When Federal Immigration Enforcement Collides with State Judicial Authority

The cases of Milwaukee County Judge Hannah Dugan and Massachusetts Judge Shelley Joseph represent a modern chapter in America’s oldest constitutional tension: federal enforcement power versus state judicial autonomy.

In 2018, during the Trump administration, Judge Joseph was charged with conspiracy and obstruction for allegedly helping an undocumented immigrant exit through her courthouse’s back door to avoid ICE agents. After a year-long investigation and her suspension without pay, the case dragged on for years. When the Biden administration took office, federal prosecutors ultimately dropped the charges, transferring the matter to the Massachusetts Judicial Conduct Commission.

Fast forward to 2025, and Judge Dugan faces similar charges after allegedly directing a defendant and attorney through an alternate courthouse exit. Unlike Joseph’s case, Dugan was swiftly arrested in her courthouse – handcuffed and photographed – a deliberate spectacle meant to send a message rather than simply enforce the law.

Before 2018, the notion of federal agents slapping cuffs on a state judge for courtroom decisions belonged to fiction, not American legal reality. Then, during Trump’s first term, Judge Joseph faced charges. Now, seven years later, Judge Dugan stares down the same prosecutorial barrel. Two cases, two Trump administrations, two unprecedented intrusions into a domain once considered sacrosanct. The historical ledger speaks its stark truth: in over two centuries of American jurisprudence, these prosecutions exist as lonely anomalies, curious artifacts of an era where the boundaries between federal power and judicial independence found themselves suddenly, dramatically redrawn.

How Judge Dugan’s Legal Team Will Argue Against the Charges

Judge Dugan’s legal team is likely mounting a defense based on judicial immunity, arguing that her actions were official judicial acts for which she cannot be prosecuted. They cite Supreme Court precedent on judicial immunity and have referenced the Trump immunity case to support their position that such immunity is an absolute bar to prosecution at the outset, not merely a defense at trial. They also argue that ICE’s administrative warrant did not compel her cooperation, that her conduct did not amount to obstruction or concealment under federal law, and that the defendant was arrested in public shortly after leaving her courtroom, undermining claims of intentional evasion. The defense further frames the prosecution as an unprecedented and unconstitutional attack on judicial independence.

Potential Impact on Federal-State Judicial Relations

Both cases highlight and may intensify the ongoing conflict between aggressive federal immigration enforcement and state judicial authority. The prosecutions have been widely interpreted as attempts to intimidate judges and deter them from exercising independent authority in their courtrooms. If such prosecutions succeed or even proceed to trial, they could chill judicial discretion, making judges more hesitant to question federal agents or assert control over their courtrooms. Conversely, if the cases are dismissed or judges are vindicated, it could reaffirm the constitutional limits on federal power and strengthen state and local autonomy in the face of federal immigration priorities. Ultimately, these cases will influence how far federal agents can go in state courthouses and how boldly state judges can assert their independence in the face of federal pressure.

The Fatal “Hiding” Requirement: Why The Concealment Charge Is Doomed

The prosecution’s case against Judge Dugan collapses when examining the essential “hiding” element required under 18 U.S.C. § 1071. Court documents reveal that federal agents accompanied Flores-Ruiz and his counsel in the same elevator as they descended to street level.

As the Justice Department’s manual acknowledges, “Section 1071 does not prohibit all forms of aid to a fugitive”. Courts have consistently held that “trivial or momentary delays generally do not satisfy the statute.” When federal agents maintain visual contact the entire time and complete an arrest just minutes later, there is no concealment under any reasonable legal interpretation.

Yes, she used a different door, but that’s NOT “hiding” under federal law (18 USC §1071). Purposeful action isn’t enough; the statute requires concealing someone “to prevent discovery.”

Flores-Ruiz walked through a standard courthouse door and was arrested 22 minutes later in the public hallways. That’s not concealment-it’s simply using Door B instead of Door A in her courtroom.

“She adjourned without consulting prosecutors/witnesses” ≠ Corrupt Intent

Judge Dugan’s case represents a direct clash between a judge’s statutory authority to control her courtroom and federal agents’ enforcement tactics.

Wisconsin law explicitly grants judges like Dugan the power to “impose reasonable limitations on access” and “maintain proper decorum and appropriate atmosphere” in their courts. Judges have the absolute right to adjust their calendars unilaterally- they need not consult prosecutors before adjourning.

When ICE agents disrupted proceedings with only an administrative warrant, Judge Dugan responded by exercising this legitimate state authority, directing them to follow proper channels through the Chief Judge.

Even today, the Chief Judge still has no straightforward procedure for handling administrative versus judicial warrants from federal agencies. At the same time, judges maintain their need to conduct court proceedings without disruption in the absence of genuine emergencies.

The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine: “Refusing to Help is Not the Same as Impeding”

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provided clear guidance on this tension. In United States v. California, the court upheld California’s sanctuary state law (SB 54), concluding that “any obstruction caused by SB 54 is consistent with California’s prerogatives under the Tenth Amendment and the anticommandeering rule.”

Most crucially, the Ninth Circuit established a principle directly applicable to these judicial cases: “Refusing to help is not the same as impeding.” The court warned that treating noncooperation as obstruction could enable the federal government to “commandeer state resources in violation of the 10th Amendment.” When judges like Dugan choose alternative exits for defendants or decline to assist ICE agents without judicial warrants, they are refusing to help immigration enforcement, not actively impeding it.

The Constitutional Balance: Federal Power Meets State Sovereignty and the 10th Amendment

Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

Judge Dugan will rely heavily on this foundational constitutional text if her case proceeds to trial. However, the legal deficiencies in the prosecution’s theory suggest dismissal during pretrial motions is likely. The facts and the law don’t support a conviction. Yet conviction doesn’t appear to be the federal government’s priority- the spectacle itself was the goal, and that’s already been achieved. Americans are now polarized and debating this case in increasingly extreme terms, with reasoned, moderate analysis emerging only occasionally amid the digital noise and partisan posturing.

The fundamental legal principle overlooked in immigration federalism debates is straightforward: the federal government lacks absolute authority to commandeer state resources for immigration enforcement. Despite claims of federal supremacy in immigration matters, the Tenth Amendment establishes clear constitutional boundaries. Federal detainers issued under 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 remain legally voluntary requests, not mandates, as established in Supreme Court jurisprudence, particularly in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), where the Court recognized that while the federal government has significant authority over immigration, states retain sovereignty over their resources and personnel.

Illinois exemplifies this delicate constitutional balance. The Illinois TRUST Act prohibits local law enforcement from detaining individuals solely based on immigration detainers without judicial warrants, a position consistent with both the Tenth Amendment and Fourth Amendment protections. Governor Pritzker’s steadfast defense of these protections demonstrates the state’s commitment to constitutional federalism rather than obstruction. As Pritzker emphasized when defending Illinois’ policies: “We’re not preventing immigration enforcement; we’re simply requiring it meet the same constitutional standards that apply to all law enforcement.” This represents the proper constitutional equilibrium: federal authorities retain enforcement power but must exercise it within constitutional confines.

When federal immigration authorities respect these boundaries, cooperation improves. Data from Illinois jurisdictions shows higher crime reporting rates in communities where local authorities maintain clear separation from federal immigration enforcement. This historical pattern reveals that effective law enforcement thrives not through federal commandeering but through respect for the dual sovereignty system that has defined American federalism since the republic’s founding- the system judges like Dugan and Joseph seek to preserve.

Constitutional Protections and the Limits of ICE Authority

Despite claims that opposing ICE’s courthouse tactics is “un-American,” a closer examination of constitutional principles reveals the opposite. The Fourth Amendment’s protections extend to everyone within U.S. jurisdiction, regardless of immigration status- a principle affirmed repeatedly by the Supreme Court.

The distinction between administrative and judicial warrants lies at the heart of cases like Judge Dugan’s. Administrative warrants, issued by ICE itself without independent review, fundamentally differ from judicial warrants that require a neutral judge’s assessment of probable cause. In Arizona v. United States (2012), the Supreme Court emphasized that even federal immigration enforcement must respect constitutional boundaries.

This distinction is critical even for individuals who entered without inspection or have removal orders. Entry without inspection constitutes a civil violation, not a criminal offense, and doesn’t automatically grant ICE arrest authority without specific evidence of removability. Courts have increasingly rejected ICE’s reliance solely on databases to justify arrests, requiring case-by-case evidence as in Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County (2014).

ICE’s authority also varies significantly between public and private spaces. While agents can make arrests in public with proper probable cause, this isn’t automatic- it requires specific evidence beyond mere suspicion of undocumented status. This distinction becomes particularly crucial in courthouses, as judges must balance federal enforcement against the integrity of state judicial proceedings.

Judicial review doesn’t obstruct legitimate enforcement- it prevents potential abuses like racial profiling or detention based on flawed data. The public safety argument for aggressive courthouse enforcement also falters when considering how such tactics deter immigrant communities from reporting crimes or appearing as witnesses, ultimately undermining rather than enhancing safety.

As the Supreme Court noted in Wong Wing v. United States (1896), constitutional rights for noncitizens aren’t optional-they’re fundamental to America’s legal tradition. When judges like Dugan and Joseph assert their authority against ICE’s administrative warrants, they’re not defying America’s values but upholding them in their purest form.

Sanctuary Cities: From Fugitive Slaves to Undocumented Immigrants

This tension between federal enforcement and local autonomy sounds strikingly familiar because it is. America’s first sanctuary cities emerged in the 1850s when Northern states implemented “personal liberty laws” to combat the federally enacted Fugitive Slave Act. Just as Northern judges and officials once refused to cooperate with federal slave catchers, today’s sanctuary jurisdictions limit cooperation with ICE.

As of May 2025, thirteen states and 220 cities and counties have claimed “sanctuary” status. Major metropolitan centers, including New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and San Diego, have established policies prohibiting local resources from assisting federal immigration enforcement. San Francisco proudly declares itself “a City and County of Refuge” – language that deliberately echoes ancient scriptural traditions of the sanctuary. At the same time, Chicago’s “Welcoming City Ordinance” ensures immigrants can only be detained under “minimal” circumstances.

Many of these sanctuary cities frame their position as reminiscent of abolitionist resistance, asserting that their “historical and moral tradition” is “rooted in the provision of sanctuary to persecuted people.” The legal justification remains remarkably consistent across centuries: federal authorities cannot commandeer state and local resources.

The historical parallels between Illinois’ resistance to federal overreach span generations with remarkable specificity. In 1850, the Chicago City Council passed a landmark resolution declaring the Fugitive Slave Act “unconstitutional” and “cruel and unjust,” formally stating that “the city and its officers would not enforce it.” Black Chicagoans organized their community patrols to watch for slave catchers, while white allies offered sanctuary in places like the “Abolition Church.”

Today’s resistance mirrors these actions with striking similarity. Governor Pritzker’s declaration that “Illinois stands as a firewall against Donald Trump’s attacks on our immigrant communities” echoes that 1850 council resolution. The 2017 TRUST Act, which prohibits local authorities from assisting ICE with civil immigration enforcement, functions almost identically to Chicago’s 1850 refusal to help federal slave catchers. Even the language remains consistent- both eras feature Illinois officials explicitly declaring they “will not cooperate” with federal enforcement they consider unjust. When Secretary Noem recently demanded Illinois abandon these protections, calling them “disastrous” and “unconstitutional,” Pritzker’s administration responded by reaffirming the same constitutional principle that Northern states asserted against the Fugitive Slave Act: federal authorities cannot commandeer local resources to enforce policies that violate a state’s moral and constitutional principles.

Former Federal Judge Gertner’s Insight

Former federal judge Nancy Gertner incisively frames this tension:

“I think that Joseph was the canary in the coal mine. It was an early sign of what she sees as a pattern of federal overreach worsening.

This is a federal government that does not understand that there are two authorities: the state and the federal government. The federal government cannot intimidate or command state proceedings to accomplish its will.

Whatever a judge does within the four corners of her courtroom is her domain. If ICE wants to wait for people outside the courthouse, that’s fine. But do they have to be hovering inside? Do they have to arrest a witness or defendant in the middle of a trial? The answer is no. The republic will still stand if ICE respects the state bench and procedures.”

The Spectacle of Enforcement in the Digital Age

What distinguishes today’s federalism conflicts from historical precedents is their visibility. When Judge Dugan was arrested in her courthouse, the images spread instantly across social media. This visual spectacle transforms legal questions into emotional flashpoints, eliminating nuance in favor of polarization.

What crosses a judge’s mind in that crystalline moment when federal power collides with judicial autonomy? The click of metal on wrists that moments before had wielded a gavel with authority; the flashbulbs capturing her perp walk through her courthouse; the knowledge that her face would be splashed across X as either traitor or patriot before sundown. This isn’t abstract constitutional theory – it’s the soul of America wrestling with itself in real-time, with Dugan’s body and career as the battleground. These rebels in robes – Dugan and Joseph – stand as the latest incarnations of America’s oldest tension, their human faces now emblazoned across our digital consciousness, forcing us to confront what it means when a judge decides to roll the dice on her career, her freedom, for a principle most Americans couldn’t name.

Beneath these clinical facts pulses the raw human drama of Judge Dugan’s experience – a lifetime on the bench advocating for the underdog, for compassion within justice, suddenly finding herself cast as either villain or hero in America’s endless immigration theater. That instant in her chambers when she realized federal agents were waiting like predators in her courthouse corridors – what cold electricity must have shot through her judicial spine? The sacred sovereignty of her courtroom, built through decades of careful rulings and measured justice, was suddenly invaded by outside force.

The portrait painted by her detractors-arrogant, imperious, a black-robed tyrant drunk on power who thought she’d outfox the feds and wink a criminal alien to freedom-crumbles when held against the flesh-and-blood reality. They can’t taste the copper tang of fear that must have flooded her mouth when those agents appeared in her domain without warning, protocol, or the Milwaukee courts having established any clear policy on how judges should handle these federal incursions. Those who’d paint her as some radical resister miss the point entirely. This wasn’t a revolution; this was reflex- the instinctive protection of judicial independence bred into American judges since Marshall stared down Jackson. The “criminal alien” these critics conjure bears no resemblance to the misdemeanor defendant standing before her, just as their cartoon empress-judge bears no resemblance to the flesh-and-blood Dugan, who likely never imagined her routine courtroom management would end with the cold snap of federal handcuffs.

Her crime wasn’t arrogance but adherence to the ancient compact between judge and court—that this space, these proceedings, have integrity that any authority, however powerful, cannot casually breach.

A common justification for aggressive immigration enforcement tactics is public safety concerns. While public safety can be a legitimate priority in some cases, the circumstances surrounding Eduardo Flores Ruiz’s arrest reveal different motivations. If Flores-Ruiz honestly presented an urgent threat to public safety, federal agents would not have allowed him to freely walk through the courthouse, ride in elevators, and move through public spaces. The agents maintained visual contact with him throughout this time, hardly the protocol for someone considered dangerous enough to warrant immediate detention.

The state court had already assessed any potential risk by granting Flores-Ruiz bail for his misdemeanor domestic-related charge, indicating local authorities didn’t consider him a significant threat to community safety. Federal agents could have easily waited until after his court proceedings concluded to make their arrest. This standard practice respects the judicial process. Instead, the timing and manner of enforcement suggest the spectacle itself was the goal. For those genuinely concerned about community safety, courthouse arrests like this have a chilling effect that discourages immigrants from participating in the justice system as witnesses, victims, or defendants, ultimately undermining the very public safety such tactics claim to protect.

Jessica Vaughan’s claim that these cases represent “shocking expressions of obstruction of legitimate immigration enforcement” exemplifies this emotional framing. Her assertion that judges are “supposed to uphold the law, not help people evade it” simplistically ignores the complex balance of dual sovereignty that has defined our constitutional system.

Vaughan, Director of Policy Studies at the Center for Immigration Studies, frames the issue as judges creating “escape hatches” that establish “a double standard that can destroy the public faith in an impartial judiciary system.” Yet this perspective ignores the critical distinction courts have established between “refusing to help” and “impeding” – a legal principle central to these cases. Her analysis also overlooks the legal requirements for obstruction and concealment charges, including the “hiding” element that cannot be satisfied when federal agents maintain visual contact with the subject.

The American Bar Association’s Immigration Commission has criticized this analytical approach for ‘substituting selective anecdotes for comprehensive legal reasoning.’ Similarly, former federal prosecutors from Republican and Democratic administrations have noted that such commentary often lacks the precise legal analysis required when evaluating the elements of criminal statutes.

The Path Forward: Law Over Spectacle

The delicate balance of federalism requires vigorous federal enforcement and respect for state judicial autonomy. This isn’t a zero-sum game – the “republic will still stand if ICE respects the state bench and state procedures,” as Judge Gertner wisely notes.

Our constitutional system was deliberately designed to prevent one level of government from dominating the other. By following established legal principles rather than creating media spectacles, we can navigate these tensions in ways that preserve order and liberty. The anti-commandeering doctrine, proper application of concealment statutes, and respect for judicial independence provide roadmaps for resolving these conflicts without the polarization that threatens to fracture our republic.

The law, not emotional reactions to courthouse arrests captured on camera, offers our best path through these complex constitutional questions that have challenged America since its founding. This is where America’s soul gets forged, in the white-hot crucible of power clashing with conscience, without guaranteeing which side will prevail.

This tension isn’t a bug in our system – it’s a feature that preserves local democracy and prevents federal overreach while still allowing for national policies. Rather than seeing this as obstructionism, we might view it as the constitutional checks and balances working exactly as designed.

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Judicial Commandments: Biblical Command Structures in Modern Legal Directives

The Court’s Holy Writ: Ancient Command Structures in Modern Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court’s May 16, 2025, ruling on the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) exemplifies the linguistic and philosophical architecture of command structures that began with “Thou shalt not” prohibitions in ancient religious texts. The distinction between negative commands (“Thou shall not”) and positive directives (“you shall facilitate”) manifests in the Court’s ruling, which creates a modern decalogue of procedural rights through a careful balance of prohibitions and affirmative obligations.

Biblical commandment structures demonstrate a clear preference for negative formulations. Eight of the Ten Commandments begin with “Thou shalt not,” representing what scholars call “factual negation” in Hebrew grammar. This negative structure isn’t merely stylistic but is essential in moral guidance. George E. Mendenhall, a renowned Old Testament scholar, explains that “a negative prohibition, by its specificity, singles out just one behavior as off-limits. Other options remain open.” This insight reveals the philosophical rationale behind negative commandments: they precisely identify prohibited behaviors while preserving freedom in all other respects.

The 613 commandments (mitzvot) in Jewish tradition comprise 248 positive commands and 365 negative prohibitions, meaning approximately 59.5% of divine commands take the negative form. This predominance of negative commandments established a lasting template for legal directives that continues to influence modern jurisprudence.

“Thou Shalt Not Summarily Remove”: The First Commandment
The Court’s primary negative injunction mirrors the biblical preference for prohibition over-prescription. As captured in the initial description, “Thou shalt not summarily remove under AEA” establishes a clear boundary that preserves due process while allowing flexibility in implementing that process. This negative structure reflects the virtue of negative specificity – prohibiting only what undermines constitutional rights rather than micromanaging administrative procedures.

Both negative and positive commands operate within what linguists call “deontic modality”-language that indicates whether a proposition is obligatory or permissible according to normative standards such as law, morality, or convention. Deontic modal expressions evaluate propositions against “some standard of ideality,” exactly what the Court accomplishes through its prohibitory language.

“Nor Deny Habeas Rights”: The Second Commandment
This prohibition on denying habeas corpus rights carries the weight of constitutional scripture. The Court’s “thou shalt not” approach to habeas corpus exemplifies how negative commands establish non-negotiable boundaries around fundamental rights. Negative commands in the Bible “precisely identify prohibited behaviors while preserving freedom in all other respects” – here, preserving the essential freedom to challenge detention.

“No Removing Class Members Till Fifth Circuit Speaks”: The Third Commandment

This temporal prohibition demonstrates how negative commands can create procedural safeguards through restraint. The Court’s order that no removals proceed until the Fifth Circuit reviews the case illustrates the same principle found in biblical prohibitions: establishing clear boundaries while preserving administrative discretion within those boundaries.

In legal contexts, the distinction between negative and positive commands manifests in the difference between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions. A prohibitory injunction “forbids a party from performing an act” or “seeks to preserve the status quo,” while a mandatory injunction “directs a person to perform certain acts.” Courts typically show greater reluctance to issue mandatory injunctions, granting them only in “extraordinary circumstances” or when the “facts are clearly favorable toward the moving party.” This preference echoes the biblical tendency toward negative commands, suggesting that prohibitions may be inherently more straightforward to enforce and less intrusive.

Notice Must Be Clear and Timely”: The Fourth Commandment
This affirmative obligation shifts from prohibition to prescription, illustrating how positive commands become necessary when mere restraint is insufficient. The Court’s insistence on clear and timely notice parallels the minority of biblical commandments structured as positive obligations. A mandatory injunction must be “least oppressive while still protecting the plaintiff’s rights,” indicating the greater burden and scrutiny placed on positive commands in legal contexts.

Christian scripture similarly categorizes commands into negative (what not to do) and positive (what to do). Interestingly, the negative commands “are basically canceled out by obedience to the positive commands,” suggesting a complementary relationship between prohibitions and affirmative duties-exactly what the Court attempts to accomplish in balancing its prohibitory and mandatory directives.

The Language of Authority: From Stone Tablets to Legal Briefs
The evolution from biblical prohibitions to modern judicial directives reveals the enduring power of command structures. The ruling demonstrates both the “thou shall not” negative commands predominant in religious texts and the “you shall facilitate” affirmative obligations necessary for administrative governance.

The Court’s order – with its blend of prohibitory and mandatory language – exemplifies “the art of command language that lies not merely in what is required or forbidden, but in choosing the most appropriate formulation for each specific context.”

“Obey, or Face Justice”: Divine and Judicial Enforcement
The concluding warning about consequences for disobedience completes the parallel between biblical and judicial commands. Just as divine commandments carried supernatural penalties, the Court’s orders carry the weight of contempt proceedings. This enforcement mechanism transforms abstract principles into concrete obligations, ensuring that both negative prohibitions and positive duties translate into real-world compliance.

Ancient Wisdom in Modern Governance
The Supreme Court’s AEA ruling demonstrates how linguistic and philosophical patterns of ancient command structures continue to shape contemporary governance. The preference for negative commands when establishing boundaries, coupled with positive obligations when procedural justice demands action, reveals the enduring wisdom of balanced command structures.

The “thou shalt not” formulations dominating biblical texts find their modern expression in judicial prohibitions against administrative overreach, while the necessary “you shall facilitate” obligations ensure that mere restraint doesn’t undermine justice through procedural neglect. This judicial decalogue – prohibiting summary removals, protecting habeas rights, requiring adequate notice, and threatening consequences for noncompliance – shows how ancient command structures remain essential to preserving both order and liberty in democratic governance.

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Constitutional Guardrails: Why Habeas Corpus Matters to Every American Patriot

In a development that deserves serious attention from all Americans who cherish constitutional freedoms, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller recently announced that the administration is “actively looking at” suspending habeas corpus for certain detainees. On May 9, 2025, Miller justified this consideration by citing an “invasion” at the southern border.

For patriots who value our founding principles, this proposal warrants careful examination regardless of which administration proposes it or which group it targets.

What’s At Stake: The Great Writ

Habeas corpus- often called the “Great Writ”-requires government authorities to justify an individual’s detention before a court. It prevents indefinite imprisonment without charges, trial, or legal representation. The Founders considered this protection so fundamental that they specifically limited when it could be suspended in Article I of the Constitution: only in “Cases of Rebellion or Invasion” when “public Safety may require it.”

A Constitutional Thought Experiment

To understand the importance of habeas corpus, consider a hypothetical question: What if the defendants on January 6th were denied this constitutional protection?
Without habeas corpus, approximately 1,417 individuals charged in connection with the Capitol events could have been detained indefinitely with:
• No formal charges required
• No right to appear before a judge
• No ability to challenge evidence or the conditions of their confinement
• No access to attorneys

About 24% of these defendants faced obstruction charges. The Supreme Court’s June 2024 ruling that limited which January 6th defendants could be charged with obstructing Congress demonstrates precisely why judicial review matters. Without habeas corpus, these Americans would have remained imprisoned despite the Court’s determination that particular prosecutions were legally flawed.

Constitutional Principles for All Americans

Whether you believe the January 6th prosecutions were justified, the principle remains: in America, we don’t imprison people without judicial review. Period.

Many patriots rightfully express concern about government overreach and the erosion of constitutional protections. These same principles should apply consistently, regardless of who is detained or which administration is in power.

The Founders understood that unchecked detention power was the hallmark of tyranny, not limited government. The Suspension Clause limits when habeas corpus can be suspended precisely because it recognizes this danger.

Historical records show that the Founders deliberately placed strict constitutional limits on when habeas corpus could be suspended. Article I, Section 9 explicitly states, “The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” These limitations, invasion, and public safety were necessary for the Founders’ intent to prevent casual or arbitrary suspension.

The debates at the Constitutional Convention further demonstrate the Founders’ concerns about unchecked detention powers. When habeas corpus was discussed on August 28, 1787, James Wilson of Pennsylvania actively “opposed the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus” that Gouverneur Morris had proposed. Similarly, Charles Pinckney argued that the writ “should not be suspended but on the most urgent occasions, and then only for a limited time not exceeding twelve months.” These objections highlight the Founders’ wariness about granting the federal government power to detain individuals without judicial review.

Historical research confirms that the Founders understood habeas corpus as a safeguard against arbitrary detention. By the Founding period, the privilege had “come to encompass a general right of persons owing allegiance and thereby enjoying the protection of domestic law – most especially citizens – not to be detained without charges for criminal or national security purposes in the absence of a valid suspension.” The Constitution Center notes that the writ is “a crucial means by which a prisoner can obtain freedom.”

The Founders recognized that “the entire point of suspending the privilege was to endow the Executive with the power to arrest and detain such persons without criminal charges in times of war.” This extraordinary power was precisely why they imposed strict limits on invoking it. Throughout early American history, “it was virtually taken for granted that where a valid suspension was not in place – even during wartime – citizens owing allegiance who were suspected of supporting the enemy could only be detained on American soil under substantiated criminal charges.”

This historical evidence confirms that the Founders viewed unchecked detention power as contradictory to limited government principles and established constitutional safeguards accordingly.

Historical Perspective

Throughout American history, habeas corpus has only been suspended four times: during the Civil War, Reconstruction, the 1905 Philippine insurrection, and briefly after Pearl Harbor. Each instance involved extraordinary circumstances that genuinely threatened national survival.

Miller’s suggestion that current immigration challenges constitute an “invasion” warranting suspension represents an expansive interpretation of constitutional language that deserves scrutiny from those who value strict constitutional construction.

Why This Matters to All Patriots

True constitutional conservatives understand that dangerous precedents threaten everyone’s liberty when fundamental rights are suspended for any group. Once established, the legal precedents that permit government detention without judicial review for one group today become the very weapons that can strip away your freedoms tomorrow.

Our constitutional republic depends on maintaining key safeguards against government power, regardless of which party controls Washington. Justice Scalia noted, “The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive.”

When government officials consider suspending fundamental rights guaranteed since our nation’s founding, every American patriot should pay close attention. After all, the Constitution we defend protects “all persons within its jurisdiction,” regardless of political creed or conviction.

This sacred document embodies the promise we make when we pledge allegiance to our flag—“with liberty and justice for all,” a commitment that transcends the ballot box, the partisan divide, and the shifting tides of public opinion, reflecting the profound commitment to universal human dignity upon which this nation was established.

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BIA’s Decision in Matter of CHOC-TUT: Implications for Immigration Bond Proceedings

Case Overview
Felipe CHOC-TUT faced multiple arrests in 2024 for driving offenses, including three DUIs with high blood alcohol levels. Despite this, an IJ granted him a $4,000 bond, partly relying on a State court’s decision to set a low bail of $500. DHS appealed, arguing he was a danger to the community. The BIA agreed, overturning the IJ’s decision and ordering detention without bond, emphasizing the gravity of his repeated offenses. The BIA ruled that while IJs can consider State court decisions on dangerousness and bail, they don’t have to defer to them. This means IJs must judge based on immigration law, which can lead to stricter outcomes, like detention, even if State courts set a lower bail. This is crucial for immigrants with criminal records, as it may result in tougher detention decisions in immigration court.

The case involved Felipe CHOC-TUT, a respondent with multiple pending criminal charges related to driving offenses, including three arrests within a short period in 2024 for driving without a license, careless driving, and driving under the influence (DUI), with blood alcohol content levels of .201 and .214. The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially granted a bond of $4,000 on July 23, 2024, finding the respondent credible and not a danger to the community or a flight risk, partly relying on the State court’s decision to set a low bail of $500 after his third arrest.

DHS appealed this decision, arguing that the IJ erred in concluding the respondent met his burden of proving he was not a danger. In its decision dated February 25, 2025, the BIA sustained the appeal, vacated the IJ’s custody redetermination, and ordered the respondent detained without bond.

Legal Framework and Analysis

The legal framework for immigration bond proceedings is governed by Section 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows IJs to grant bond if they conclude, in their discretion, that release is warranted. The burden is on the respondent to demonstrate they are not a danger to property or persons and are likely to appear for future proceedings, as outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (2025) and supported by precedents like Matter of Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. 1102 (BIA 1999), and Matter of Urena, 25 I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 2009).

The BIA’s ruling in Matter of CHOC-TUT specifically addressed the relationship between State court custody orders and immigration bond proceedings. The decision clarified that while IJs may consider a State court’s assessment of dangerousness and the amount of bail set, they do not defy these orders. This is because the legal standards for bail in State courts may differ from those in immigration court, and IJs must make independent determinations under the INA and applicable precedents, as reinforced by Matter of Panin, 28 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2024).
Key Findings and Reasoning

The BIA found that the IJ’s reliance on the State court’s low bail setting was misplaced, particularly given the respondent’s repeated and serious offenses. The decision highlighted that driving under the influence is a “grave danger to the community,” citing Matter of Siniauskas, 27 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2018), and Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), which recognized DUI as an extremely dangerous crime. The respondent’s arrests, including a second DUI arrest just 18 days after the first, indicated a “strong disregard for public safety,” as noted in Portillo-Rendon v. Holder, 662 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2011).

The BIA concluded that the IJ’s bond determination lacked a “reasonable foundation,” as required by Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006), and reversed the decision, ordering detention without bond.

This underscores that only if an alien establishes they are not a danger should the IJ proceed to set a bond amount, per Matter of Urena, 25 I&N Dec. at 141.

Implications and Broader Context t

This ruling has significant implications for immigration bond proceedings, particularly for respondents with criminal histories. It establishes that, while informative, state court decisions do not bind IJs, who must prioritize immigration law standards. This may lead to stricter detention outcomes for immigrants with DUI or similar offenses, even if State courts view them as less dangerous. • Download Matter of CHOC-TUT, 29 I&N Dec. 48 (BIA 2025) https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-05/4092.pdf



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Why ICE’s Public Space Enforcement Isn’t as Simple as It Seems – A Constitutional Perspective

ICE’s authority to enforce administrative warrants in public spaces often oversimplifies complex legal principles. Critics label opposition to ICE’s tactics as “un-American,” but this ignores the constitutional safeguards that protect everyone-including noncitizens-from government overreach. Here’s a breakdown of the legal nuances, precedents, and why judicial oversight matters.

1. The Fourth Amendment Protects Everyone, Regardless of Immigration Status
The Constitution doesn’t exclude noncitizens from its protections. The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause and judicial warrants for arrests, even in immigration cases:

Administrative warrants (issued by ICE/DHS) lack independent judicial review.

Judicial warrants require a neutral judge to assess evidence of a crime.

Key Precedent: In Arizona v. United States (2012), the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot conduct warrantless immigration arrests, emphasizing that federal enforcement must still respect constitutional limits.

2. Entry Without Inspection or Removal Orders Don’t Nullify Rights
Critics argue that individuals who entered without inspection (EWI) or have removal orders forfeit protections. This is false:

EWI is a civil violation, not a criminal offense. It doesn’t automatically grant ICE arrest authority without proof of removability.

Removal orders issued administratively (e.g., by ICE, not a judge) still don’t override the Fourth Amendment. ICE must show probable cause for public arrests.

Example: Courts have blocked ICE from relying solely on databases to justify arrests, requiring case-by-case evidence (Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 2014).

3. Public vs. Private Spaces: What ICE Can (and Can’t) Do

Public spaces: ICE can make arrests if they have probable cause (e.g., a final removal order). However, “probable cause” isn’t automatic-it requires specific evidence.

Private spaces: ICE needs a judicial warrant to enter homes or workplaces, even with removal orders. Administrative warrants aren’t enough.

Recent Case: A 2025 ruling blocked ICE from re-establishing offices at Rikers Island, citing risks of circumventing judicial oversight in sanctuary cities like NYC.

4. Why Judicial Oversight Isn’t “Un-American” – It’s the Rule of Law
Opposing unchecked ICE authority isn’t anti-enforcement; it’s pro-Constitution:

Judicial review prevents abuse: Judges ensure ICE doesn’t detain people based on racial profiling or flawed data.

Sanctuary policies protect due process: Cities like Chicago limit ICE collaboration to avoid violating residents’ rights.

Key Quote: “The federal structure permits states to pursue their own policies, but it also restrains them from undermining federal law” (Arizona v. United States).

5. The Bigger Picture: Balancing Security and Liberty
ICE plays a role in enforcement, but its power isn’t absolute:

Public safety requires trust: Overbroad ICE tactics deter immigrant communities from reporting crimes.

Constitutional rights are non-negotiable: As the Supreme Court noted in Wong Wing v. United States (1896), even noncitizens are entitled to due process.

The argument that opposing ICE’s administrative warrants is “un-American” misunderstands the Constitution. Judicial oversight ensures enforcement respects civil liberties-a principle as American as the Fourth Amendment itself. Limiting ICE’s warrant power in public spaces isn’t about protecting “dangerous aliens”; it’s about upholding the rule of law for everyone.
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