Parole in Place for Military Families

PM-602-0091: Parole of Spouses, Children and Parents of Active Duty Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, and Former Members of the U.S. Armed Forces or Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve and the Effect of Parole on Inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)
PM-602-0091: Parole of Spouses, Children and Parents of Active Duty Members of the U.S. Armed Forces

November 15, 2013 PM-602-0091

Policy Memorandum

SUBJECT: Parole of Spouses, Children and Parents of Active Duty Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, and Former Members of the U.S. Armed Forces or Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve and the Effect of Parole on Inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)

Purpose

This policy memorandum (PM) amends Chapter 21.1 of the Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) to ensure consistent adjudication of parole requests made on behalf of aliens who are present without admission or parole and who are spouses, children and parents of those serving on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces, in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve or who previously served in the U.S. Armed Forces or Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve.

This PM also amends AFM Chapter 40.6 concerning the effects of parole on an alien’s inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). This amendment to AFM chapter 40.6 applies to any paroled alien, not only to the family members of Armed Forces personnel.

Scope: This PM applies to and is binding on all U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) employees.

Authority: INA §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 212(d)(5)(A), 235(a), and 245(a), (c); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1182(d)(5)(A), 1225(a), and 1255(a), (c)

Background

Parole of Spouses, children and parents of Armed Forces personnel

• In partnership with the Department of Defense (DoD), USCIS has launched a number of initiatives to assist military members, veterans, and their families to navigate our complex immigration system and apply for naturalization and other immigration services and benefits.
• This PM builds on these important initiatives as there is concern within DoD that some active members of the U.S. Armed Services, individuals serving in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve and individuals who have previously served in the U.S. Armed Forces or Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve face stress and anxiety because of the immigration status of their family
members in the United States.
• Military preparedness can potentially be adversely affected if active members of the U.S. Armed
Forces and individuals serving in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, who can be quickly called into active duty, worry about the immigration status of their spouses, parents and children.
• Similarly, our veterans, who have served and sacrificed for our nation, can face stress and anxiety because of the immigration status of their family members in the United States. We as a nation have made a commitment to our veterans, to support and care for them. It is a commitment that begins at enlistment, and continues as they become veterans.
• Responding to these and similar concerns by several Members of Congress about soldiers and veterans, the Secretary of Homeland Security on August 30, 2010 emphasized the Department’s commitment to assisting military families. The Secretary identified several of the discretionary tools that the Department utilizes “to help military dependents secure permanent immigration status in the United States as soon as possible.” Among the tools listed was “parole … to minimize periods of family separation, and to facilitate adjustment of status within the United States by immigrants who are the spouses, parents and children of military members.”1
• INA § 212(d)(5)(A) gives the Secretary the discretion, on a case-by-case basis, to “parole” for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit” an alien applying for admission to the United States. Although it is most frequently used to permit an alien who is outside the United States to come into U.S. territory, parole may also be granted to aliens who are already physically present in the U.S. without inspection or admission. This latter use of parole is sometimes called “parole in place.” The legal authority for granting parole in place was formally recognized by the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) General Counsel in a 1998 opinion.2 That opinion was endorsed the following year in a memorandum by the then-INS Commissioner.3 In 2007, the then-DHS General Counsel concurred with the 1998 INS General Counsel’s opinion in relevant part.4 The basic authority for parole in place is INA § 212(d)(5)(A), which expressly grants discretion to parole “any alien applying for admission to the United States.” INA § 235(a)(1), in turn, expressly defines an applicant for admission to include “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted.”

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1 See Letter from Hon. Janet Napolitano, Sec. of Homeland Security, to Hon. Zoe Lofgren, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 30, 2010).

2 Memorandum from Paul W. Virtue, INS General Counsel, to INS officials, “Authority to Parole Applicants for Admission Who Are Not Also Arriving Aliens,” Legal Op. 98-10 (Aug. 21, 1998), 1998 WL 1806685.

3 Memorandum from Doris Meissner, INS Commissioner, to INS officials, “Eligibility for Permanent Residence Under the Cuban Adjustment Act Despite Having Arrived at a Place Other than a designated Port-of-Entry” (Apr. 19, 1999), reprinted in 76 Interpreter Releases 676, 684, App. 1 (May 3, 1999).

4 Memorandum from Gus P. Coldebella, DHS General Counsel, to DHS officials, “Clarification of the Relation Between Release under Section 236 and Parole under Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (Sept. 28, 2007). The same DHS General Counsel’s opinion rejected a conclusion that Mr. Virtue had reached on a separate issue related to release from detention under INA § 236(a)(2)(B) (so-called “conditional parole”), see Matter of Castillo-Padilla, 25 I&N Dec. 257 (BIA 2010) (agreeing with DHS that “conditional parole” under INA § 236(a)(2)(B) does not constitute parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A)).

This PM addresses two related issues. The first is a policy question: Should parole in place be granted to certain family members of active duty members of the U.S. Armed Forces, individuals in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, or individuals who previously served in the U.S. Armed Forces or the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve? The second is a legal question: Does parole in place (for military family members or anyone else) affect whether an alien is inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)? That provision is discussed below and is critical to determining the alien’s eligibility for adjustment of status under INA § 245.

A. Parole in Place for Spouses, Children and Parents of Active Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, Individuals in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve or Individuals Who Previously Served in the U.S. Armed Forces or the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve

As noted above, the decision whether to grant parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A) is discretionary. Generally, parole in place is to be granted only sparingly. The fact that the individual is a spouse, child or parent of an Active Duty member of the U.S. Armed Forces, an individual in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve or an individual who previously served in the U.S. Armed Forces or the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, however, ordinarily weighs heavily in favor of parole in place. Absent a criminal conviction or other serious adverse factors, parole in place would generally be an appropriate exercise of discretion for such an individual. If USCIS5 decides to grant parole in that situation, the parole should be authorized in one-year increments, with re-parole as appropriate.

B. Effect of Parole on Inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and Adjustment of Status under INA § 245

INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) contains two closely related inadmissibility grounds. The first ground relates to the alien who is “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” This inadmissibility ground generally covers those who entered the United States without inspection (and are still in the United States). Aliens who have entered the United States without inspection, while not “arriving aliens” as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q), are eligible for parole because they remain applicants for admission.6

The second inadmissibility ground in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) relates to the alien “who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the [Secretary of Homeland Security].” Where the first inadmissibility ground leaves off, this one picks up. Using the present tense (“arrives”), it covers the alien who is in the process of entering U.S. territory without inspection. As is true throughout section 212(a), the choice of tense (“arrives”) is clearly deliberate. In enacting the various inadmissibility grounds in section 212(a), Congress was very specific as to whether the

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5 ICE and CBP also have parole authority. “Memorandum of Agreement between USCIS, ICE, and CBP for the purpose of coordinating the concurrent exercise by USCIS, ICE, and CBP of the Secretary’s Parole Authority Under INA § 212(d)(5)(A) with respect to certain aliens located outside of the United States,” Addendum I (September 2008). Their decisions whether to grant parole are outside the scope of the present PM.
6 INA § 235(a)(1).

individual grounds cover past, present, or future events, or some combination thereof.7 In particular, when Congress intended that a ground cover both past and present events, it said so explicitly.8 In contrast, in the second prong of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i), Congress used only the present tense. Moreover, if “arrives” were read as if it said “arrives or previously arrived,” so as to cover any alien who had ever entered at an undesignated time or place, then the first prong of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) would be practically superfluous. Ordinarily, the only way for an alien to be present in the United States without admission or parole, as the first prong requires, is to have entered without inspection at some point in the past.9 Those individuals would already be covered by the second prong if “arrives” were read to mean “arrives or previously arrived.”

The two inadmissibility grounds contained within section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) are thus complementary. Together, they capture aliens who have already achieved entry without inspection and those who are in the process of attempting such entry.

Reading “arrives” as if it said “arrives or has previously arrived”10 would also produce at least two anomalies. First, as noted, it would render the first prong of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) practically superfluous. Second, in combination with another inadmissibility ground, section 212(a)(9)(B)(i), reading “arrives” as “arrives or has previously arrived” would lead to results that Congress could not possibly have intended. The latter ground renders inadmissible any alien who has ever been unlawfully present in the United States for more than 180 days and then departs, but it limits the inadmissibility to either 3 years or 10 years, depending on the duration of the unlawful presence. If the second inadmissibility ground in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) were interpreted to mean that any prior entry without inspection renders the alien inadmissible, then both the 180-day threshold and the 3-year and 10-year limitations on inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) would be meaningless. One who enters without inspection and remains for less than 180 days – even one day, for that matter – and then leaves, is not inadmissible at all under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i), but it would not matter, because that person would be inadmissible for life under the more expansive reading of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). Further, the alien who enters without inspection, remains for 8 months, and then leaves, is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i), but only for 3 years. That 3-year limitation would be meaningless, however, if section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) were interpreted to bar the person for life for the very same prior entry.11
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7 Some inadmissibility grounds, like the second prong of 212(a)(6)(A)(i), cover only present conduct. See, e.g., sections 212(a)(1)(A)(i) (determined “to have a communicable disease of public health significance”)(emphasis added); 212(a)(1)(A)(iv) (“determined … to be a drug addict”) (emphasis added); 212(a)(6)(D) (“is a stowaway”) (emphasis added). Other grounds cover only events that have occurred in the past (up to and including the present time). See, e.g., sections 212(a)(3)(B)(i) (“has engaged in a terrorist activity) (emphasis added); 212(a)(3)(E)(ii) (“ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in genocide”); 212(a)(6)(E) (“knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law”) (emphasis added). Still others cover only predictions of future activity. See, e.g., sections 212(a)(4)(A) (“is likely at any time to become a public charge”); 212(a)(10)(A) (“coming to the United States to practice polygamy”).

8 See, e.g., sections 212(a)(2)(D)(ii) (“procures or attempts to procure, or [less than ten years earlier] procured or attempted to procure … prostitutes”); 212(a)(3)(D)(i) (“is or has been a member of or affiliated with the Communist … party”); 212(a)(6)(C)(i) (fraudulently “seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit …”); 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) (“falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself” to be a U.S. citizen).

9 There is one scenario in which the first prong of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) would capture an alien who does not fall within even the more expansive interpretation of the second prong. If the alien seeks admission at a designated port of entry, is denied admission, is detained, escapes from detention, and then makes his or her way into the interior, he or she would be inadmissible under the first ground but not the second one. It would be far-fetched, however, to assume that this was the only intended use of the first ground in 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (present without admission or parole).

10 Former AFM section 40.6.2(a)(3)(ii) had stated that “[i]nadmissibility does not continue after the alien has departed the United States.” But if this language were interpreted to imply the converse – i.e., that inadmissibility does continue even after the alien has long since arrived in the United States (and terminates only upon departure) – the assumption would have to be that “arrives” means “arrives or, if the person has not departed, has arrived.” There is no apparent legal basis or policy reason to interpret “arrives” in that way.

The above considerations all come into play when an alien who entered without inspection subsequently receives parole. Such an alien will no longer be inadmissible under the first ground in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (present without having been admitted or paroled), because the alien has been paroled. And since that alien arrived in the United States only in the past, the second inadmissibility ground in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) is already inapplicable (even without the parole), because the alien is not one who “arrives” (present tense) at an undesignated time or place. It is not a question of parole curing or erasing the second inadmissibility ground. Rather, the alien who arrived in the past is already outside the ambit of that second ground; past arrivals are the subject of the first ground.

Interpreting the explicit statutory language exactly as it is written therefore avoids all these anomalies. An alien who entered the United States without inspection, but subsequently receives parole, is not inadmissible under either of the two inadmissibility grounds contained in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i).12

For an alien who entered without inspection, a grant of parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A) affects at least two of the eligibility requirements for adjustment of status. First, adjustment of status requires that the person be “admissible.” INA § 245(a)(2). As discussed above, parole eliminates one ground of inadmissibility, section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). Second, adjustment of status requires that the alien have been “inspected and admitted or paroled.” INA § 245(a). The grant of parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A) overcomes that obstacle as well. The alien must still, however, satisfy all the other requirements for adjustment of status. One of those requirements is that, except for immediate relatives of United States citizens and certain other individuals,13 the person has to have “maintain[ed] continuously a lawful status since entry into the United States.” INA § 245(c)(2). Parole does not erase any periods of prior unlawful status. Thus, an alien who entered without inspection will remain ineligible for adjustment, even after a grant of parole, unless he or she is an immediate relative or falls within one of the other designated exemptions. Moreover, even an alien who satisfies all the statutory prerequisites for adjustment of status additionally requires the favorable exercise of discretion.
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11 The only apparent counter-point is that, even if the language of the second prong (“arrives”) were read to mean “arrives or has ever arrived,” the limitations built into section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) would still be meaningful with respect to overstays (as opposed to those who entered without inspection). Nothing in the legislative history of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i), however, suggests a specific congressional focus on overstays, or a desire to distinguish between the two groups of undocumented aliens, or an intent to subject an alien to lifelong inadmissibility for having once before entered without inspection. Moreover, if a prior entry without inspection were enough to bar a person for life, then INA § 212(a)(9)(C), which prescribes that result only when the entry without inspection follows either one year of unlawful presence or a removal order, would be superfluous.

12 This analysis pertains exclusively to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). It does not and is not intended to disturb the long-standing principles that an alien granted parole remains an applicant for admission who is considered to be constructively standing at the border, see INA § 101(a)(13)(B); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 189 (1958); Ibragimov v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 2008); and that “an application for admission [is] a continuing one,” Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, 26 I&N Dec. 53, 56 (BIA 2012) (parole for criminal prosecution).

This PM supersedes any previous USCIS guidance on these issues, including the Memorandum to Field Leadership (AD07-18) at 5-6 (March 3, 2009).

Implementation

AFM Chapters 21.1 and 40.6 (AFM Update AD 12-30) are updated as follows.  1. A new section 21.1(c) is added to read:

21.1 General Information About Relative Petitions

(c) Special Parole Consideration for Spouses, Children and Parents of Active Duty Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, individuals in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve or Individuals Who Previously Served in the U.S. Armed Forces or the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve. The decision whether to grant parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A) is discretionary. Generally, USCIS grants parole in place only sparingly. The fact that the individual is a spouse, child or parent of an Active Duty member of the U.S. Armed Forces, an individual in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve or an individual who previously served in the U.S. Armed Forces or the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, however, ordinarily weighs heavily in favor of parole in place. Absent a criminal conviction or other serious adverse factors, parole in place would generally be an appropriate exercise of discretion for such an individual. If USCIS decides to grant parole in that situation, the parole should be authorized in one-year increments, with extensions of parole as appropriate.

To request parole, the alien must submit to the director of the USCIS office with jurisdiction over the alien’s place of residence:

o Completed Form I-131, Application for Travel Document (The USCIS Director has determined that in this situation the Form I-131 may be filed without fee, per 8 CFR 103.7(d));

o Evidence of the family relationship;
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13 INA § 245(c)(2) also exempts certain employment-based immigrants whose unlawful presence was for 180 days or less, in accordance with INA § 245(k)(2); aliens who were unlawfully present only in the past, without “fault” or for “technical reasons;” and certain subcategories of “special immigrant” described in INA § 101(a)(27)(H), (I), (J), or (K).

Evidence that the alien’s family member is an Active Duty member of the U.S. Armed Forces, individual in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve or an individual who previously served in the U.S. Armed Forces or the Selected Reserve or the Ready Reserve such as a photocopy of both the front and back of the service member’s military identification card (DD Form 1173);

o Two identical, color, passport style photographs; and

o Evidence of any additional favorable discretionary factors that the requestor wishes considered.

2. Chapter 40.6.2(a) of the AFM is revised: a. By amending Chapter 40.6.2(a)(1);

b. By deleting Chapter 40.6.2(a)(3)(ii);

c. By deleting Chapter 40.6.2(a)(4)(ii) and redesignating Chapter 40.6.2(a)(4)(iii) as Chapter 40.6.2(a)(4)(ii); and

d. By amending the redesignated Chapter 40.6.2(a)(4)(ii).

The revisions read as follows:

40.6.2 Individual Grounds of Inadmissibility Under INA Section 212(a)(6)

(a) INA Section 212(a)(6)(A): Alien Present Without Admission or Parole or Who Arrives at Undesignated Time or Place

(1) General. INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) contains two closely related inadmissibility grounds. The first ground relates to the alien who is “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” This inadmissibility ground generally covers those who entered the United States without inspection (and are still in the United States).

The second inadmissibility ground in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) relates to the alien “who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the [Secretary of Homeland Security].” Where the first inadmissibility ground leaves off, this one picks up. Using the present tense (“arrives”), it covers the alien who is in the process of entering U.S. territory without inspection.

The two inadmissibility grounds contained within section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) are thus complementary. Together, they capture aliens who have already achieved entry without inspection and those who are in the process of attempting such entry.

Parole. An alien who is paroled under INA section 212(d)(5)(A) will no longer be inadmissible under the first ground in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (present without being admitted or paroled), because the person has been paroled. And since that alien arrived in the United States only in the past, the second inadmissibility ground in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) is already inapplicable (even without the parole), because the alien is not one who “arrives” (present tense) at an undesignated time or place. It is not a question of parole curing or erasing the second inadmissibility ground. Rather, the alien who arrived in the past is already outside the ambit of that second ground; past arrivals are the subject of the first ground. Thus, an alien who entered the United States without inspection, but subsequently receives parole, is not inadmissible under either of the two inadmissibility grounds contained in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i).

For an alien who entered without inspection, a grant of parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A) affects at least two of the eligibility requirements for adjustment of status. First, adjustment of status requires that the person be “admissible.” INA § 245(a)(2). As discussed above, parole eliminates one ground of inadmissibility, section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). Second, adjustment of status requires that the alien have been “inspected and admitted or paroled.” INA § 245(a). The grant of parole overcomes that obstacle as well. The alien must still, however, satisfy all the other requirements for adjustment of status. One of those requirements is that, except for immediate relatives of United States citizens and certain other exempt categories listed in INA section 245(c)(2), the person has to have “maintain[ed] continuously a lawful status since entry into the United States.” Parole does not erase any periods of prior unlawful status or any other applicable grounds of inadmissibility. An alien who entered without inspection will therefore remain ineligible for adjustment, even after a grant of parole, unless he or she is an immediate relative or falls within one of the other designated exemptions. Moreover, even an alien who satisfies all the statutory prerequisites for adjustment of status additionally requires the favorable exercise of discretion.

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4) Exemptions and Waivers

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(ii) Waivers. There are no waivers available to applicants inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) other than the waivers (or inapplicabilities) described in AFM Chapter 40.6.1(b) or (c). As stated in AFM Chapter 40.6.2(a)(1), however, an alien paroled under INA section 212(d)(5)(A) is not inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i).

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3. The AFM Transmittal Memorandum button is revised by adding a new entry, in numerical order, to read:

Use

This PM is intended solely for the guidance of USCIS personnel in the performance of their official duties. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or by any individual or other party in removal proceedings, in litigation with the United States, or in any other form or manner.

Contact Information

Questions or suggestions regarding this PM should be addressed through appropriate channels to the Field Operations Directorate.

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Letter to Congress, Aug. 30, 2010 “On a case-by-case basis, DHS utilizes parole and deferred action to minimize periods of family separation, and to facilitate adjustment of status within the United States, by immigrants who are the spouses, parents, and children of military members.”

INA §201(b)(2)(A)(i) “the term ‘immediate relatives’ means the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States, except that, in the case of parents, such citizens shall be at least 21 years of age.”

Who is covered by PIP?

• “Immediate relatives” of US military personnel
• Active duty and Reserve Component (including National Guard)
• Combat duty not required
• Overseas duty not required
• Military connection to need for PIP

Who Should Not Apply for PIP?

• PIP does not solve other inadmissibility problems
– False claim to USC
– Prior deportation order, ULP bar
– Criminal grounds of inadmissibility
• PIP application may trigger removal
• Issues with parents
– Parents as military dependents

Procedure for PIP

• General Procedure
– File request with local USCIS office
– Do not file with USCIS HQ or lockbox
• After grant of PIP, file one-step adjustment
• Special Issues with Removal Proceedings
• What about family members of LPRs/CPRs?

A parole-in-place request is often proper for immediate military family members who entered the United States without inspection, do not have an eligible visa petition or labor certification filed on or before April 30, 2001, and do not otherwise fall into a special adjustment category.

Parole in place is available to the “spouses, parents, and children” of members of the U.S. Armed Forces. In immigration law, “immediate relatives” describes the spouses, unmarried children under age 21, and parents of U.S. citizens, although a U.S. citizen cannot normally file for a parent unless the U.S. citizen is 21 years old or older.

Parole in place may resolve the issue of whether a spouse, parent, or child has been “admitted or paroled,” but will not resolve immigration problems that involve issues other than ineligibility under INA § 245(a). A grant of parole in place will not, for example, lift a permanent bar for false claim to United States citizenship, work to waive a criminal ground of inadmissibility, relieve an immigrant of the consequences of a prior deportation or removal order, or allow an immigrant to adjust status when the immigrant needs a waiver of some other ground of inadmissibility. Parole in place only cures the problem that an immigrant cannot adjust status without showing that he or she has been “admitted or paroled.” Requesting parole in place may also not be advisable when there is no military-related reason to grant the parole. For example, USCIS may determine not to grant parole in place when the military member is about to be discharged from the military or when the military member is serving as an inactive Reserve member.

Step One: Obtain Parole in Place

In most USCIS field offices, a parole-in-place request consists of a hardship letter signed by the service member and accompanied by supporting documentation, which should be submitted to the local USCIS office having jurisdiction over the service member’s residence or place of duty.

A parole-in-place request letter for a noncitizen spouse is typically addressed to the director of the local USCIS field office or, if the client has an ongoing case with USCIS, the office that has issued the most recent decision regarding the family member’s immigration case. The letter should be accompanied with enclosures demonstrating all the relevant facts that argue for a grant of parole in place.

The opening paragraph of the hardship letter should state that this is a request for a parole in place so that the particular military family member can file an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) while in the United States. The body of the letter should describe the circumstances that led the service member to join the Armed Forces. The letter should then describe the history of the military member’s relationship with the family member seeking parole in place; establishing the bona fide nature of the relationship is extremely important as USCIS is unlikely to grant parole in place in any case in which there are indicators of marriage fraud. The family member’s immigration status should be discussed, including the status of any petitions filed for the family member, such as a Form I-130 (Petition for Alien Relative). The conditions of the family member’s home country at the time when he or she came to the United States should be discussed. The current conditions may be mentioned if they are such that a return to the country would pose a danger to the family member’s health or safety. If the family member is from a country where the military member is unable to travel, this fact should also be mentioned. If applicable, the family member’s loss of commissary and base exchange privileges, military housing, access to military family member health care, and assistance from the family readiness group may be mentioned. Finally, the hardship that the service member would experience if the family member were deported should be described in detail. If the military member or the military member’s children have special needs that make them especially dependent on the family member for support, these needs should be explained and supporting documentation provided where appropriate. At a minimum, the body of the letter must contain the service member’s name, date of birth, place of birth, rank in military, branch of service, and unit of assignment as well as the dates and places of birth of the family member and any children. Any upcoming deployments for which the military member is preparing should be mentioned.

Documents should include at least the following:

• the military member’s birth certificate and proof of U.S. citizenship (if applicable);

• the family member’s birth certificate;

• the birth certificates of any children;

• if the family member is the spouse, the couple’s marriage certificate and evidence of the bona fide nature of the marriage;

• two original passport photos of the family member;

• a copy of any deployment orders for the service member;

• military-related documents demonstrating the relationship, such as:

• the family member’s military identification and privilege card;

• a copy of any Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS) enrollment documentation for the family member (Form DD 1172);

• leave and earnings statement for the military member (showing current service and marital status, allotments to family members, or separation allowance);

• orders issued to the military member that name the family member;

• Certificate of Overseas Assignment to Support Application to File Petition for Naturalization, DD Form 1278 (if applicable);

• designation of family member as a beneficiary for the military member’s Servicemembers Group Life Insurance (SGLI) or for Family Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (FSGLI);

• evidence of the military member’s health insurance policy on behalf of the military family member;

• documentation showing that the family member resides in base or post housing;

• power of attorney showing that the military member has designated a spouse or parent to act as his or her attorney while the military member is deployed;

• living will or last will and testament designating the spouse or parent or child;

• pre-authorization by the military member for emergency financial assistance for the military family member; or

• military member’s record of emergency data, showing the family member as someone to notify of the military member’s injury or death; and

• additional documents that substantiate the case of hardship.

Parole-in-place determinations are made on a case-by-case basis and are purely discretionary. The client should not assume that his or her request is approved until USCIS officially notifies him or her of the approval. Typically, clients are notified to come for an interview with a USCIS officer who is specially trained to handle parole-in-place applications, and that officer will make an initial determination whether to grant the parole in place, but the officer’s decision will be reviewed at a higher level before the parole-in-place request is approved.

When the request for parole in place has been granted, the military family member will receive a parole document in the form of an I-94 card

Step Two: File and Complete a One-Step Adjustment or Move to Reopen a Previously Denied Adjustment Application

If the client has never filed anything at all with USCIS, once parole in place is granted, he or she should file a “one step” adjustment package with the relevant USCIS lockbox following the same procedures that attorneys use to file similar petitions for other lawfully present immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Typically, this package includes an immediate relative immigrant visa petition (Form I-130) and an Application to Register for Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) along with related documents including a copy of the parole document.

If the client had received a denial of his or her I-485 but already had an I-130 approved, the attorney should draft a letter addressed to the USCIS field office that issued the denial, requesting that the case be reopened. The attorney should enclose a certified copy of the parole document with the request.

Typically, the one-step adjustment process proceeds like any other adjustment application by the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen. Practitioners report that some USCIS offices are occasionally unfamiliar with the concept of a person adjusting status after being granted parole in place as the immediate family member of someone serving in the U.S. Armed Forces, but supplying the office with a copy of the Janet Napolitano letter to Congress–or, if all else fails, filing a request for assistance with the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman using the online system or DHS Form 7001–will usually remedy the situation.

FAMILY MEMBERS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

If the client is in proceedings, the attorney will also file a one-step application with USCIS because an immigration judge does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate an adjustment application by someone who has been granted parole in place.

Parole in place is possible when a person is in removal proceedings. If a military family member is in removal proceedings and is granted parole in place, an immigration judge would be prevented by regulation from adjudicating a follow-on adjustment application. USCIS, however, does have jurisdiction to adjudicate an adjustment application in this situation. Family members in this situation may file a new adjustment application with USCIS–after the parole in place is granted–and then request termination of proceedings without prejudice to allow them to pursue administrative remedies. Counsel may explain that, whether or not the immigration judge terminates, the respondent will still be eligible to adjust status, and, if the case is not terminated and the immigration proceeds, the immigration judge may be facing a future motion to reopen.

PROBLEMS WITH APPLICATIONS BY PARENTS

Although Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano has specifically advised members of Congress that parole in place is available to facilitate the adjustment of status of parents of U.S. military personnel, some USCIS offices are reluctant to grant parole in place to the parents of U.S. citizens serving in the military. Their reluctance is particularly problematic in that parents are not eligible–based on having a relationship with a son or daughter in the U.S. military–for a waiver of the bar to inadmissibility that is triggered when they depart the United States to apply abroad for a visa after having been in the United States in unlawful status. Parents may even sometimes be statutorily eligible for special immigration benefits as a result of having a son or daughter in the military who died in combat but may be prevented from obtaining those statutory benefits unless they are granted parole in place.

If USCIS is unnecessarily reluctant to grant parole in place to the parent of a U.S. military member, it may be helpful to have the military member enroll the parent in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS). Under military service regulations, the parents of a military member are considered to be military dependents if they meet certain requirements set by each service. Once parents are determined to be military dependents, they are given access to military facilities and benefits and will possess a military family member identification card. Refer to the regulations of the particular military service to determine when a parent qualifies as a military dependent. Even if a parent does not qualify as a military dependent, however, USCIS should grant parole in place to a parent where there is a strong, military-related need for the parole in place–such as the fact that the parent will be taking care of the military member’s child if the military member deploys overseas.

OBTAINING SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FROM THE MILITARY

Military family members have occasionally experienced problems obtaining military family member identification documents from military authorities despite the need for USCIS to have such documents in order to provide them for immigration benefits. These problems apparently stem from a misguided 2009 Department of Defense (DOD) regulation that is being interpreted to require DHS Form I-9 documents to verify a family member’s eligibility for DOD benefits.

Although immigration lawyers know that Form I-9 is only supposed to be used by employers to verify the employment eligibility of new hires, and for related DHS worksite enforcement actions, the DOD has been using the form improperly to determine eligibility for military benefits. The DOD has not been authorized by statute to use the Form I-9 to verify a dependent’s eligibility for family member benefits, and yet some DOD entities have been refusing to issue military family member identification cards to military family members who cannot produce the documents listed on the Form I-9. Military family member identification card offices point to a DOD directive as the source of this policy.

Family members who cannot produce the required documents are entered into DEERS with proof of identity and marriage or relationship to their military sponsor, but, until they return with acceptable documents for I-9 purposes, their record is locked and no military identification card office is able to issue a family member identification card to them. The policy allegedly exists so that the family members do not use their military identification cards to obtain drivers licenses and other government-issued identity documents.

Without an identification card, however, a deployed military member’s spouse may be turned away at a military medical facility for lack of a military identification card. To make matters worse, the DOD also reproduced an obsolete version of Form I-9 in the directive. Practitioners who have clients who experience problems obtaining documents from the military as a result of this apparently unlawful instruction should report the matter to their congressional representative or senators.

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BIA Precedent Decisions Volume 25 (3643 – 3765)

A-S-J-, 25 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 2012)

ID 3765 (PDF)

An Immigration Judge lacks jurisdiction to review the termination of an alien’s asylum status by the Department of Homeland Security pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a) (2007).


C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 2012)

ID 3764 (PDF)

(1) In order to meaningfully effectuate the statutory and regulatory privilege of legal representation where it has not been expressly waived by a respondent, an Immigration Judge must grant a reasonable and realistic period of time to provide a fair opportunity for the respondent to seek, speak with, and retain counsel.

(2) If a respondent expresses a fear of persecution or harm in a country to which he or she might be removed, the regulations require the Immigration Judge to advise the respondent of the right to apply for asylum or withholding of removal (including protection under the Convention Against Torture) and make the appropriate application forms available.

(3) If a respondent indicates that he or she will not waive appeal and is therefore ineligible for a grant of voluntary departure prior to the completion of removal proceedings under section 240B(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2006), the Immigration Judge should consider the respondent’s eligibility for voluntary departure at the conclusion of the proceedings under section 240B(b)(1).


CALDERON-HERNANDEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 885 (BIA 2012)

ID 3763 (PDF)

An applicant for cancellation of removal seeking to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his or her child is not required to provide an affidavit and other documentary evidence regarding the child’s care and support upon the alien’s removal if the child will remain in the United States with another parent, even if the other parent is in this country unlawfully. Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994), clarified.


AKRAM, 25 I&N Dec. 874 (BIA 2012)

ID 3762 (PDF)

(1) An alien who was admitted to the United States as a K-4 nonimmigrant may not adjust status without demonstrating immigrant visa eligibility and availability as the beneficiary of a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed by his or her stepparent, the United States citizen K visa petitioner.

(2) A K-4 derivative child of a K-3 nonimmigrant who married the United States citizen K visa petitioner after the K-4 reached the age of 18 is ineligible for adjustment of status because he or she cannot qualify as the petitioner’s “stepchild.”


VALENZUELA, 25 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 2012)

ID 3761 (PDF)

An alien who is admitted to the United States in K-4 nonimmigrant status may only adjust his or her status to that of a lawful permanent resident based on the Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed by the United States citizen K visa petitioner.


CUELLAR, 25 I&N Dec. 850 (BIA 2012)

ID 3760 (PDF)

(1) A formal judgment of guilt of an alien entered by a municipal court is a “conviction” under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006), if the proceedings in which the judgment was entered were genuine criminal proceedings. Matter of Rivera-Valencia, 24 I&NDec. 484 (BIA2008), and Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I&N Dec. 684 (BIA 2004), followed.

(2) A Wichita, Kansas, municipal ordinance which recapitulates a Kansas statute prohibiting marijuana possession is a “law or regulation of a State . . . relating
to a controlled substance” under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006).

(3) Possession of marijuana after a prior municipal ordinance conviction for marijuana possession in violation of former sections 65-4162(a) and (b) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated is an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B) of theAct by virtue of its correspondence to the Federal felony of “recidivist possession,” 21U.S.C. § 844 (2006), provided the prior conviction was final when the second offense was committed. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006), followed; Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010), and Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 2007), distinguished.


GUZMAN MARTINEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 845 (BIA 2012)

ID 3759 (PDF)

Pursuant to section 101(a)(13)(C)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii) (2006), a lawful permanent resident of the United States may be treated as an applicant for admission in removal proceedings if the Department of Homeland Security proves by clear and convincing evidence that the returning residentengaged in “illegal activity” at a United States port of entry.


VALENZUELA GALLARDO, 25 I&N Dec. 838 (BIA 2012)

ID 3758 (PDF)

(1) A crime “relate[s] to obstruction of justice” within the meaning of section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2006), if it includes the critical element of an affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice, irrespective of the existence of an ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding. Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 955 (BIA 1997), reaffirmed. Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. 889 (BIA 1999), clarified.

(2) A conviction for accessory to a felony under section 32 of the California Penal Code that results in a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year is a conviction for an aggravated felony
under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, because the offense “relate[s] to obstruction of justice.”


FERNANDEZ TAVERAS, 25 I&N Dec. 834 (BIA 2012)

ID 3757 (PDF)

(1) Section 101(a)(13)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2006), which relates to returning lawful permanent residents seeking admission at a port of entry, is not applicable to an alien applying for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006), who has the burden to prove admissibility to the United States.

(2) A lawful permanent resident who was granted cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006), in prior removal proceedings based on a drug conviction has the burden to prove that he is not inadmissible on the basis of the conviction when applying for adjustment of status in a subsequent removal proceeding.


ISIDRO, 25 I&N Dec. 829 (BIA 2012)

ID 3756 (PDF)

An applicant for cancellation of removal whose son or daughter met the definition of a “child” when the application was filed but turned 21 before the Immigration Judge adjudicated the application on the merits no longer has a qualifying relative under section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006). Matter of Bautista Gomez, 23 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 2006), clarified.


C. VALDEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 824 (BIA 2012)

ID 3755 (PDF)

An alien’s pre-November 28, 2009, admission to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”) by the CNMI Immigration Service does not constitute an inspection and admission or parole “into the United States” for purposes of adjustment of status pursuant to section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006).


O. VAZQUEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 817 (BIA 2012)

ID 3754 (PDF)

An alien may satisfy the “sought to acquire” provision of section 203(h)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1)(A) (2006), by filing an application for adjustment of status or by showing that there are other extraordinary circumstances in the case, particularly those where the failure to timely file was due to circumstances beyond the alien’s control.


SANCHEZ SOSA, 25 I&N Dec. 807 (BIA 2012)

ID 3753 (PDF)

(1) In determining whether good cause exists to continue removal proceedings to await the adjudication of an alien’s pending U nonimmigrant visa petition, an Immigration Judge should consider (1) the response of the Department of Homeland Security to the alien’s motion to continue; (2) whether the underlying visa petition is prima facie approvable; and (3) the reason for the continuance and other procedural factors.

(2) To establish prima facie eligibility for a U nonimmigrant visa, an alien must have suffered substantial physical ormental abuse as the innocent victimof a qualifying crime for which the alien has been, is being, or will be helpful to law enforcement, which ordinarily requires an approved law enforcement certification.

(3) An alien who has filed a prima facie approvable petition for a U visa with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services will ordinarily warrant a favorable exercise of discretion for a continuance for a reasonable period of time.


SKIRBALL CULTURAL CENTER, 25 I&N Dec. 799 (AAO 2012)

ID 3752 (PDF)

(1) Congress did not define the term “culturally unique,” as used in section 101(a)(15)(P)(iii) of the Immigration andNationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(P)(iii) (2006), leaving reasonable construction of that term to the expertise of the agency charged with adjudicating P-3 nonimmigrant visa petitions.

(2) The term “culturally unique,” as defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(p)(3) (2012), is not limited to traditional art forms, but may include artistic expression that is deemed to be a hybrid or fusion of more than one culture or region.

(3) As the regulatory definition provides for the cultural expression of a particular “group of persons,” the definition may apply to beneficiaries whose unique artistic expression crosses regional, ethnic, or other boundaries.

(4) The regulatory definition of “culturally unique” calls for a case-by-case factual determination.

(5) The petitioner bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiaries’ artistic expression, while drawing from diverse influences, is unique to an identifiable group of persons with a distinct culture; it is the weight and quality of evidence that establishes whether or not the artistic expression is “culturally unique.”


DIAZ-GARCIA, 25 I&N Dec. 794 (BIA 2012)

ID 3751 (PDF)

(1) The unlawful removal of an alien during the pendency of a direct appeal from a deportation or removal order in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a) (2012) does not deprive the Board of Immigration Appeals of jurisdiction to review the appeal.

(2) Where an accomplice is defined as one who aids another in the commission of an offense, a person convicted of being an accomplice to a crime has been convicted of the offense as a second-degree principal.


A-Y-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 791 (BIA 2012)

ID 3750 (PDF)

Following the enactment of the Child Status Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002), an unmarried alien seeking derivative asylum status based on the approval of his or her parent’s application for asylum who turned 21 while the application was pending continues to be classified as a “child” for purposes of qualifying for derivativestatus under section 208(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(B) (2006).


E. W. RODRIGUEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2012)

ID 3749 (PDF)

(1) In removal proceedings arising within the jurisdictions of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, an aggravated felony conviction disqualifies an alien from relief under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006), only if the conviction occurred after the alien was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident following inspection at a port of entry. Bracamontes v. Holder, Nos. 10-2033, 10-2280, 2012 WL 1037479 (4th Cir.Mar. 29, 2012);Martinez v.Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2008); and Lanier v. U.S. Attorney General, 631 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011), followed in jurisdiction only.

(2) In removal proceedings arising outside the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, section 212(h) relief is unavailable to any alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony after acquiring lawful permanent resident status, without regard to the manner in which such status was acquired. Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2010), reaffirmed.


ARRABALLY AND YERRABELLY, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012) (Amended Order)

ID 3748 (PDF)

An alien who leaves the United States temporarily pursuant to a grant of advance parole does not thereby make a “departure . . . from the United States” within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2006). Matter of Lemus, 24 I&N Dec. 373 (BIA 2007), clarified.


D-K-, 25 I&N Dec. 761 (BIA 2012)

ID 3747 (PDF)

(1) An alien who is a refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. § 1157 (2006), and has not adjusted status to that of a lawful permanent resident may be placed in removal proceedings without a prior determination by the Department of Homeland Security that the alien is inadmissible to the United States. Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I&N Dec. 407 (BIA 1986), distinguished.

(2) When removal proceedings are initiated against an alienwho has been “admitted” to the United States as a refugee, the charges of removability must be under section 237 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006), rather than section 212 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006).


M-W-, 25 I&N Dec. 748 (BIA 2012)

ID 3746 (PDF)

Pursuant to the categorical approach, a conviction for the aggravated felony of murder, as defined in section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(43)(A) (2006), includes a conviction for murder in violation of a statute requiring a showing that the perpetrator acted with extreme recklessness or a malignant heart, notwithstanding that the requisite mental state may have resulted from voluntary intoxication and that no intent to kill was established.


LEMUS, 25 I&N Dec. 734 (BIA 2012)

ID 3745 (PDF)

Adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2006), is unavailable to an alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2006), absent a waiver. Matter of Lemus, 24 I&N Dec. 373 (BIA 2007), clarified.


LANFERMAN, 25 I&N Dec. 721 (BIA 2012)

ID 3744 (PDF)

A criminal statute is divisible, regardless of its structure, if, based on the elements of the offense, some but not all violations of the statute give rise to grounds for removal or ineligibility for relief.


ILIC, 25 I&N Dec. 717 (BIA 2012)

ID 3743 (PDF)

For an alien to independently qualify for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2006), as a derivative grandfathered alien, the principal beneficiary of the qualifying visa petition must satisfy the requirements for grandfathering, including the physical presence requirement of section 245(i)(1)(C) of the Act, if applicable.


L-S-, 25 I&N Dec. 705 (BIA 2012)

ID 3742 (PDF)

(1) An asylum applicant who has established past persecution but no longer has
a well-founded fear of persecution may nevertheless warrant a discretionary grant
of humanitarian asylum based not only on compelling reasons arising out of the
severity of the past persecution, but also on a “reasonable possibility that he or she
may suffer other serious harm” upon removal to his or her country under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2011).

(2) “Other serious harm”may bewholly unrelated to the applicant’s past harmand need not
be inflicted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion, but the harm must be so serious that it equals the severity
of persecution.

(3) In determiningwhether an applicant has established a “reasonable possibility” of “other
serious harm,” adjudicators should focus on current conditions that could severely affect
the applicant, such as civil strife and extreme economic deprivation, as well as on the
potential for new physical or psychological harm that the applicant might suffer.


CASTRO RODRIGUEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 698 (BIA 2012)

ID 3741 (PDF)

An alien convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under State law has
the burden to show that the offense is not an aggravated felony because it involved a “small
amount of marihuana for no remuneration” within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4)
(2006), which the alien may establish by presenting evidence outside of the record of conviction. Matter of Aruna, 24 I&N Dec. 452 (BIA 2008),
clarified.


AVETISYAN, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012)

ID 3740 (PDF)

(1) Pursuant to the authority delegated by the Attorney General and the responsibility
to exercise that authority with independent judgment and discretion, the Immigration
Judges and the Board may administratively close removal proceedings, even if a party
opposes, if it is otherwise appropriate under the circumstances. Matter of Gutierrez,
21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996), overruled.

(2) In determining whether administrative closure of proceedings is appropriate,
an Immigration Judge or the Board should weigh all relevant factors, including but not
limited to: (1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any
opposition to administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed
on any petition, application, or other action he or she is pursuing outside of removal
proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility of either
party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate
outcome of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the proceedings or entry
of a removal order) when the case is recalendared before the Immigration Judge or the
appeal is reinstated before the Board.


J. R. VELASQUEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 680 (BIA 2012)

ID 3739 (PDF)

(1) The documents listed in section 240(c)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (2006), and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(a) (2011) are admissible
as evidence of a criminal conviction in immigration proceedings, but pursuant to 8 C.F.R.§ 1003.41(d), other probative evidencemay also be admitted to prove a
conviction in the discretion of the Immigration Judge.

(2) Conviction records thatwere submitted by electronicmeans are conclusively admissible
as evidence of a criminal conviction in immigration proceedings if they are authenticated
in themanner specified by section 240(c)(3)(C) of theAct and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(c), but
those methods of authentication, which operate as “safe harbors,” are not mandatory
or exclusive, and documents that are authenticated in other waysmay be admitted if they
are found to be reliable.

(3) A document that requires authentication but that is not authenticated is not admissible
as “other evidence that reasonably indicates the existence of a criminal conviction”
within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d).


U. SINGH, 25 I&N Dec. 670 (BIA 2012)

ID 3738 (PDF)

(1) A decision by a Federal court of appeals reversing a precedent decision of the Board
of Immigration Appeals is not binding authority outside the circuit in which the case
arises.

(2) A stalking offense for harassing conduct in violation of section 646.9(b) of the
California Penal Code is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006) and
is therefore an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006). Matter of Malta, 23 I&N Dec. 656
(BIA 2004), reaffirmed. Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007),
followed in jurisdiction only.


D-X- & Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 664 (BIA 2012)

ID 3737 (PDF)

(1) A facially valid permit to reside in a third country constitutes prima facie evidence
of an offer of firm resettlement pursuant to section 208(b)(2)(A)(vi) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2006), even if the permit was
fraudulently obtained.

(2) Where an asylum applicant who has resettled in a third country travels to the
United States or the country of claimed persecution and then returns to the country
of resettlement, he or she has not remained in that country “only as long aswas necessary
to arrange onward travel” for purposes of establishing an exception to firmresettlement
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(a) (2011).


R-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 657 (BIA 2012)

ID 3736 (PDF)

The respondent’s conviction for possession of child pornography is for a particularly
serious crime under section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006), based on the nature of the offense and the specific facts
and circumstances of the crime.


ESPINOSA GUILLOT, 25 I&N Dec. 653 (BIA 2011)

ID 3735 (PDF)

An alien who has adjusted status to that of a lawful permanent resident pursuant to the
Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161,
as amended, has been admitted to theUnited States and is subject to charges of removability
under section 237(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006).


CAMARILLO, 25 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2011)

ID 3734 (PDF)

Under the “stop-time rule” at section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2006), any period of continuous residence or continuous physical
presence of an alien applying for cancellation of removal under section 240A is deemed
to end upon the service of a notice to appear on the alien, even if the notice to appear does
not include the date and time of the initial hearing.


ISLAM, 25 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 2011)

ID 3733 (PDF)

(1) In determining whether an alien’s convictions for two or more crimes involving moral
turpitude arose out of a “single scheme of criminal misconduct” within the meaning
of section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006), the Board will uniformly apply its interpretation of that
phrase in all circuits. Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506 (BIA 1992), followed.

(2) Where the respondentwas convicted in two counties of forgery and possession of stolen
property based on his use of multiple stolen credit or debit cards to obtain items of value
from several retail outlets on five separate occasions over the course of a day, his crimes
did not arise out of a “single scheme of criminal misconduct.”


GUERRERO, 25 I&N Dec. 631 (BIA 2011)

ID 3732 (PDF)

(1) Because solicitation to commit a “crime of violence” is itself a crime of violence under
18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006), a felony conviction for solicitation to commit assault with
a dangerous weapon in violation of section 11-1-9 of the General Laws of Rhode Island
is for a crime of violence and therefore an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006), where
a sentence of 1 year or more has been imposed.

(2) The offense of solicitation is not an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(U)
of the Act because it is not an attempt or conspiracy.


RIVENS, 25 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2011)

ID 3731 (PDF)

(1) In order to establish that a returning lawful permanent resident alien is to be treated
as an applicant for admission to the United States, the Department of Homeland
Security has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that one of the six
exceptions to the general rule for lawful permanent residents set forth at section
101(a)(13)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)
(2006), applies.

(2) The offense of accessory after the fact is a crime involving moral turpitude, but only if
the underlying offense is such a crime.


BAUTISTA, 25 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 2011)

ID 3730 (PDF)

Attempted arson in the third degree in violation of sections 110 and 150.10 of the
New York Penal Law is an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(E)(i) of the
Immigration andNationalityAct, 8U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i) (2006), even though the State
crime lacks the jurisdictional element in the applicable Federal arson offense. Matter
of Vasquez-Muniz
, 23 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2002), followed.

 


ZAMORA-MOLINA, 25 I&N Dec. 606 (BIA 2011)

ID 3729 (PDF)

(1) Section 201(f)(2) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2) (2006),
governs whether an alien who is the beneficiary of a visa petition according him or her
second-preference status as the child of a lawful permanent resident under section
203(a)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A) (2006), is an immediate relative upon
the naturalization of the petitioning parent.

(2) Pursuant to section 201(f)(2) of the Act, an alien’s actual, not adjusted, age on the date
of his or her parent’s naturalization determines whether he or she is an immediate
relative.

(3) Section 204(k)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(k)(2) (2006), does not allow an alien
to retain his or her 2A-preference status by opting out of automatic conversion to the
first-preference category as a son or daughter of a United States citizen upon his or her
parent’s naturalization.


CRUZ DE ORTIZ, 25 I&N Dec. 601 (BIA 2011)

ID 3728 (PDF)

Because section 246(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (2006),
relates only to proceedings to rescind lawful permanent resident status acquired through
adjustment of status, the 5-year statute of limitations in that section is not applicable to bar
the removal of an alien who was admitted to the United States with an immigrant visa.
Garcia v. Attorney General of the United States, 553 F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2009), distinguished.


FIGUEROA, 25 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 2011)

ID 3727 (PDF)

When an application for Temporary Protected Status that has been denied by the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is renewed in removal
proceedings, the Immigration Judge may consider any material and relevant evidence,
regardless of whether the evidence was previously considered in proceedings before the
USCIS.


HERRERA DEL ORDEN, 25 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 2011)

ID 3726 (PDF)

Until an alien who is arrested without a warrant is placed in formal proceedings by the
filing of a Notice to Appear (Form I-862), the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c) (2011) does
not require immigration officers to advise the alien that he or she has a right to counsel and
that any statements made during interrogation can subsequently be used against the alien.


E-R-M-F- & A-S-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 580 (BIA 2011)

ID 3725 (PDF)

Until an alien who is arrested without a warrant is placed in formal proceedings by the filing of a Notice to Appear (Form I-862), the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c) (2011) does not require immigration officers to advise the alien that he or she has a right to counsel and that any statements made during interrogation can subsequently be used against the alien.


HENRIQUEZ RIVERA, 25 I&N Dec. 575 (BIA 2011)

ID 3724 (PDF)

When an application for Temporary Protected Status that has been denied by the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is renewed in removal
proceedings, the Immigration Judge may, in the appropriate circumstances, require the Department of Homeland Security to provide the application that the applicant filed with the
USCIS.


RAMON MARTINEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 571 (BIA 2011)

ID 3723 (PDF)

A violation of section 220 of the California Penal Code is categorically a crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 16(a) and (b) (2006).


BUSTAMANTE, 25 I&N Dec. 564 (BIA 2011)

ID 3722 (PDF)

The bar to cancellation of removal in section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2006), which precludes an alien who has been
convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2006),from establishing eligibility for relief, may not be overcome by a waiver under section
212(h) of the Act.


SALOMON, 25 I&N Dec. 559 (BIA 2011)

ID 3721 (PDF)

Nonidentical reciprocal discipline of an attorney does not amount to a “grave injustice”
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)(2)(iii) (2011) where the attorney has engaged in wide-ranging
misconduct and was disciplined in multiple jurisdictions.


RUIZ-LOPEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 551 (BIA 2011)

ID 3720 (PDF)

(1) The offense of driving a vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or willful disregard for
the lives or property of others while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle
in violation of section 46.61.024 of the Revised Code of Washington is a crime involving
moral turpitude.

(2) The maximum sentence possible for an offense, rather than the standard range
of sentencing under a State’s sentencing guidelines, determines an alien’s eligibility for
the “petty offense” exception under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006).


LE, 25 I&N Dec. 541 (BIA 2011)

ID 3719 (PDF)

A derivative child of a nonimmigrant fiancé(e) visa holder under section 101(a)(15)(K)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii) (2006), is not ineligible for adjustment of status simply by virtue of having turned 21 after admission to the United States on a K-2 nonimmigrant visa.


N-C-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 535 (BIA 2011)

ID 3718 (PDF)

To be eligible for late initial registration for Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”),
an applicant filing as the “child of an alien currently eligible to be a TPS registrant” must
establish only that he or she qualified as a “child” at the time of the initial registration period,
not at the time the application was filed.


N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526 (BIA 2011)

ID 3717 (PDF)

(1) Opposition to state corruption may, in some circumstances, constitute the expression
of political opinion or give a persecutor a reason to impute such an opinion to an alien.

(2) For claims arising under the REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of Pub. L. No. 109-13,
119 Stat. 302, a showing of retaliation for opposing governmental corruption is, by itself,
insufficient to establish eligibility for relief; instead, an alien must persuade the trier
of fact that his or her actual or imputed anticorruption belief (or other protected trait) was
one central reason for the harm.

(3) In making the nexus determination, an Immigration Judge should consider: (1) whether
and to what extent the alien engaged in activities that could be perceived as expressions
of anticorruption beliefs; (2) any direct or circumstantial evidence that the persecutor was
motivated by the alien’s actual or perceived anticorruption beliefs; and (3) any evidence
regarding the pervasiveness of corruption within the governing regime.


E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2011)

ID 3716 (PDF)

(1) Section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006), does not limit the prosecutorial discretion of the Department
of Homeland Security to place arriving aliens in removal proceedings under section 240
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006).

(2) The fact that an Immigration Judge has no jurisdiction over applications for
adjustment of status under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161, as amended, does not negate his or her jurisdiction over
the removal proceedings of arriving Cuban aliens under section 240 of the Act.


ECHEVERRIA, 25 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 2011)

ID 3715 (PDF)

(1) A late initial registrant for Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) under 8 C.F.R. § 1244.2(f)(2) (2011) must independently meet all initial registration requirements of TPS.

(2) One of the initial registration requirements applicable to a late initial registrant is that
the applicant must be a national (or, in the case of an alien having no nationality, a habitual
resident) of a foreign state currently designated for TPS by the Attorney General.


STRYDOM, 25 I&N Dec. 507 (BIA 2011)

ID 3714 (PDF)

A conviction under section 21-3843(a)(1) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated for violation
of the no-contact provision of a protection order issued pursuant to section 60-3106 of the
Kansas Protection from Abuse Act constitutes a deportable offense under section
237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2006).


A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 2011)

ID 3713 (PDF)

(1) Pursuant to section 208(b)(2)(A)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2006), and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (2011), the framework for making
firm resettlement determinations focuses exclusively on the existence of an offer
of permanent resettlement and allows for the consideration of direct and indirect evidence.

(2) The Department of Homeland Security has the initial burden to make a prima facie
showing of an offer of firm resettlement by presenting direct evidence of an alien’s ability
to stay in a country indefinitely; when direct evidence is unavailable, indirect evidence
may be used if it has a sufficient level of clarity and force to establish that the alien is able
to permanently reside in the country.

(3) An asylum applicant can rebut evidence of a firm resettlement offer by showing
by a preponderance of the evidence that such an offer has not been made or that the
applicant’s circumstances would render him or her ineligible for such an offer
of permanent residence.

(4) Evidence that permanent resident status is available to an alien under the law of the
country of proposed resettlement may be sufficient to establish a prima facie showing
of an offer of firm resettlement, and a determination of firm resettlement is not contingent
on whether the alien applies for that status. Matter of Soleimani, 20 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA
1989), modified.


DORMAN, 25 I&N Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011)

ID 3712 (PDF)

The Attorney General vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and
remanded for the Board to make specific findings with regard to the respondent’s eligibility
for cancellation of removal.


M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474 (BIA 2011)

ID 3711 (PDF)

(1) Aliens in immigration proceedings are presumed to be competent and, if there are
no indicia of incompetency in a case, no further inquiry regarding competency is required.

(2) The test for determining whether an alien is competent to participate in immigration
proceedings is whether he or she has a rational and factual understanding of the nature and
object of the proceedings, can consult with the attorney or representative if there is one,
and has a reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses.

(3) If there are indicia of incompetency, the Immigration Judge must make further inquiry
to determine whether the alien is competent for purposes of immigration proceedings.

(4) If the alien lacks sufficient competency to proceed, the Immigration Judge will evaluate
appropriate safeguards.

(5) Immigration Judges must articulate the rationale for their decisions regarding
competency issues.

 


CUBOR, 25 I&N Dec. 470 (BIA 2011)

ID 3710 (PDF)

Personal service of a Notice to Appear (Form I-862) on a minor who is 14 years of age
or older at the time of service is effective, and the regulations do not require that notice also
be served on an adult with responsibility for the minor.


AHORTALEJO-GUZMAN, 25 I&N Dec. 465 (BIA 2011)

ID 3709 (PDF)

Evidence outside of an alien’s record of conviction may properly be considered
in determining whether the alien has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
only where the conviction record itself does not conclusively demonstrate whether the alien
was convicted of engaging in conduct that constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), followed


D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445 (BIA 2011)

ID 3708 (PDF)

(1) The respondent’s deliberate omission from his refugee application that he was a special
police officer during the Bosnian War, during which time he served in an entity that was
part of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Srpska, could have affected or influenced the
Government’s decision whether to grant him refugee status and was therefore a willful
misrepresentation of a material fact.

(2) The respondent is removable under section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (2006), where the totality of the record
supported the conclusion that he assisted in the extrajudicial killing of 200 Bosnian
Muslims that his unit was involved in capturing, including evidence of his command
responsibility, his presence, his platoon’s active participation, and the finding that
he must have been aware that many other Bosnian Muslims who were similarly situated
had been executed nearby several days earlier.

(3) An Immigration Judge may make reasonable inferences from direct and circumstantial
evidence in the record as a whole and is not required to accept a respondent’s account
where other plausible views of the evidence are supported by the record.

(4) An expert witness is broadly defined as one who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education and who has specialized knowledge that will
assist the Immigration Judge to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.


SESAY, 25 I&N Dec. 431 (BIA 2011)

ID 3707 (PDF)

(1) Under section 245(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(d) (2006),
a fiancé(e) visa holder can only adjust status based on the marriage to the fiancé(e)
petitioner. Matter of Zampetis, 14 I&N Dec. 125 (Reg. Comm’r 1972), superseded.

(2) A fiancé(e) visa holder whose bona fide marriage to the fiancé(e) visa petitioner is more
than 2 years old at the time the adjustment application is adjudicated is not subject to the
provisions for conditional resident status under section 216 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a
(2006).

(3) A fiancé(e) visa holder satisfies the visa eligibility and visa availability requirements of
section 245(a) of the Act on the date he or she is admitted to the United States as a K-1
nonimmigrant, provided that the fiancé(e) enters into a bona fide marriage with the
fiancé(e) petitioner within 90 days.

(4) A fiancé(e) visa holder may be granted adjustment of status under sections 245(a) and
(d) of the Act, even if the marriage to the fiancé(e) visa petitioner does not exist at the time
that the adjustment application is adjudicated, if the applicant can demonstrate that he or
she entered into a bona fide marriage within the 90-day period to the fiancé(e) visa petitioner.


VO, 25 I&N Dec. 426 (BIA 2011)

ID 3706 (PDF)

Where the substantive offense underlying an alien’s conviction for an attempt offense
is a crime involving moral turpitude, the alien is considered to have been convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of section 237(a)(2)(A) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2006), even though that section makes
no reference to attempt offenses.


GUEVARA ALFARO, 25 I&N Dec. 417 (BIA 2011)

ID 3705 (PDF)

(1) Any intentional sexual conduct by an adult with a child involves moral turpitude,
as long as the perpetrator knew or should have known that the victim was under the
age of 16. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), followed.
Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 2007), not followed.

(2) Absent otherwise controlling authority, Immigration Judges and the Board
of Immigration Appeals are bound to apply all three steps of the procedural framework
set forth by the Attorney General in Matter of Silva-Trevino for determining whether
a particular offense constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.


NELSON, 25 I&N Dec. 410 (BIA 2011)

ID 3704 (PDF)

Once an alien has been convicted of an offense that stops the accrual of the 7-year period
of continuous residence required for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006), section 240A(d)(1) of the Act
does not permit such residence to restart simply because the alien has departed from, and
returned to, the United States.


ALYAZJI, 25 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 2011)

ID 3703 (PDF)

In general, an alien’s conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude triggers
removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006), only if the alien committed the crime within 5 years after the date
of the admission by virtue of which he or she was then present in the United States. Matter
of Shanu, 23 I&N Dec. 754 (BIA 2005), overruled in part.


SOSA VENTURA, 25 I&N Dec. 391 (BIA 2010)

ID 3702 (PDF)

(1) A grant of Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) waives certain grounds of
inadmissibility or deportability solely for the limited purpose of permitting an alien
to remain and work temporarily in the United States for the period of time that TPS
is effective.

(2) It is not proper to terminate an alien’s removal proceedings based on a grant of TPS.


SORAM, 25 I&N Dec. 378 (BIA 2010)

ID 3701 (PDF)

The crime of unreasonably placing a child in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the
child’s life or health in violation of section 18-6-401(1)(a) of the Colorado Revised Statutes
is categorically a crime of child abuse under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2006), even though no proof of actual harm
or injury to the child is required. Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA
2008), clarified.


CHAWATHE, 25 I&N Dec. 369 (AAO 2010)

ID 3700 (PDF)

(1) For purposes of establishing the requisite continuous residence in naturalization
proceedings pursuant to section 316(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(b) (2006), a publicly held corporation may be deemed an “American firm
or corporation” if the applicant establishes that the corporation is both incorporated
in the United States and trades its stock exclusively on U.S. stock exchange markets.

(2) When an applicant’s employer is a publicly held corporation that is incorporated in the
United States and trades its stock exclusively on U.S. stock markets, the applicant need
not demonstrate the nationality of the corporation by establishing the nationality of those
persons who own more than 51% of the stock of that firm. Matter of Warrach, 17 I&N
Dec. 285, 286-87 (Reg. Comm’r 1979), clarified.

(3) In most administrative immigration proceedings, the applicant must prove
by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.

(4) Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant,
probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “more
likely than not” or “probably” true, the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof.
Matter of E-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm’r 1989), followed.

(5) If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either
request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim
is probably not true, deny the application or petition.


AL WAZZAN, 25 I&N Dec. 359 (AAO 2010)

ID 3699 (PDF)

(1) Although section 204(j) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j)
(2000), provides that an employment-based immigrant visa petition shall remain valid
with respect to a new job if the beneficiary’s application for adjustment of status has
been filed and remained unadjudicated for 180 days, the petition must have been “valid”
to begin with if it is to “remain valid with respect to a new job.”

(2) To be considered “valid” in harmony with related provisions and with the statute
as a whole, the petition must have been filed for an alien who is “entitled” to the
requested classification and that petition must have been “approved” by a U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) officer pursuant to his or her authority
under the Act.

(3) Congress specifically granted USCIS the sole authority to make eligibility
determinations for immigrant visa petitions under section 204(b) of the Act.
(4) An unadjudicated immigrant visa petition is not made “valid” merely through the act
of filing the petition with USCIS or through the passage of 180 days.


GRUENANGERL, 25 I&N Dec. 351 (BIA 2010)

ID 3698 (PDF)

The crime of bribery of a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A) (2006)
is not an offense “relating to” commercial bribery and is therefore not an aggravated
felony under section 101(a)(43)(R) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(R) (2006).


C-T-L-, 25 I&N Dec. 341 (BIA Dec. 2010)

ID 3697 (PDF)

The “one central reason” standard that applies to asylum applications pursuant to section
208(b)(1)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006),
also applies to applications for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(A) of the
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006).


ANYELO, 25 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 2010)

ID 3696 (PDF)

The holding in Matter of G-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 2001), as to the notice required
to authorize the entry of an in absentia order, is applicable to cases arising in the Eleventh
Circuit. Dominguez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 284 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002), distinguished.


GARCIA, 25 I&N Dec. 332 (BIA 2010)

ID 3695 (PDF)

A conviction for a single crime involving moral turpitude that qualifies as a petty offense
is not for an “offense referred to in section 212(a)(2)” of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2006), for purposes of triggering the “stop-time” rule in section
240A(d)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2006), even if it renders the alien removable
under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006).


LEGASPI, 25 I&N Dec. 328 (BIA 2010)

ID 3694 (PDF)

An alien is not independently “grandfathered” for purposes of adjustment of status under
section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1255(i) (2006), simply
by virtue of marriage to another alien who is “grandfathered” under section 245(i) as the
result of having been a derivative beneficiary of a visa petition.


X-M-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 322 (BIA 2010)

ID 3693 (PDF)

(1) A determination that an alien has filed a frivolous application for asylum, pursuant
to section 208(d)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6)
(2006), can be made in the absence of a final decision on the merits of the asylum
application.

(2) Withdrawal of an alien’s asylum application after the required warnings and safeguards have been provided does not preclude a finding that the application is frivolous.


CASILLAS-TOPETE, 25 I&N Dec. 317 (BIA 2010)

ID 3692 (PDF)

An alien is removable under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2006), as one who was inadmissible at the time of entry
or adjustment of status pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)
(2006), where an appropriate immigration official knows or has reason to believe that the
alien is a trafficker in controlled substances at the time of admission to the United States.
Matter of Rocha, 20 I&N Dec. 944 (BIA 1995), modified.


PEDROZA, 25 I&N Dec. 312 (BIA 2010)

ID 3691 (PDF)

An alien’s conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude does not render him ineligible
for cancellation of removal under section 40A(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2006), if his crime is punishable by imprisonment for
a period of less than a year and qualifies for the petty offense exception under section
212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006). Matter of Cortez,
25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010), followed.


CORTEZ , 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010)

ID 3690 (PDF)

(1) An alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
for which a sentence of a year or longer may be imposed has been convicted
of an offense “described under” section 237(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)
(2006), and is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal under section
240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2006), regardless of the alien’s
eligibility for the petty offense exception under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006). Matter of Almanza, 24 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA
2009), clarified. Matter of Gonzalez-Zoquiapan, 24 I&N Dec. 549 (BIA 2008); Matter
of Gonzalez-Silva, 24 I&N Dec. 218 (BIA 2007); and Matter of Garcia-Hernandez,
23 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 2003), explained.

(2) In determining which offenses are “described under” sections 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), and
237(a)(3) of the Act for purposes of section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, only language
specifically pertaining to the criminal offense, such as the offense itself and the sentence
imposed or potentially imposed, should be considered.

(3) The respondent’s misdemeanor conviction for welfare fraud in violation of section
10980(c)(2) of the California Welfare and Institutions Code rendered her ineligible for
cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, because it was for
a crime involving moral turpitude for which she could have been sentenced to a year
in county jail and was therefore for an offense “described under” section 237(a)(2) of the
Act.


REZA, 25 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 2010)

ID 3689 (PDF)

A grant of Family Unity Program benefits does not constitute an “admission” to the
United States under section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006), for purposes of establishing that an alien has accrued the
requisite 7-year period of continuous residence after having been “admitted in any status”
to be eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1229b(a)(2) (2006).


QUILANTAN, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010)

ID 3688 (PDF)

For purposes of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006), an alien seeking to show that
he or she has been “admitted” to the United States pursuant to section 101(a)(13)(A) of the
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006), need only prove procedural regularity in his or her
entry, which does not require the alien to be questioned by immigration authorities or be
admitted in a particular status. Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980),
reaffirmed.


VELASQUEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 278 (BIA 2010)

ID 3687 (PDF)

The misdemeanor offense of assault and battery against a family or household member
in violation of section 18.2-57.2(A) of the Virginia Code Annotated is not categorically
a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2006) and therefore not categorically a crime
of domestic violence within the meaning of section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2006).


SANCHEZ-CORNEJO, 25 I&N Dec. 273 (BIA 2010)

ID 3686 (PDF)

The offense of delivery of a simulated controlled substance in violation of Texas law is not
an aggravated felony, as defined by section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006), but it is a violation of a law relating
to a controlled substance under former section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994).


GARCIA ARREOLA, 25 I&N Dec. 267 (BIA 2010)

ID 3685 (PDF)

Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006),
requires mandatory detention of a criminal alien only if he or she is released from non-DHS
custody after the expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules (“TPCR”) and only
where there has been a post-TPCR release that is directly tied to the basis for detention under
sections 236(c)(1)(A)–(D) of the Act. Matter of Saysana, 24 I&N Dec. 602 (BIA 2008),
overruled; Matter of Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. 1102 (BIA 1999), modified.


INTERIANO-ROSA, 25 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 2010)

ID 3684 (PDF)

When an application for relief is timely filed but supporting documents are not submitted
within the time established, the Immigration Judge may deem the opportunity to file the
documents to be waived but may not deem the application itself abandoned.


CASTILLO-PADILLA, 25 I&N Dec. 257 (BIA 2010)

ID 3683 (PDF)

(1) Conditional parole under section 236(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B) (2006), is a distinct and different procedure from parole under
section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2006).

(2) An alien who was released from custody on conditional parole pursuant to section
236(a)(2)(B) of the Act has not been “paroled into the United States” for purposes
of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006).


MENDEZ-ORELLANA, 25 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 2010)

ID 3682 (PDF)

(1) In removal proceedings, the antique firearm exception in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (2006)
is an affirmative defense that must be sufficiently raised by an alien charged under section
237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2006),
as an alien who has been convicted of an offense involving a firearm.

(2) Where the Department of Homeland Security has presented evidence that an alien has
been convicted of an offense involving a firearm, it has met its burden of presenting clear
and convincing evidence of deportability, and the burden then shifts to the respondent
to show that the weapon was, in fact, antique.


MONGES, 25 I&N Dec. 246 (BIA 2010)

ID 3681 (PDF)

(1) The 90-day time limitation for filing a motion to reopen in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)
(2010) applies to motions to reopen in absentia deportation orders for the purpose
of adjusting status, whether filed before or after the 1996 promulgation of the regulations.

(2) The 5-year limitation on discretionary relief for failure to appear at deportation
proceedings under former section 242B(e)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1252b(e)(1) (1994), is not in conflict with, and does not provide an exception
to, the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).


B-Y-, 25 I&N Dec. 236 (BIA 2010)

ID 3680 (PDF)

(1) In making a frivolousness determination, an Immigration Judge may incorporate
by reference any factual findings made in support of an adverse credibility finding,
so long as the Immigration Judge makes explicit findings that the incredible aspects of the
asylum application were material and were deliberately fabricated. Matter of Y-L-,
24 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 2007), clarified.

(2) In considering an asylum applicant’s explanations for inconsistencies or discrepancies,
an Immigration Judge making a frivolousness determination must separately address the
applicant’s explanations in the context of how they may have a bearing on the materiality
and deliberateness requirements unique to that determination.

(3) When the required frivolousness warnings have been given to an asylum applicant prior
to the merits hearing, the Immigration Judge is not required to afford additional warnings
or to seek further explanation in regard to inconsistencies that have become obvious
during the course of the hearing.


ALANIA, 25 I&N Dec. 231 (BIA 2010)

ID 3679 (PDF)

Aliens who are otherwise eligible to adjust status under section 245(i) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2006), are not subject to the unauthorized
employment restrictions of sections 245(c) and the exception for such employment in section
245(k) that apply to applications for adjustment of status under section 245(a).


RICHARDSON, 25 I&N Dec. 226 (BIA 2010)

ID 3678 (PDF)

(1) The term “conspiracy” in section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) (2006), is not limited to conspiracies that require the
commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by one of the conspirators.

(2) An alien who was only convicted of conspiracy to commit an aggravated felony and
is removable on the basis of that conviction under section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Act may
not also be found removable for the underlying substantive offense, even though the record
of conviction shows that the conspirators actually committed the substantive offense.


KOLJENOVIC, 25 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2010)

H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010)

ID 3676 (PDF)

(1) Whether an alien has presented sufficient evidence to establish a well-founded fear
of persecution is a legal determination that is reviewed de novo by the Board
of Immigration Appeals.

(2) In order to determine, under de novo review, whether specific facts are sufficient
to meet a legal standard such as a “well-founded fear,” the Board has authority to give
different weight to the evidence from that given by the Immigration Judge.

(3) State Department reports on country conditions are highly probative evidence and
are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations.

(4) The evidence presented by the respondents, considered in light of State Department
country reports specific to Fujian Province, failed to establish a reasonable possibility
that either respondent would be subject to forced sterilization due to having two children
born in the United States or would face penalties or sanctions so severe that they would
rise to the level of persecution.


PEREZ RAMIREZ, 25 I&N Dec. 203 (BIA 2010)

MILIAN, 25 I&N Dec. 197 (BIA 2010)

ID 3674 (PDF)

In applying the modified categorical approach to assess an alien’s conviction, it is proper
to consider the contents of police reports as part of the record of conviction if they were
specifically incorporated into the guilty plea or were admitted by the alien during the
criminal proceedings.


T-M-H- & S-W-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 193 (BIA 2010)

DIAZ AND LOPEZ, 25 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 2010)

ID 3672 (PDF)

An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i) (2006), is ineligible for adjustment of status
under section 245(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2006). Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec.
355 (BIA 2007), reaffirmed.


MORALES, 25 I&N Dec. 186 (BIA 2010)

ID 3671 (PDF)

A stepparent who qualifies as a “parent” under section 101(b)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (2006), at the time of the proceedings is a qualifying
relative for purposes of establishing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for
cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)
(2006).


ROSE, 25 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 2010)

ID 3670 (PDF)

A conditional permanent resident under section 216(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a) (2006), who is seeking to remove the conditional basis of that
status and who has timely filed the petition and appeared for the interview required under
section 216(c)(1), does not need a separate section 216(c)(4) hardship waiver if the
petitioning spouse died during the 2-year conditional period.


MARCAL NETO, 25 I&N Dec. 169 (BIA 2010)

ID 3669 (PDF)

Immigration Judges have authority to determine whether the validity of an alien’s
approved employment-based visa petition is preserved under section 204(j) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j) (2006), after the alien’s change in jobs
or employers. Matter of Perez Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 829 (BIA 2005), overruled.


GAMERO, 25 I&N Dec. 164 (BIA 2010)

ID 3668 (PDF)

(1) Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3) (2010), an Immigration Judge who grants an alien
voluntary departure must advise the alien that proof of posting of a bond with the
Department of Homeland Security must be submitted to the Board of Immigration
Appeals within 30 days of filing an appeal and that the Board will not reinstate a period
of voluntary departure in its final order unless the alien has timely submitted sufficient
proof that the required bond has been posted.

(2) Where the Immigration Judge did not provide all the advisals that are required upon
granting voluntary departure and the respondent failed to submit timely proof to the
Board that a voluntary departure bond had been posted, the record was remanded for the
Immigration Judge to grant a new period of voluntary departure and to provide the
required advisals.


KRONEGOLD, 25 I&N Dec. 157 (BIA 2009)

ID 3667 (PDF)

(1) Where disciplinary proceedings are based on a final order of suspension or disbarment,
the order creates a rebuttable presumption that reciprocal disciplinary sanctions
should follow, which can be rebutted only if the attorney demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the underlying disciplinary proceeding resulted in a deprivation
of due process, that there was an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct, or that
discipline would result in a grave injustice.

(2) In determining whether to impose reciprocal discipline on an attorney who has been
suspended or disbarred by a State court, the Board of Immigration Appeals conducts
a deferential review of the proceedings that resulted in the initial discipline.

(3) Where the respondent was disbarred in New York, which precludes an attorney from
seeking reinstatement for 7 years, and he failed to rebut the presumption that reciprocal
discipline should be imposed, his suspension from practice before the Board, the
Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security for 7 years was
an appropriate sanction.


MARTINEZ-SERRANO, 25 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 2009)

ID 3666 (PDF)

(1) An alien’s conviction for aiding and abetting other aliens to evade and elude
examination and inspection by immigration officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006)
and 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) (2006) establishes that the convicted alien is removable under
section 237(a)(1)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(i)
(2006).

(2) Where the facts underlying the respondent’s conviction demonstrated that she knowingly
assisted other aliens to enter the United States in violation of law, clear and convincing
evidence established that she is removable under section 237(a)(1)(E)(i) of the Act.


PORTILLO-GUTIERREZ, 25 I&N Dec. 148 (BIA 2009)

ID 3665 (PDF)

A stepchild who meets the definition of a “child” under section 101(b)(1)(B) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(B) (2006), is a qualifying relative
for purposes of establishing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for cancellation
of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006).


VELASCO, 25 I&N Dec. 143 (BIA 2009)

ID 3664 (PDF)

(1) The voluntary departure regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(4), Nt. (2009), which took
effect on January 20, 2009, and superseded Matter of Diaz-Ruacho, 24 I&N Dec. 47 (BIA
2006), do not apply retroactively.

(2) Where an Immigration Judge granted voluntary departure prior to January 20, 2009, and
the alien failed to timely post the voluntary departure bond required by section 240B(b)(3)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(3) (2006), the former
regulatory scheme, as interpreted in Matter of Diaz-Ruacho, remains applicable, and the
penalties imposed by section 240B(d)(1) for failure to depart within the voluntary
departure period do not apply.

(3) Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3)(ii), Nt., a voluntary departure order entered
by an Immigration Judge on or after January 20, 2009, will not be reinstated by the Board
of Immigration Appeals in its final order on appeal unless the alien provides the Board,
within 30 days of filing the appeal, sufficient proof that the voluntary departure bond was
timely posted with the Department of Homeland Security.


URENA, 25 I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 2009)

ID 3663 (PDF)

(1) Dangerous aliens are properly detained without bond pending the completion
of proceedings to remove them from the United States.

(2) Only if an alien has established that he would not pose a danger to property or persons
should an Immigration Judge decide the amount of bond necessary to ensure the alien’s
presence at proceedings to remove him from the United States.

(3) Where an Immigration Judge characterized an alien seeking release from custody as a “potential” danger to the community but ordered him released upon the posting
of a bond amount, the record was remanded for the Immigration Judge to clarify whether
the alien met his burden of proving that his release on bond would not pose a danger
to property or persons.


RAJAH, 25 I&N Dec. 127 (BIA 2009)

ID 3662 (PDF)

(1) In determining whether good cause exists to continue removal proceedings to await
the adjudication of a pending employment-based visa petition or labor certification,
an Immigration Judge should determine the alien’s place in the adjustment of status
process and consider the applicable factors identified in Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec.
785 (BIA 2009), and any other relevant considerations.

(2) An alien’s unopposed motion to continue ongoing removal proceedings to await the
adjudication of a pending employment-based visa petition should generally be granted
if approval of the visa petition would render him prima facie eligible for adjustment
of status.

(3) The pendency of a labor certification is generally not sufficient to warrant a grant
of a continuance.


MARTINEZ ESPINOZA, 25 I&N Dec. 118 (BIA 2009)

ID 3661 (PDF)

(1) An alien may be rendered inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006), on the basis of a conviction for possession or use of drug paraphernalia.

(2) An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act based on a drug paraphernalia offense may qualify for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act if that offense “relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana.”


MORENO-ESCOBOSA, 25 I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 2009)

ID 3660 (PDF)

(1) The date of an alien’s plea agreement, rather than the date of sentencing, is controlling
in determining whether the alien is eligible for a waiver under former section 212(c)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994).

(2) The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Abebe
v. Mukasey
, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009), does not invalidate 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3 (2009),
so as to preclude an alien who seeks to waive a deportation ground from establishing
eligibility for section 212(c) relief.


YAURI, 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009)

ID 3659 (PDF)

(1) With a narrow exception not applicable to this case, the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate an arriving
alien’s application for adjustment of status under 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1) (2009) and agrees
that it retains jurisdiction to adjudicate the application even where an unexecuted
administratively final order of removal remains outstanding.

(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals generally lacks authority to reopen the proceedings
of aliens under final orders of exclusion, deportation, or removal who seek to pursue relief
over which the Board and the Immigration Judges have no jurisdiction, especially where
reopening is sought simply as a mechanism to stay the final order while the collateral
matter is resolved by the agency or court having jurisdiction to do so.

(3) With regard to untimely or number-barred motions to reopen, the Board will not
generally exercise its discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte for an arriving alien
to pursue adjustment of status before the USCIS.


CARRILLO, 25 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2009)

ID 3658 (PDF)

In determining whether an alien whose status was adjusted pursuant to section 1 of the
Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of November 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161,
is removable as an alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
committed within 5 years after the alien’s “date of admission,” the admission date
is calculated according to the rollback provision of section 1, rather than the date adjustment
of status was granted.


GARCIA-GARCIA, 25 I&N Dec. 93 (BIA 2009)

ID 3657 (PDF)

(1) An Immigration Judge has authority under section 236(a)(2)(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) (2006), and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (2009)
to review and consider whether to modify the conditions of release imposed on an alien
by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

(2) Where the respondent filed an application with the Immigration Judge to ameliorate
the terms of release within 7 days of his release from custody by the DHS, the Immigration
Judge had jurisdiction to review and modify the condition placed on the respondent’s
release that he participate in the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program.


SILITONGA, 25 I&N Dec. 89 (BIA 2009)

ID 3656 (PDF)

Under 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(1) and 1245.2(a)(1)(ii) (2009), Immigration Judges have
no jurisdiction to adjudicate an application filed by an arriving alien seeking adjustment
of status, with the limited exception of an alien who has been placed in removal proceedings
after returning to the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole to pursue
a previously filed application.


G-D-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 82 (BIA 2009)

ID 3655 (PDF)

An alien who entered the United States pursuant to a crewman’s visa for the purpose of
obtaining employment as a crewman is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal
under section 240A(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(1)
(2006). Matter of Goncalves, 10 I&N Dec. 277 (BIA 1963), followed.


EVRA, 25 I&N Dec. 79 (BIA 2009)

ID 3654 (PDF)

The conduct underlying an alien’s arrest and incarceration does not constitute “fault”
within the meaning of section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (2006), which provides that an order of removal issued at a
hearing conducted in absentia may be rescinded if the alien was in Federal or State custody
at the time of the scheduled hearing and the failure to appear was “through no fault of the
alien.”


A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2009)

ID 3653 (PDF)

(1) Notwithstanding the heading of section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2006), which only refers to nonpermanent residents, a lawful
permanent resident who qualifies as a battered spouse may be eligible to apply for
cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) of the Act.

(2) Given the nature and purpose of the relief of cancellation of removal for battered
spouses under section 240A(b)(2) of the Act, such factors as an alien’s divorce from an
abusive spouse, remarriage, and previous self-petition for relief based on the abusive
marriage are relevant in determining whether an application for that relief should be
granted in the exercise of discretion.


LAMUS, 25 I&N Dec. 61 (BIA 2009)

ID 3652 (PDF)

A motion to reopen to apply for adjustment of status based on a marriage entered into after
the commencement of removal proceedings may not be denied under the fifth factor
enumerated in Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002), based on the mere fact that
the Government has filed an opposition to the motion, without regard to the merit of that opposition.


BULNES, 25 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 2009)

ID 3651 (PDF)

An alien’s departure from the United States while under an outstanding order of deportation
or removal issued in absentia does not deprive the Immigration Judge of jurisdiction to
entertain a motion to reopen to rescind the order if the motion is premised upon lack of
notice.


LUJAN-QUINTANA, 25 I&N Dec. 53 (BIA 2009)

ID 3650 (PDF)

The Board of Immigration Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review an appeal by the
Department of Homeland Security of an Immigration Judge’s decision to vacate an expedited
removal order after a claimed status review hearing pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1235.3(b)(5)(iv)
(2009), at which the Immigration Judge determined the respondent to be a United States
citizen.


LOPEZ-ALDANA, 25 I&N Dec. 49 (BIA 2009)

ID 3649 (PDF)

An applicant for Temporary Protected Status may seek de novo review by an
Immigration Judge in removal proceedings, regardless of whether all appeal rights before the
Department of Homeland Security have been exhausted. Matter of Barrientos, 24 I&N Dec.
100 (BIA 2007), clarified.


A-W-, 25 I&N Dec. 45 (BIA 2009)

ID 3648 (PDF)

(1) The Attorney General has not delegated authority to Immigration Judges, under 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2009), to redetermine the conditions of custody imposed by the Department
of Homeland Security with respect to aliens who have not been issued and served with a
Notice to Appear (Form I-862) in relation to removal proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
Part 1240 (2009).

(2) An alien admitted to the United States pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program who has not
been served with a Notice to Appear pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Part 1240 is not entitled to a
custody hearing before an Immigration Judge under 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d). Matter
of Gallardo
, 21 I&N Dec. 210 (BIA 1996), superseded.


BARCENAS-BARRERA, 25 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2009)

ID 3647 (PDF)

(1) An alien who willfully and knowingly makes a false representation of birth in
the United States on a passport application is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (2006), for making
a false representation of United States citizenship.

(2) The respondent, who was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (2006) for
falsely representing that she was born in the United States on an application for a
passport, is removable under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A)
(2006), as an alien who was inadmissible at the time of her adjustment of status under
section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act.


WANG, 25 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 2009)

ID 3646 (PDF)

The automatic conversion and priority date retention provisions of the Child Status
Protection Act, Pub L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002), do not apply to an alien who ages
out of eligibility for an immigrant visa as the derivative beneficiary of a fourth-preference
visa petition, and on whose behalf a second-preference petition is later filed by a different
petitioner.


CARDIEL, 25 I&N Dec. 12 (BIA 2009)

ID 3645 (PDF)

A conviction for receipt of stolen property under section 496(a) of the California Penal
Code, with a sentence of imprisonment of at least 1 year, categorically qualifies as a receipt
of stolen property aggravated felony conviction under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2006).


A-T-, 25 I&N Dec. 4 (BIA 2009)

ID 3644 (PDF)

(1) Requests for asylum or withholding of removal premised on past persecution related to
female genital mutilation must be adjudicated within the framework set out by the
Attorney General in Matter of A-T-, 24 I&N Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008).

(2) Once past persecution on account of an enumerated ground is shown, a presumption is
triggered that there would be future harm on the basis of the original claim or, in other
words, on account of the same statutory ground.

(3) An applicant for asylum or withholding should clearly indicate what enumerated
ground(s) he or she is relying upon in making a claim, including the exact delineation of
any particular social group to which the applicant claims to belong.


COMPEAN, BANGALY & J-E-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009)

ID 3643 (PDF)

The Attorney General vacated the decision in Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-,
24 I&N Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009), and pending the outcome of a rulemaking process, directed
the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Judges to continue to apply the
previously established standards for reviewing motions to reopen based on claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.





 

Posted in BIA, BIA Precedent Decisions, BIA Precedent Decisions Volume 25 | Leave a comment

Concurrent Filing of immigrant petition and the adjustment application

Concurrent Filing

Concurrent filing is when an immigrant petition and the adjustment application (application for a green card, Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status) are filed at the same time and mailed together with all the required filing fees and supporting documentation to the same filing location.

Who can file concurrently?

Concurrent filing is allowed in the following instances:

  • Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens living in the United States
  • Most employment based applicants and their eligible family members when a visa number is immediately available
  • Special Immigrant Juveniles
  • Self petitioning battered spouse or child if
  • The abusive spouse or parent is a U.S. citizen, or
  • If an immigrant visa number is immediately available
  • Certain Armed Forces Members applying for a special immigrant visa under Section101(a)(27)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)Special Immigrant International Organization Employee or family member

Consular Processing and Concurrent Filing

Concurrent filing cannot occur in consular processed cases, as the immigrant petition is filed with USCIS and the application for an immigrant visa is filed with the Department of State. Therefore concurrent filing is only seen in the context of an immigrant who is adjusting to permanent resident status (a green card) while in the United States.

Visa Availability and Concurrent Filing

A petition and application may be filed concurrently when there is a visa number immediately available at the time of filing. Concurrent filing is always allowed for all immediate relatives of a United States citizen, since there are no numeric limitations in this category. However, in some categories, even if there is a visa number available at the time of filing, concurrent filing is not allowed as the intending immigrant must have an approved basis of eligibility (i.e. an approved petition) before being allowed to file for adjustment of status. For more information on if you can file concurrently, refer to the instructions on your immigrant petition:

When adjudicating concurrent filings, the determination of eligibility for the immigrant visa petition is made first. If a visa number remains available for the immigrant classification and the Form I-485 is approvable (which in certain cases requires an interview) USCIS will generally consider the adjustment application at the same time. Separate decision notices will be sent for both forms.

For more information, see Visa Availability & Priority Dates
Also, Visa Bulletin

Posted in Adjustment of Status | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Guidance on Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers

U.S. Department of Homeland Security January 24, 2014 Field Guidance

SUBJECT: Guidance Pertaining to Applicants for Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Field Operations Directorate Washington, DC 20529

Purpose: This field guidance addresses the adjudication of Form I-601A, Application for Provisional Unlawful Presence Waiver in cases involving applicants with criminal history.

Scope: This field guidance applies to and binds all USCIS employees. Authority: 8 CFR 212.7(e)

Guidance Pertaining to Applicants for Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers

Background

On March 4, 2013, we began a new provisional unlawful presence waiver program for certain relatives of U.S. citizens whose only ground of inadmissibility is unlawful presence in the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). See 78 FR 536-01 (January 3, 2013). The provisional unlawful presence waiver process allows immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (spouses, children, or parents) who are currently residing in the United States to apply for a provisional waiver while in the United States, provided they meet all eligibility requirements outlined in 8 CFR 212.7(e) and warrant a favorable exercise of discretion.

There are several circumstances that may render an individual ineligible for a provisional unlawful presence waiver. For example, individuals with final orders of exclusion, deportation, or removal; individuals who are currently in removal proceedings that are not administratively closed at the time of filing; and individuals who have a pending application with USCIS for lawful permanent resident status are not eligible to apply for the provisional unlawful presence waiver. Individuals for whom there is a reason to believe that they may be subject to grounds of inadmissibility other than unlawful presence at the time of the immigrant visa interview with a Department of State (DOS) consular officer also are ineligible for the provisional unlawful presence waiver. See 8 CFR 212.7(e) (2013).

If a USCIS officer determines, based on the record, that there is a reason to believe that the applicant may be subject to a ground of inadmissibility other than unlawful presence at the time of his or her immigrant visa interview with a DOS consular officer, USCIS will deny the request for a provisional unlawful presence waiver. See 8 CFR 212.7(e)(4)(i) (2013).

In some cases, USCIS has denied a Form I-601A if an applicant has any criminal history. In these cases, if the record contains evidence that an applicant was charged with an offense or convicted of any crime (other than minor traffic citations such as parking violations, red light/stop sign violations, expired license or registration, or similar offenses), regardless of the sentence imposed or whether the offense is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), USCIS has denied the Form I-601A. 1

All applicants who are ineligible for a provisional unlawful presence waiver, including applicants with a criminal history, may seek a waiver of inadmissibility abroad after they appear for their immigrant visa interviews at a U.S. Embassy or consulate.

We have examined whether USCIS officers should find a reason to believe that an applicant may be subject to inadmissibility under INA section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) at the time of the immigrant visa interview if it appears that the applicant’s criminal offense falls within the “petty offense” or “youthful offender” exception under INA section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) or it appears that the applicant’s criminal offense is not a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under INA section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). After further consideration, USCIS issues this field guidance.

Field Guidance

USCIS officers should review all evidence in the record, including any evidence submitted by the applicant or the attorney of record. If, based on all evidence in the record, it appears that the applicant’s criminal offense: (1) falls within the “petty offense” or “youthful offender” exception under INA section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) at the time of the I-601A adjudication, or (2) is not a CIMT under INA section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) that would render the applicant inadmissible, then USCIS officers should not find a reason to believe that the individual may be subject to inadmissibility under INA section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) at the time of the immigrant visa interview solely on account of that criminal offense. The USCIS officer should continue with the adjudication to determine whether the applicant meets the other requirements for the provisional unlawful presence waiver, including whether the applicant warrants a favorable exercise of discretion.

Use

This field guidance is intended solely for the guidance of USCIS personnel in the performance of their official duties. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or by any individual or other party in removal proceedings, in litigation with the United States, or in any other form or manner.

Contact Information

Questions or suggestions regarding this field guidance should be addressed through appropriate directorate channels to the Field Operations Directorate.

Posted in Application for Provisional Unlawful Presence WaiverI-601A, I-601A, Provisional Waivers, Stateside Processing of I-601A Waivers, The Provisional Waiver, Unlawful Presence, Unlawfully Present in the United States, Waivers, Waivers of Inadmissibility | Tagged , | Leave a comment

CA7 holds that misadvice and failure to advise does not evade the non‐retroactivity of Padilla

Chavarria, born in Mexico, became a legal permanent U.S. resident in 1982. In 2009, Chavarria pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine. One year later, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, imposing a duty on defense attorneys to inform noncitizen clients of deportation risks stemming from plea agreements, and held that legal advice, or the lack thereof, involving the prospect of deportation resulting from guilty pleas can support a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Chavarria filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his trial counsel stated that “the attorney had checked with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement … and they said they were not interested” in deporting him. Chavarria was deported before counsel was appointed. The district court denied a motion to dismiss, holding that Padilla could be applied retroactively. Shortly thereafter, the Seventh Circuit decided, in Chaidez v. U.S., that Padilla was a new rule and not retroactive. The district court vacated its ruling and dismissed. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court affirmed Chaidez, foreclosing Chavarria’s argument that Padilla was retroactive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Chaidez distinguished between providing no advice (actionable under Padilla) and providing bad advice (actionable under pre‐Padilla law).

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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 11‐3549 JULIO CESAR CHAVARRIA, Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. No. 2:10‐CV‐191 — Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 1, 2013 — DECIDED JANUARY 9, 2014

Before CUDAHY, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. This case involves an ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning the effect of Chavarria’s guilty plea on his immigration status. Defendant Julio Cesar Chavarria, born in Mexico, became a legal permanent resident of the United States in 1982. In 2009, Chavarria was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, four counts of distributing cocaine. No. 11‐3549

One year later, the United States Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Padilla imposed a duty on criminal attorneys to inform noncitizen clients of deportation risks stemming from plea agreements, and for the first time held that the Sixth Amendment supported ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from legal advice, or the lack thereof, involving the prospect of deportation resulting from guilty pleas. See Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 (2012) (explaining the new Padilla rule). Chavarria then filed a pro se motion involving such a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Chavarria alleged that his criminal trial counsel responded to his deportation queries by indicating that Chavarria need not worry about deportation—specifically that “the attorney had checked with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement … and they said they were not interested” in deporting him. Chavarria also alleged that his attorney had counseled him to defer to the cues of his attorney during questioning by the district court. In connection with his § 2255 motion, Chavarria filed a Petition to Stay Deportation Proceedings, but by the time counsel had been appointed for these motions, he had already been deported. The government subsequently sought to dismiss Chavarria’s § 2255 motion based, in part, on the contention that Padilla announced a new rule not to be applied retroactively. The district court denied the government’s motion for dismissal, holding that the Padilla rule could be applied retroactively.

Shortly thereafter, we issued our opinion in Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). The Chaidez majority concluded that Padilla was a new rule and not retroactive. In light of Chaidez, the district court vacated its ruling based on the retroactivity of Padilla, and dismissed Chavarria’s § 2255 motion.

Chavarria appealed, challenging both our decision in Chaidez, and the district court’s application of it here. After the government filed its response brief, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Chaidez and subsequently affirmed. After Chaidez thus foreclosed Chavarria’s argument that Padilla was retroactive, he now argues that Chaidez distinguished between providing no advice (actionable under the Padilla rule) and providing bad advice (actionable under pre‐Padilla law).

I.

At the outset we briefly note that Chaidez foreclosed any argument that Padilla was retroactive, the original basis of Chavarria’s appeal. On collateral review, lacking retroactivity, we will look only to the state of the law at the time the conviction became final. For that reason, Chavarria originally argued that Padilla did not propound a new rule, but that it was merely another step in the evolution of ineffective assistance claims. However, the Supreme Court decided definitively that Padilla announced a new rule, which was not retroactive, when it affirmed our decision in Chaidez. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1105.

II.

His retroactivity argument gone, Chavarria now argues that under Padilla only failure to advise of immigration consequences constitutes ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment, but affirmative misadvice provides an alternative basis for a constitutional claim under pre‐Padilla law.

This argument about affirmative misadvice is based on certain Chaidez language, which recognized precedent from three circuits holding that, pre‐Padilla, misstatements about deportation could support an ineffective assistance claim. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1112 (“Those decisions [in three circuits] reasoned only that a lawyer may not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead his client on any important matter, however related to a criminal prosecution.”). Thus, Chavarria argues that Padilla is irrelevant to Chavarria’s situation—because affirmative misrepresentations have long been subject to challenge under the test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Chavarria’s argument fails, first, because the distinction between affirmative misadvice and non‐advice was not a relevant factor in Padilla. Second, the precedent, pre‐Padilla, supporting the application of Strickland in this context is insufficient to satisfy Teague v. Lane. 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)(holding that to impart retroactivity, a rule must be supported by ample existing precedent).

A lawyer’s advice about matters not involving the “direct” consequences of a criminal conviction—collateral matters—is, in fact, irrelevant under the Sixth Amendment; such advice is categorically excluded from analysis as professionally incompetent, as measured by Strickland. Padilla departed from this direct‐collateral distinction because of the “unique” nature of deportation. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366. That case determined that “a lawyer’s advice (or non‐advice)” should not be exempt from Sixth Amendment scrutiny without reference to the traditional distinction between direct and collateral consequences. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110. Therefore, in its analysis, the Padilla majority was unconcerned with any distinction between affirmative misadvice and non‐advice; because, until Padilla was decided, the Sixth Amendment did not apply to deportation matters at all. Id. (“It was Padilla that first rejected the categorical approach— and so made the Strickland test operative—when a criminal lawyer gives (or fails to give) advice about immigration consequences.”). Thus, regardless of how egregious the failure of counsel was if it dealt with immigration consequences, pre‐Padilla, both the Sixth Amendment and the Strickland test were irrelevant.

The Chaidez majority jointly referred to both misadvice and non‐advice throughout its opinion. There is no question that the majority understood that Padilla announced a new rule for all advice, or lack thereof, with respect to the consequences of a criminal conviction for immigration status. If taken out of context, language in Chaidez offers some support for Chavarria’s argument, but that language is contradicted by a substantial amount of more specific language in the same opinion. See e.g., Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110 (referring jointly to scrutiny of a lawyer’s misadvice and “nonadvice”).

Ironically, Chavarria asks us to recognize a distinction between misadvice and non‐advice, even though Padilla was itself about an affirmative misrepresentation. In fact, this distinction, which is thin on its own terms, fails on Padilla’s facts. Thus, Chavarria is essentially asking us to hold that Chaidez held that the Padilla rule is not retroactive except on Padilla’s own facts (which involved misadvice). In fact, the Padilla majority, in responding to the government’s argument to limit its holding, specifically discussed limiting its holding to only affirmative misadvice, but did not because of the possible absurd results. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 370–71. This discussion signals that the Padilla majority had no intent to exclude either affirmative misadvice or non‐advice from the new rule it announced.

Finally, Chavarria relies on cases from three federal circuits to prove that the distinction between affirmative misadvice and the failure to advise, and a constitutional rule based on that distinction constitutes pre‐Padilla precedent. Yet, under Teague, the rule sought by Chavarria must be dictated by existing precedent. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Chavarria cannot simply show the existence of such a distinction, but instead he must show that the distinction was so evident “that all reasonable judges, prior to Padilla, thought they were living in a Padilla‐like world.” Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1112.

The Court supported this conclusion by reiterating the trend among the lower courts, which viewed such collateral deportation matters as beyond the reach of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1113. The Court stated, “[o]n those courts’ view, the Sixth Amendment no more demanded competent advice about a plea’s deportation consequences than it demanded competent representation in the deportation process itself. Padilla decided that view was wrong. But to repeat: it was Padilla that did so.” Id. The material misrepresentations that were upheld by those three circuits cannot support a constitutional rule to be applied retroactively, since an old rule is one “limited to those holdings so compelled by precedent that any contrary conclusion must be deemed unreasonable.” See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 538 (1997). At the time Chavarria’s case became final, precedent did not dictate that preclusion of an ineffective assistance claim was unreasonable when it arose from an attorney’s material misrepresentation of a deportation risk. Thus, even if this Court were to find the misadvice/nonadvice distinction relevant to this analysis, it does not have the clear precedential weight to be considered a pre‐Padilla rule.

The district court correctly concluded that it was bound by Chaidez and that Padilla had no retroactive effect on Chavarria’s case. Having determined that the distinction between affirmative misadvice and failure to advise does not somehow evade the non‐retroactivity of Padilla, we AFFIRM.

Posted in 7th Circuit, 7th Circuit Cases- Aliens, Chicago Immigration Court, ineffective assistance of counsel, Padilla, Padilla v. Kentucky | Leave a comment