BIA Says Arriving Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal May Be Placed in §240 Proceedings

DHS has the discretion to place arriving aliens in removal proceedings under INA §240, even if they may also be subject to expedited removal under INA §235(b)(1)(A)(i). Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M, 25 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2011)

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Cancellation of Removal/Break in Continuous Physical Presence Based on Execution of Form I-826 and Voluntary Return

In Reyes-Sanchez v. Holder, 2011 WL 2725813 (7th Cir. 2011), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review filed by a citizen of Mexico whose application for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b) [8 USCA § 1229b(b)], applicable to nonlawful permanent resident aliens, was denied by the IJ and the BIA. The circuit court agreed with the government that the petitioner’s apprehension by the U.S. Border Patrol and her formalized agreement to return to her native Mexico rather than to opt for an immigration court hearing interrupted her statutorily required 10-year period of continuous physical presence, thus rendering her ineligible to qualify for cancellation relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the agency’s determination that petitioner was ineligible for Cancellation of Removal because her voluntary return (Form I-826) after a brief visit to Mexico was under threat of prosecution and thus was sufficient to break her continuous presence in the United States.

The petitioner entered the U.S. without inspection in 1987. She subsequently married and raised three children in the U.S. She returned briefly to Mexico in 2001 and reentered the U.S. in August 2001 without being admitted or paroled. Upon her apprehension by the Border Patrol and placement into custody, she executed the Spanish version of Form I-826, Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition. It offered her three options: (1) hearing before IJ, (2) asylum hearing, or (3) acknowledgement of unlawful presence and agreement to return to native country as soon as arrangements can be made for departure. The petitioner chose the third option and was immediately returned to Mexico. In May 2003, she was apprehended in the U.S. by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents who were looking for her nephew, and she was placed into removal proceedings, charged under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) [8 USCA § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] with being present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled.

Before the IJ, her counsel conceded the petitioner’s removability and opted not to ask for cancellation due to the break in residence. The IJ refused to grant a continuance pending the results of the petitioner’s legalization application but granted voluntary departure (VD) relief. While her case was pending before the BIA, the Eighth Circuit issued a decision, Ortiz-Cornejo v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2005), which held that merely being turned back at the border without any threat of deportation does not constitute a break in continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation relief. Consequently, the Board returned Reyes-Sanchez’s case to the IJ for fact finding on the “break” issue. The IJ then proceeded to hold that the petitioner’s return to Mexico pursuant to the I-826 process was a response to a threat of removal and therefore broke her continuous U.S. presence. The BIA affirmed this result and did not extend her VD as she failed to post the required bond. In upholding the Board’s decision, it deferred to its precedent decision in Matter of Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I. & N. Dec. 423 (B.I.A. 2002) (en banc), which held that, in addition to the departures exceeding the specified durations under the statute, a departure under a threat of deportation also constitutes a break in the accrual of continuous physical presence for cancellation purposes. The Board characterized acceptance of voluntary departure under the prior regime as a “plea bargain” and remarked that this type of enforced departure should create no legitimate expectation by either of the parties that an alien could illegally reenter the U.S. and resume a period of continuous physical presence.

The court contrasted the situation where an alien is merely just turned around at the border without any particular process, noting that in its prior decision, Morales-Morales v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2004), it deemed this type of return not to break the continuous presence as it could not be equated with a formal voluntary departure or departure under an order of removal or deportation. The court also cited to Matter of Avilez-Nava, 23 I. & N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 2005) (en banc), which recognized that a mere refusal to admit an alien at the border does not constitute a break in continuous physical presence as this does not involve a formal documented process pursuant to which the alien was determined to be inadmissible to the U.S. In that case, the Board outlined what might constitute a formal process, keying in on production of official forms and processes accompanying return of the alien to his or her native country.

The court outlined the process involved in Reyes’s case and deemed it to be sufficiently formalized. It considered that Reyes’s use of a fictitious name to sign the Form I-826 suggested that she understood the form did indeed carry legal consequences. The court rejected the counterarguments advanced by the petitioner, including that the use of the phrase “voluntary return” on the form was not the equivalent of “voluntary departure.” It pointed out that the use of different words in this context is not central to the law as interpreted by the Board in Romalez, supra, and that this understanding has been endorsed by every circuit court to consider this issue. The court noted that, at oral argument, petitioner’s counsel argued that the form was insufficient because it did not go the extra step of informing Ms. Reyes that she might have been eligible for cancellation of removal based on her 10 years of continuous residence from 1987 to 2001 but would have to request a hearing. In rejecting this argument, the court remarked that, given the myriad of circumstances that those apprehended at the border face, the brevity of Form I-826 may well have been preferable to providing each detainee a denser explanation of the relevant law. The court was satisfied that the BIA and IJ correctly determined that the petitioner’s continuous physical presence in the U.S. was interrupted when she chose to return to Mexico in a formal documented process while facing the threat of removal.

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BIA Addresses Whistleblowing as a Basis for Asylum: Matter of N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526 (BIA 2011)

The BIA found that retaliation for opposition to state corruption may form the basis for a claim based on political opinion if, post-REAL ID, the actual or imputed anti-corruption belief was one central reason for the harm. Matter of N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526 (BIA 2011)

Matter of N-M-, which arose within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, involved a Colombian woman who had worked in a state-run agency where she was pressured to falsify information and hire contractors outside of the official hiring process.  When she refused to do so and voiced concerns about the corruption, she was transferred to a different position and threatened.  The immigration judge granted the woman asylum, the Department of Homeland Security appealed, and the BIA sustained the appeal and remanded the case for further fact finding.

In its decision, the BIA noted that in some circumstances, opposition to state corruption may demonstrate the respondent’s political opinion or give a persecutor reason to impute such political opinion” to the respondent, particularly where the opposition involved participating in “classic political activities” or exposing the corruption to other authorities.  Id. at 528.  However, when determining whether the respondent was persecuted on account of that actual or imputed political opinion, the BIA held that the respondent must provide some direct or circumstantial evidence that the persecutor targeted the respondent because of her political beliefs. Id.  Moreover, for cases arising under the REAL ID Act of 2005, the respondent must demonstrate that her actual or imputed political opinion was ‘one central reason’ for the persecution.  Id. at 532.  As a result, evidence simply showing the respondent was harmed in retaliation for exposing corruption linked to a political system is insufficient to prove that the respondent’s anti-corruption beliefs were ‘one central reason’ for her persecution. Id.

Finally, the BIA provided three factors that an adjudication “may find useful” when examining an asylum claim based on opposition to state corruption.  First, the adjudicator ‘may consider whether and to what extent the alien engaged in activities that could be perceived as expressions of anti-corruption beliefs.  Id. Second, the adjudicator should consider any direct or circumstantial evidence that the alleged persecutor was motivated by the alien’s perceived or actual anti-corruption beliefs.  Id.  Finally, the adjudicator should consider ‘evidence regarding the pervasiveness of governmental corruption’s and ‘whether there are direct ties between the corrupt elements and higher level officials.  Id. at 533.  On the third point, the BIA noted that where a respondent threatens to expose corruption by rogue officials acting without the support of the government, “it seems less likely that the act would be perceived as politically motivated or threatening.”  Id.  Similarly, whether the government itself, and not just the corrupt individuals, retaliates against the respondent is relevant to this issue.  Id.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has issued several decisions regarding corruption or whistle-blower’s-based asylum claims. See e.g., Musabelliu v. Gonzalez, 442 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 2006). The BIA’s discussion of Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), in N-M- seems inconsistent with recent Seventh Circuit’s decisions regarding political opinion-based asylum claims.  Compare N-M- at 529 (asserting that the majority [in Elias-Zacarias] did not adopt the dissent’s argument that an inquiry into the individual persecutor’s motivation is unnecessary so long as an alien demonstrates that the persecution occurred in response to an act manifesting a political opinion) (internal citations omitted) with Martinez-Buendia v. Holder, 616 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating, “if political opposition is the reason an individual refuses to cooperate with a guerrilla group, and that individual is persecuted for his refusal to cooperate, logic dictates that the persecution is on account of the individual’s political opinion.”).

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BIA Finds Driving with Wanton or Willful Disregard for Lives or Property to Elude Police is a CIMT

The BIA held in Matter of Ruiz-Lopez, 25 I.&N. Dec. 551 (B.I.A. June 3, 2011) that (1) the offense of driving a vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of others while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.024 is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and (2) the maximum sentence possible for an offense, rather than the standard range of sentencing under a state’s sentencing guidelines, determines an alien’s eligibility for the “petty offense” exception under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) [8 USCA § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)] (2006).

The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled. On December 29, 1997, he was convicted of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.024, for which he was sentenced to 40 days confinement. Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged that the respondent was inadmissible because he was convicted of a CIMT and was present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled. The immigration judge (IJ) sustained both charges. In addition, the IJ determined that the respondent’s conviction rendered him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b) [8 USCA § 1229b(b)] (2006). The IJ ordered him removed from the U.S. and the respondent appealed to the BIA, contending that his conviction was not for a CIMT and that, even if it was, the “petty offense” exception under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) applies so that he remains eligible for cancellation of removal.

At the time of the respondent’s conviction, Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.024 provided, in pertinent part, that:

“Any driver of a motor vehicle who wilfully fails or refuses to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop and who drives his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives or property of others while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a class C felony. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such a signal shall be in uniform and his vehicle shall be appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.”

The respondent contended that his conviction was not for a CIMT because (1) pursuant to the holding in Matter of Khourn, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1041, 1046 (B.I.A. 1997), an evil intent is required for a finding of moral turpitude and although “a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives or property of others” must be established for a conviction under the Washington statute, no showing of evil intent is necessary; (2) although his attempt to elude a police officer was a willful act, it was not committed with the evil intent generally associated with other crimes found to involve moral turpitude, such as the offense of aggravated fleeing discussed in Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004); and (3) “wanton disregard” equates to recklessness, which, under Matter of Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475 (B.I.A. 1996), must be coupled with the infliction of serious bodily injury for a finding of moral turpitude, and under Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.024 a person may be convicted based on a showing of wanton disregard for only property, without any serious bodily harm, and further, under the Board’s decisions in Matter of M-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 686 (C.O., B.I.A. 1946) (involving damage to railway telegraph property), and Matter of B-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 867 (C.O., B.I.A. 1947) (involving willful damage to mail boxes and other property), such reckless harm to property has not been considered to be morally turpitudinous. Therefore, he contended, the offense of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle under the Washington statute is not categorically a CIMT.

The Board, in an opinion written by Board Member Linda S. Wendtland for the panel which included Board Members Lauri S. Filppu and Roger Pauley, rejected each of these contentions. The Board noted that judicial and administrative precedents have recognized that “reckless disregard” can constitute the requisite “evil intent” for a CIMT under at least some circumstances. In rejecting the respondent’s reliance on Matter of Fualaau for the proposition that in order to involve moral turpitude, an offense with a mens rea of recklessness must be coupled with the infliction of serious bodily injury, the Board pointed out that (1) in Matter of Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611, 613-14 (B.I.A. 1976), [FN6] aff’d sub nom. Medina-Luna v. INS, 547 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1977) which involved aggravated assault, it concluded that moral turpitude inhered in criminally reckless conduct with the use of a deadly weapon as an aggravating factor, but with no serious bodily injury, and (2) whenever it has held that a “recklessness” mens rea requires either serious bodily injury or some other aggravating factor to establish moral turpitude, it has been in the specific context of assault offenses. Since the respondent’s offense did not involve assault, the Board found his argument in this regard unpersuasive. Moreover, the Board pointed out that, as a general rule, “the seriousness of a criminal offense . . . is [not] determinative of whether a crime involves moral turpitude,” Matter of Sejas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 236, 237 (B.I.A. 2007).

Turning to the offense for which the respondent was convicted, the Board explained that three elements are required to support a conviction of attempting to elude a pursing police officer under Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.024: (1) a uniformed police officer whose vehicle is appropriately marked must give the driver of a motor vehicle a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop; (2) the driver must willfully fail or refuse to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop; and (3) while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, the driver must drive his or her vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of others. The Board noted that, in construing this last element, the Supreme Court of Washington has stated that “[t]he statute is absolutely clear that at the very least the manner in which one drives must indicate wanton and willful disregard” and concluded that this “crime of felony flight” “[o]bviously … does contain culpable mental elements.” State v. Sherman, 653 P.2d 612, 615-16 (Wash. 1982) (en banc). Moreover, Washington courts have found that the usual meaning of “willful,” “wanton,” or “reckless” is that the actor “has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences, State v. Brown, 697 P.2d 583, 586 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts § 34, at 213 (5th ed. 1984)) (emphasis added).

The Board also pointed out that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Mei v. Ashcroft, held that the Illinois offense of aggravated fleeing from a police officer–which involved the willful failure to obey a police officer’s order to stop, with the aggravating circumstance that the offender was driving at 21 or more miles per hour above the speed limit–is a CIMT. The court stated that “a person who deliberately flees at a high speed from an officer who, the fleer knows, wants him to stop, thus deliberately flouting lawful authority and endangering the officer, other drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, is deliberately engaged in seriously wrongful behavior.” Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d at 742. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that, while the driver may not want to endanger anyone, he has to know that he is greatly increasing the risk of an accident as a consequence of his deliberate and improper decision to ignore a lawful order of the police. Id. The Board noted further that, while Mei v. Ashcroft did not involve an offense containing an element of willful disregard for lives or property, the Seventh Circuit cited to a case that did: People v. Dewey, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), which held that California’s felony offense of fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer by driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property was a CIMT and which specifically rejected the contention that the offense could not involve moral turpitude because an individual eluding a police officer might only be acting with the requisite disregard for the safety of property.

The Board found little distinction between the respondent’s offense and those considered in Mei v. Ashcroft and People v. Dewey as the respondent’s conduct was similar to that involved in those cases in that he willfully failed or refused to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop after a uniformed police officer in an appropriately marked vehicle gave him a signal to stop his motor vehicle and, while attempting to elude the pursuing police vehicle, drove his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton and/or willful disregard for the risk of injury to another person or to property. Assuming arguendo that there is a “realistic probability” of prosecution under the Washington statute where the offense of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle was committed with a reckless disregard for only property, the Board found that moral turpitude necessarily inheres in such a crime given the combination of circumstances involved. The Board concluded that when a person deliberately flouts lawful authority and recklessly endangers the officer, other drivers, passengers, pedestrians, or property, he or she is “engaged in seriously wrongful behavior” that violates the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed to society. Thus the respondent’s conviction was for a CIMT.

The Board also found that the respondent was not eligible for the “petty offense” exception under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) because the maximum penalty for the crime of which he was convicted is five years of imprisonment. The Board rejected the respondent’s assertion that he was eligible for this exception because the standard range of sentencing for his offense was from 0 to 60 days under the State of Washington’s Sentencing Guidelines, noting that the presumptive sentence is not the maximum sentence possible and that, although the respondent was only sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 40 days, the judgment and sentence stated that the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime to which he pled guilty was five years. Accordingly, the Board held that, because the respondent’s conviction for a CIMT does not come within the “petty offense” exception, he was convicted of an offense described under INA § 212(a)(2) and is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1)(C). Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

As a side note, the BIA provided a paragraph detailing the proper analysis to use to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude under Matter of Silva-Treviño, 24 I&N Dec. 687, 688-89 (A.G. 2008). 
The BIA explained,

“Pursuant to Matter of Silva-Trevino, the first stage of the analysis employs a categorical approach, under which the criminal statute at issue is examined to ascertain whether moral turpitude is intrinsic to all offenses that have a ‘realistic probability’ of being prosecuted under that statute. If the issue cannot be resolved under the categorical approach, the second stage involves a modified categorical inquiry, which requires inspection of specific documents comprising the alien’s record of conviction to discern the nature of the underlying conviction. Finally, if the record of conviction is inconclusive, the Attorney General has held that because moral turpitude is not an element of an offense, evidence beyond the record of conviction may be considered when evaluating whether an alien’s crime involved moral turpitude.”

Matter of Ruiz-Lopez, 25 I&N Dec. at 553. Silva-Treviño, the BIA suggests, requires a linear analysis: only use step two (the modified categorical approach) if step one does not answer the question; only use step three (the anything-goes prong) if step two does not answer the question. 

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Withholding of Removal, Macedonia Stanojkova v. Holder (7th Cir. 2011)

No. 10-3327 Decision Date: July 14, 2011 Petition granted

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=10-3327_002.pdf (PDF)

Record failed to support Bd.’s denial of application for withholding of removal by aliens (native of Macedonia) alleging that they were persecuted by members of paramilitary police in native country because of their sympathetic views of Albanian minority within native country. While Bd. believed that aliens’ 10-minute confrontation with paramilitary police was insufficient to establish persecution claim, evidence was sufficient where: (1) alien claimed that police entered his home, rendered his parents unconscious, held gun to his head, and sexually assaulted his pregnant wife while accusing him of being against Macedonia; and (2) actual police were unwilling to arrest assailants. On remand, though, Bd. may consider improved conditions in Macedonia when evaluating alien’s claim.

In Stanojkova v. Holder, 2011 WL 2725850 (7th Cir. 2011), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review filed by a Macedonian couple who claimed that they were victimized by rogue police officers, called “Lions,” on account of the male petitioner’s refusal to report for duty with the Macedonia army due to his disapproval with his country’s suppression of the Albanian minority. In remanding the matter back to the BIA to reassess whether the petitioners qualified for withholding of removal, the court took issue with the IJ’s and the Board’s prior determination that the mistreatment that they suffered, including a sexual assault of the wife-petitioner, constituted mere harassment as opposed to persecution. The court also pointed out that changed country conditions and the risk of future persecution were not addressed by the IJ or the Board in their prior deliberations, so those issues remained for consideration on remand.

Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court’s three-judge panel, started his opinion by providing the historical context and demographics, noting that Macedonia emerged as a country after the breakup of Yugoslavia and is mostly Slavic with about a quarter of the population being of Albanian ethnicity. He observed that Albanian extremists began an insurrection in January 2001, but it “petered out” after the “Ohrid Framework Agreement” was negotiated in August 2001 to grant greater rights to the Albanian minority. During that time period, the male petitioner declined to report for military duty. Consequently, in 2002 three armed and masked men broke into the petitioners’ home. They rendered the male petitioner’s parents unconscious with a chemical spray and then proceeded to menace the male petitioner with a gun to his head, accusing him of being a “betrayer of Macedonians” for not participating in the war (against the Albanian minority). One of the assailants sexually assaulted his wife, who was pregnant at the time, and when the husband intervened, he was beaten on his head and back with a gun. The attackers left because of the wife’s loud screams, and no actual rape occurred. Upon reporting this incident to the police, the petitioners were informed that the assailants were “Lions,” i.e., paramilitary police officers, with an implication that “ordinary” officers would not be able to afford protection. Consequently, the petitioners left their country.

They eventually came to the U.S. but without visas. In removal proceedings, they asked for asylum and related relief, but the IJ denied any relief, and the BIA, in a single-member decision, perfunctorily affirmed the IJ’s removal order. As explained by Judge Posner, the petitioners missed the one-year filing deadline to be considered for asylum but remained eligible for withholding of removal (under INA § 241(b)(3) [8 USCA § 1231(b)(3)]. They did not press a CAT claim before the court. He further explained that to obtain withholding requires a demonstration that the applicant will more likely than not be subjected to persecution if removed from the U.S. and that a finding of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution pursuant to 8 CFR § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). He pointed out that the IJ, seconded by the BIA, ruled that the presumption was inapplicable because of their conclusion that the petitioners had not been persecuted.

Judge Posner described the IJ’s decision as “garbled” on the issue of political motivation and criticized the IJ’s statement that there was no evidence of human rights abuses by the Macedonian army in 2001 as ignoring the State Department’s Country Report. He noted that the Board member found that the petitioners were credible but reasoned that the harm that they suffered during the home invasion did not rise to the level of persecution. He observed that neither the Board member nor the IJ made any effort to specify the amount of harm required to rise to the level of persecution and intimated that the court could not find a useful definition of persecution by the Board or the courts, although the importance of distinguishing between harassment and persecution has been noted. He remarked that “in terms of outcome the cases are all over the lot” and cited to an article by Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., “Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and Proposals for Reform” (2009), documenting this phenomenon. He referred to the Board’s attempted definition of persecution in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), as “harm or suffering that is inflicted upon an individual for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome.” However, he described this definition as “vacuous with regard to the minimum amount of harm required.” He lamented the fact that “responsibility on this point of law has, by default, devolved on the courts, yet only provisionally – only until the Board assumes the responsibility – to try to create some minimum coherence in the adjudication of claims of persecution, as [the Seventh Circuit has] tried to do in the [instant]opinion.” He suggested that, in light of the current situation in Macedonia, there may well be less than a 50% probability that the petitioners would be persecuted if returned to Macedonia, which is the ultimate issue in a withholding case, but that this was a matter to be addressed by the Board or the IJ on remand.

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