014, Janet Murguía of the National Council of La Raza called him the “deporter in chief.”

Republicans learned the same lesson in June 2014. Eric Cantor, the House majority leader, lost his primary to Dave Brat, an economics professor who attacked him as soft on illegal immigration. Immigration was not Cantor’s only problem, but it was Brat’s loudest charge. No majority leader had lost a primary since the post was created in 1899. Whatever appetite House Republicans had left for reform died with Cantor’s career.

Emanuel’s warning has held in both parties for everyone who ignored it.

Trump grabbed it

Trump grabbed the rail anyway and kept his grip. He picked the squares most likely to frighten, crime and security. In March 2025 he invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 against Venezuelans he tied to the Tren de Aragua gang and called their presence an “invasion.” A Fifth Circuit panel found no invasion, and in August 2026 the court dismissed the case after the government deported the plaintiffs under other laws. The legal theory fizzled, but the word did its job anyway.

So did the word illegal. It let voters believe the target was the person who skipped the line.

Bier’s data show the target was the line itself.

Voters have started to notice. A Fox News poll in September put Trump’s immigration approval at 43 percent, down from 48 percent the summer before. An AP-NORC poll this summer found about half of Americans believe he has gone too far in restricting legal immigration.

He still holds the border. An NBC News poll this spring found 53 percent approved of his handling of border security, while 54 percent disapproved of his handling of immigration. Voters already treat the border and immigration as separate questions, a distinction the administration refuses to make.

When Congress worked

I learned immigration law from Stephen Legomsky at Washington University School of Law in the late 1980s. He wrote the casebook that law schools across the country still assign. He later served as chief counsel of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. In his class we studied the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 while the law was brand new.

IRCA was a trade. Employers accepted sanctions for hiring unauthorized workers, and in return about 2.7 million people gained legal status. Republican senator Alan Simpson carried the bill with House Democrats Romano Mazzoli and Peter Rodino, and Ronald Reagan signed it. In 2007 I posted the government’s own legalization manual on this blog.

The law left a hole: it legalized workers but not their spouses and children. Reagan’s immigration service patched part of it by executive action in 1987, and in February 1990 George H. W. Bush’s administration widened the fix to reach the rest. Congress then wrote it into the Immigration Act of 1990 as the Family Unity program, and Bush signed it.

Congress came back once more. The immigration service had read the legalization rules too narrowly, and lawsuits dragged on for years. In December 2000 Bill Clinton signed the LIFE Act, which let roughly 200,000 people caught in that litigation finally apply.

That is how government should work. Congress passed a law and the president signed it. When it fell short, the next president adjusted it and Congress made the fix permanent. When the courts found more gaps, Congress closed them. Republican presidents started the repair with Democrats at their side, and a Democratic president finished it. I cannot picture today’s Republican Party doing the same.

IRCA still failed in one crucial way: it made no room for future workers or waiting families. The Migration Policy Institute calls that its fatal flaw, and Legomsky told a House subcommittee the same thing in 2007. He named the largest gap as “the failure to update the criteria for legal immigration.” No mix of sanctions and legalization, he testified, would dent illegal immigration while the legal rules gave so many people reason to break them. The unauthorized population tripled.

The 1990 Act was the last time Congress set the overall legal numbers, and it has not reset them since. So the real question remains open. How many people should the country admit each year, in which categories, and on what terms? Nobody in power is asking it. Each side stands on its own square instead.

Bier’s ledger shows what happens when a president answers that question by proclamation, fee, and consular suspension. The legal number falls faster and farther than the illegal one. Nobody voted on it.

The lesson I took from his classroom has held for nearly four decades: numbers this large defeat enforcement alone. A country that wants control needs a rational system of legal immigration, with doors sized to real demand. Shut the doors, and people climb the walls. Open them with care, and the border quiets.

Walls do not hold against that pull. The Berlin Wall fell, and North Korea stays sealed and stays poor. Those walls trapped citizens while ours aims to bar newcomers, but both fight the pull of markets, and markets win. Franco’s Spain learned that in 1959, when it abandoned two decades of economic self-sufficiency and opened to trade. Money and goods cross borders every second, and people follow them. That is globalization too.

None of this means open borders. American politics keeps offering a false choice between shutting it all down and opening every gate, and no serious person proposes either. The real work lies in the middle, in numbers, categories, and tradeoffs. That work bores voters. Fear never does.

Fear wins because a prohibition is easy to grasp. Eight of the Ten Commandments forbid something, and a wall is a commandment in concrete. A rational visa system takes a chart to explain.

The bill comes due

The Congressional Budget Office, Congress’s nonpartisan scorekeeper, estimated in February that the administration’s actions to reduce immigration will add about $500 billion to deficits over ten years. Fewer workers mean fewer taxpayers.

Net international migration to the United States

2.7 million20241.3 million2025about 321,0002026 (projected)

Years run to July 1. The 2026 figure is the Census Bureau’s projection if trends continue. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, January 2026.

Economists writing jointly for Brookings and the conservative American Enterprise Institute found that net migration turned negative in 2025, the first time in at least half a century. They warned that job growth could turn negative in 2026. When the labor force stops growing, the economy loses the hands it needs.

These costs are real, and almost nobody hears them. A deficit projection never shows up on a receipt, and a nurse who never arrived sends no bill. A citizen whose wife waits abroad suffers in one household at a time.

The Iran war’s costs are loud. Gasoline averaged $4.36 a gallon in early October, never this high at this time of year, according to AAA. A Brown University tracker estimates the war has pushed gasoline $1.37 and diesel $2.60 a gallon above where they would otherwise sit. Every driver reads that number every week. In recent polling, voters rated Trump’s handling of gas prices worse than any other issue.

So the immigration cuts will not sink him by themselves. Voters punish what they can feel. But the damage compounds underneath the gas price, adding weight nobody sees until the bill arrives.

The best case on the other side

The restrictionist argument deserves a fair hearing. Fewer newcomers can mean less competition for lower wage jobs and less pressure on housing. CBO itself says immigration raises total output but not necessarily output per person. A country can grow larger without each citizen growing richer.

That argument has force at the border. It has little force against this ledger. The cuts fell hardest on the spouses of citizens, refugees, students, and specialty workers recruited by American employers. A citizen’s wife undercuts nobody’s wage. And the deficit figure comes from CBO, not from Cato.

If your family is waiting abroadThe rules shifted twice in August, so assume nothing. The 75 country issuance pause no longer applies, but immigrant visa interviews remain on hold worldwide, and the separate country ban may still reach your relative. A fiancé visa runs through a different consular line than an immigrant visa, and marrying abroad first can close that option. Keep every notice, receipt, and consular email. Talk to counsel before you marry, travel, or change petitions.

Where this goes

Bier’s count settles one question. This administration draws no line between the person who skipped the queue and the person who waited in it.

Three things will decide what comes next. The first is the courts, where a district court has struck down the original H-1B fee and the Supreme Court has upheld the asylum closure at the ports. The second is the midterms, where gas prices top the list of voter grievances. The third is the next release of State Department data. When it arrives, I expect the ratio to hold or widen.

This post is general information, not legal advice. Every case turns on its own facts. For advice about your situation, contact the Law Offices of Michael D. Baker at 312-714-2800. Chart data from David J. Bier, Cato Institute, unless noted; charts drawn for this post.

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