Constitutional Guardrails: Why Habeas Corpus Matters to Every American Patriot

In a development that deserves serious attention from all Americans who cherish constitutional freedoms, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller recently announced that the administration is “actively looking at” suspending habeas corpus for certain detainees. On May 9, 2025, Miller justified this consideration by citing an “invasion” at the southern border.

For patriots who value our founding principles, this proposal warrants careful examination regardless of which administration proposes it or which group it targets.

What’s At Stake: The Great Writ

Habeas corpus- often called the “Great Writ”-requires government authorities to justify an individual’s detention before a court. It prevents indefinite imprisonment without charges, trial, or legal representation. The Founders considered this protection so fundamental that they specifically limited when it could be suspended in Article I of the Constitution: only in “Cases of Rebellion or Invasion” when “public Safety may require it.”

A Constitutional Thought Experiment

To understand the importance of habeas corpus, consider a hypothetical question: What if the defendants on January 6th were denied this constitutional protection?
Without habeas corpus, approximately 1,417 individuals charged in connection with the Capitol events could have been detained indefinitely with:
• No formal charges required
• No right to appear before a judge
• No ability to challenge evidence or the conditions of their confinement
• No access to attorneys

About 24% of these defendants faced obstruction charges. The Supreme Court’s June 2024 ruling that limited which January 6th defendants could be charged with obstructing Congress demonstrates precisely why judicial review matters. Without habeas corpus, these Americans would have remained imprisoned despite the Court’s determination that particular prosecutions were legally flawed.

Constitutional Principles for All Americans

Whether you believe the January 6th prosecutions were justified, the principle remains: in America, we don’t imprison people without judicial review. Period.

Many patriots rightfully express concern about government overreach and the erosion of constitutional protections. These same principles should apply consistently, regardless of who is detained or which administration is in power.

The Founders understood that unchecked detention power was the hallmark of tyranny, not limited government. The Suspension Clause limits when habeas corpus can be suspended precisely because it recognizes this danger.

Historical records show that the Founders deliberately placed strict constitutional limits on when habeas corpus could be suspended. Article I, Section 9 explicitly states, “The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” These limitations, invasion, and public safety were necessary for the Founders’ intent to prevent casual or arbitrary suspension.

The debates at the Constitutional Convention further demonstrate the Founders’ concerns about unchecked detention powers. When habeas corpus was discussed on August 28, 1787, James Wilson of Pennsylvania actively “opposed the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus” that Gouverneur Morris had proposed. Similarly, Charles Pinckney argued that the writ “should not be suspended but on the most urgent occasions, and then only for a limited time not exceeding twelve months.” These objections highlight the Founders’ wariness about granting the federal government power to detain individuals without judicial review.

Historical research confirms that the Founders understood habeas corpus as a safeguard against arbitrary detention. By the Founding period, the privilege had “come to encompass a general right of persons owing allegiance and thereby enjoying the protection of domestic law – most especially citizens – not to be detained without charges for criminal or national security purposes in the absence of a valid suspension.” The Constitution Center notes that the writ is “a crucial means by which a prisoner can obtain freedom.”

The Founders recognized that “the entire point of suspending the privilege was to endow the Executive with the power to arrest and detain such persons without criminal charges in times of war.” This extraordinary power was precisely why they imposed strict limits on invoking it. Throughout early American history, “it was virtually taken for granted that where a valid suspension was not in place – even during wartime – citizens owing allegiance who were suspected of supporting the enemy could only be detained on American soil under substantiated criminal charges.”

This historical evidence confirms that the Founders viewed unchecked detention power as contradictory to limited government principles and established constitutional safeguards accordingly.

Historical Perspective

Throughout American history, habeas corpus has only been suspended four times: during the Civil War, Reconstruction, the 1905 Philippine insurrection, and briefly after Pearl Harbor. Each instance involved extraordinary circumstances that genuinely threatened national survival.

Miller’s suggestion that current immigration challenges constitute an “invasion” warranting suspension represents an expansive interpretation of constitutional language that deserves scrutiny from those who value strict constitutional construction.

Why This Matters to All Patriots

True constitutional conservatives understand that dangerous precedents threaten everyone’s liberty when fundamental rights are suspended for any group. Once established, the legal precedents that permit government detention without judicial review for one group today become the very weapons that can strip away your freedoms tomorrow.

Our constitutional republic depends on maintaining key safeguards against government power, regardless of which party controls Washington. Justice Scalia noted, “The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive.”

When government officials consider suspending fundamental rights guaranteed since our nation’s founding, every American patriot should pay close attention. After all, the Constitution we defend protects “all persons within its jurisdiction,” regardless of political creed or conviction.

This sacred document embodies the promise we make when we pledge allegiance to our flag—“with liberty and justice for all,” a commitment that transcends the ballot box, the partisan divide, and the shifting tides of public opinion, reflecting the profound commitment to universal human dignity upon which this nation was established.

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BIA’s Decision in Matter of CHOC-TUT: Implications for Immigration Bond Proceedings

Case Overview
Felipe CHOC-TUT faced multiple arrests in 2024 for driving offenses, including three DUIs with high blood alcohol levels. Despite this, an IJ granted him a $4,000 bond, partly relying on a State court’s decision to set a low bail of $500. DHS appealed, arguing he was a danger to the community. The BIA agreed, overturning the IJ’s decision and ordering detention without bond, emphasizing the gravity of his repeated offenses. The BIA ruled that while IJs can consider State court decisions on dangerousness and bail, they don’t have to defer to them. This means IJs must judge based on immigration law, which can lead to stricter outcomes, like detention, even if State courts set a lower bail. This is crucial for immigrants with criminal records, as it may result in tougher detention decisions in immigration court.

The case involved Felipe CHOC-TUT, a respondent with multiple pending criminal charges related to driving offenses, including three arrests within a short period in 2024 for driving without a license, careless driving, and driving under the influence (DUI), with blood alcohol content levels of .201 and .214. The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially granted a bond of $4,000 on July 23, 2024, finding the respondent credible and not a danger to the community or a flight risk, partly relying on the State court’s decision to set a low bail of $500 after his third arrest.

DHS appealed this decision, arguing that the IJ erred in concluding the respondent met his burden of proving he was not a danger. In its decision dated February 25, 2025, the BIA sustained the appeal, vacated the IJ’s custody redetermination, and ordered the respondent detained without bond.

Legal Framework and Analysis

The legal framework for immigration bond proceedings is governed by Section 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows IJs to grant bond if they conclude, in their discretion, that release is warranted. The burden is on the respondent to demonstrate they are not a danger to property or persons and are likely to appear for future proceedings, as outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (2025) and supported by precedents like Matter of Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. 1102 (BIA 1999), and Matter of Urena, 25 I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 2009).

The BIA’s ruling in Matter of CHOC-TUT specifically addressed the relationship between State court custody orders and immigration bond proceedings. The decision clarified that while IJs may consider a State court’s assessment of dangerousness and the amount of bail set, they do not defy these orders. This is because the legal standards for bail in State courts may differ from those in immigration court, and IJs must make independent determinations under the INA and applicable precedents, as reinforced by Matter of Panin, 28 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2024).
Key Findings and Reasoning

The BIA found that the IJ’s reliance on the State court’s low bail setting was misplaced, particularly given the respondent’s repeated and serious offenses. The decision highlighted that driving under the influence is a “grave danger to the community,” citing Matter of Siniauskas, 27 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2018), and Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), which recognized DUI as an extremely dangerous crime. The respondent’s arrests, including a second DUI arrest just 18 days after the first, indicated a “strong disregard for public safety,” as noted in Portillo-Rendon v. Holder, 662 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2011).

The BIA concluded that the IJ’s bond determination lacked a “reasonable foundation,” as required by Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006), and reversed the decision, ordering detention without bond.

This underscores that only if an alien establishes they are not a danger should the IJ proceed to set a bond amount, per Matter of Urena, 25 I&N Dec. at 141.

Implications and Broader Context t

This ruling has significant implications for immigration bond proceedings, particularly for respondents with criminal histories. It establishes that, while informative, state court decisions do not bind IJs, who must prioritize immigration law standards. This may lead to stricter detention outcomes for immigrants with DUI or similar offenses, even if State courts view them as less dangerous. • Download Matter of CHOC-TUT, 29 I&N Dec. 48 (BIA 2025) https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-05/4092.pdf



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Why ICE’s Public Space Enforcement Isn’t as Simple as It Seems – A Constitutional Perspective

ICE’s authority to enforce administrative warrants in public spaces often oversimplifies complex legal principles. Critics label opposition to ICE’s tactics as “un-American,” but this ignores the constitutional safeguards that protect everyone-including noncitizens-from government overreach. Here’s a breakdown of the legal nuances, precedents, and why judicial oversight matters.

1. The Fourth Amendment Protects Everyone, Regardless of Immigration Status
The Constitution doesn’t exclude noncitizens from its protections. The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause and judicial warrants for arrests, even in immigration cases:

Administrative warrants (issued by ICE/DHS) lack independent judicial review.

Judicial warrants require a neutral judge to assess evidence of a crime.

Key Precedent: In Arizona v. United States (2012), the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot conduct warrantless immigration arrests, emphasizing that federal enforcement must still respect constitutional limits.

2. Entry Without Inspection or Removal Orders Don’t Nullify Rights
Critics argue that individuals who entered without inspection (EWI) or have removal orders forfeit protections. This is false:

EWI is a civil violation, not a criminal offense. It doesn’t automatically grant ICE arrest authority without proof of removability.

Removal orders issued administratively (e.g., by ICE, not a judge) still don’t override the Fourth Amendment. ICE must show probable cause for public arrests.

Example: Courts have blocked ICE from relying solely on databases to justify arrests, requiring case-by-case evidence (Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 2014).

3. Public vs. Private Spaces: What ICE Can (and Can’t) Do

Public spaces: ICE can make arrests if they have probable cause (e.g., a final removal order). However, “probable cause” isn’t automatic-it requires specific evidence.

Private spaces: ICE needs a judicial warrant to enter homes or workplaces, even with removal orders. Administrative warrants aren’t enough.

Recent Case: A 2025 ruling blocked ICE from re-establishing offices at Rikers Island, citing risks of circumventing judicial oversight in sanctuary cities like NYC.

4. Why Judicial Oversight Isn’t “Un-American” – It’s the Rule of Law
Opposing unchecked ICE authority isn’t anti-enforcement; it’s pro-Constitution:

Judicial review prevents abuse: Judges ensure ICE doesn’t detain people based on racial profiling or flawed data.

Sanctuary policies protect due process: Cities like Chicago limit ICE collaboration to avoid violating residents’ rights.

Key Quote: “The federal structure permits states to pursue their own policies, but it also restrains them from undermining federal law” (Arizona v. United States).

5. The Bigger Picture: Balancing Security and Liberty
ICE plays a role in enforcement, but its power isn’t absolute:

Public safety requires trust: Overbroad ICE tactics deter immigrant communities from reporting crimes.

Constitutional rights are non-negotiable: As the Supreme Court noted in Wong Wing v. United States (1896), even noncitizens are entitled to due process.

The argument that opposing ICE’s administrative warrants is “un-American” misunderstands the Constitution. Judicial oversight ensures enforcement respects civil liberties-a principle as American as the Fourth Amendment itself. Limiting ICE’s warrant power in public spaces isn’t about protecting “dangerous aliens”; it’s about upholding the rule of law for everyone.
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The Judge Dugan Case: Examining the Legal and Procedural Questions in the FBI’s Obstruction Charges

The Judge Dugan Case: Examining the Legal and Procedural Questions in the FBI’s Obstruction Charges

The recent arrest of Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Hannah Dugan by the FBI has raised significant questions about judicial authority, immigration enforcement in courthouses, and the distinction between administrative and judicial warrants. Before forming any conclusions, a thorough examination of the criminal complaint and the relevant legal framework is essential.
The Criminal Complaint: Key Elements and Allegations

The criminal complaint against Judge Dugan, filed by FBI Special Agent Lindsay Schloemer in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, charges her with two federal offenses: obstructing a proceeding before a federal agency (18 U.S.C. § 1505) and concealing a person from arrest (18 U.S.C. § 1071)

. These charges stem from events on April 18, 2025, when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents attempted to arrest Eduardo Flores-Ruiz, an undocumented immigrant with a pending domestic violence case, in Judge Dugan’s courtroom.

According to the complaint, ICE agents arrived at the Milwaukee County Courthouse with an administrative warrant for Flores-Ruiz’s arrest. The complaint alleges that when Judge Dugan learned of ICE’s presence, she became “visibly angry,” confronted the agents, questioned their authority without a judicial warrant, directed them to speak with the Chief Judge, and then escorted Flores-Ruiz through a “jury door” to a non-public area of the courthouse
. Flores-Ruiz was ultimately arrested outside the courthouse after a brief foot chase, approximately 22 minutes after being first spotted in the building

.
Witness Statements and Characterizations

The complaint relies heavily on characterizations of Judge Dugan’s demeanor as “visibly angry” and “confrontational,” drawing on statements from courthouse staff and other witnesses
. It portrays her actions as deliberately obstructive rather than procedurally motivated. Her attorney, Craig Mastantuono, has stated that “Judge Dugan wholeheartedly regrets and protests her arrest. It was not made in the interest of public safety”

.
Administrative vs. Judicial Warrants: A Critical Distinction

Central to understanding this case is the distinction between administrative and judicial warrants, which the FBI complaint acknowledges was at issue during Judge Dugan’s confrontation with ICE agents.

Administrative warrants are issued by federal agencies such as DHS or ICE and signed by immigration officers or immigration judges – not by federal or state court judges
. Crucially, administrative warrants do not authorize searches of non-public areas and do not grant ICE agents the authority to enter private spaces without consent

.

In contrast, judicial warrants are issued by courts, signed by judges or magistrates, and provide full legal authority for searches, arrests, or seizures

. The difference is not merely technical – it reflects fundamental constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

When Judge Dugan asked ICE agents if they had a judicial warrant and was told they only had an administrative warrant, her subsequent questioning of their authority aligns with this legal distinction

. Her direction that they speak with the Chief Judge could be viewed as following proper channels for resolving jurisdictional questions rather than obstruction.
Courthouses as Contested Enforcement Spaces

The enforcement of immigration laws in courthouses has been a contentious issue with changing policies. Until January 2025, the Biden administration had maintained policies limiting immigration enforcement in “protected areas” including courthouses
. The Trump administration rescinded these policies earlier this year

.

Prior to this policy change, the Department of Homeland Security had recognized that immigration enforcement in courthouses could have a “chilling effect on individuals’ willingness to come to court or work cooperatively with law enforcement”

. This concern reflects the tension between immigration enforcement and the judicial system’s need to ensure access to justice for all individuals regardless of immigration status.
Milwaukee’s Local Context

The complaint acknowledges that there had been “public attention” to two previous courthouse arrests in Milwaukee

. This suggests an existing tension around the practice in the local community. The Milwaukee ICE ERO Task Force was reportedly focusing its resources on apprehending charged defendants in criminal cases, but the decision to execute the arrest inside the courthouse rather than outside raises questions about necessity and proportionality.
Legal Elements of the Charges

To prove obstruction under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, prosecutors must establish that Judge Dugan acted “corruptly” to influence, obstruct, or impede a proceeding before a federal department or agency
. The term “corruptly” is defined as “acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information”

.

For the concealment charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1071, prosecutors must prove:

A federal warrant had been issued

The defendant knowingly harbored or concealed the person

The defendant knew about the warrant

The defendant intended to prevent discovery or arrest

A viable defense could argue that Judge Dugan lacked corrupt intent if she believed she was asserting legitimate judicial authority over her courtroom and properly questioning the basis for ICE’s enforcement action without a judicial warrant. Similarly, her actions in directing Flores-Ruiz through a non-public door might be characterized as routine courtroom management rather than intentional concealment.
Precedent and Similar Cases

This case bears some resemblance to that of Massachusetts Judge Shelley Joseph, who was indicted in April 2019 on obstruction of justice charges for allegedly preventing an ICE officer from taking custody of an immigrant defendant
. Notably, those charges were eventually dropped in 2022, with Judge Joseph admitting to certain facts in the case

. The resolution of that case could have implications for how Judge Dugan’s case might proceed.
The Political Context

The arrest of Judge Dugan comes amid significant changes at the FBI. In February 2025, Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Dick Durbin revealed allegations that FBI Director Kash Patel had been “personally directing the ongoing purge of senior law enforcement officials at the FBI”
. Patel, who was appointed by President Trump, publicly announced Judge Dugan’s arrest on social media

This political backdrop raises questions about whether the decision to pursue federal charges against a sitting state judge reflects neutral law enforcement priorities or signals a broader effort to enforce compliance with federal immigration policies at the local level.
Potential Defenses and Alternative Interpretations

Several arguments could be made in Judge Dugan’s defense:

Judicial authority: Judges have inherent authority to manage their courtrooms. Judge Dugan may have been acting within her authority to question the basis for ICE’s presence without a judicial warrant.

Lack of corrupt intent: If Judge Dugan believed she was following proper procedure by requiring a judicial warrant and referring the agents to the Chief Judge, this would undermine the claim that she acted “corruptly.”

Minimal impact: Flores-Ruiz was arrested just 22 minutes after being spotted in the courthouse. This minimal delay resulted in no significant harm to the enforcement action.

Proportionality concerns: The pursuit of federal felony charges against a sitting judge for actions that resulted in a brief delay raises questions about prosecutorial discretion and proportionality.

The criminal complaint against Judge Hannah Dugan presents serious allegations but leaves room for substantial legal and procedural questions. The distinction between administrative and judicial warrants, the evolving policies on courthouse enforcement, and the complex interplay between federal immigration authority and state judicial independence all merit careful consideration.

While the FBI characterizes Judge Dugan’s actions as deliberate obstruction, an alternative view could see them as a good-faith assertion of judicial authority in a contested enforcement space. As this case proceeds, it will likely raise important questions about the boundaries between federal immigration enforcement and the independence of state courts-questions that extend far beyond the specific circumstances of this case.

The resolution of these charges will have significant implications not only for Judge Dugan but for judges nationwide who must navigate the complex intersection of immigration enforcement and judicial proceedings. Regardless of the outcome, this case highlights the tension between federal enforcement priorities and local judicial autonomy that continues to shape our legal system.
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 25-M-397(SCD)
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USCIS Registration Requirement for Non-U.S. Citizens: What You Need to Know

USCIS Registration Requirement

On March 12, 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published an Interim Final Rule requiring certain non-U.S. citizens to register with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). This rule is set to take effect on April 11, 2025. Individuals who are not registered and lack proof of inspection from their last entry should consult legal counsel for specific advice.
Who is Subject to the Registration Requirement?

The registration requirement applies to:

Foreign Nationals Aged 14 and Older: Non-U.S. citizens who were not fingerprinted or registered when applying for a U.S. visa and plan to stay in the U.S. for 30 days or longer must register before the expiration of the 30 days.

Foreign National Children Under 14: Parents or legal guardians must register children who were not registered upon visa application and who will remain in the U.S. for 30 days or longer. Registration must occur within 30 days of reaching the age of 14.

Previously Registered Foreign National Children Turning 14: Children turning 14 must re-register and provide fingerprints within 30 days after their 14th birthday.

Who is Already Registered?

Individuals considered to be registered already include:

Lawful Permanent Residents (“green card” holders);

Foreign Nationals with Immigrant or Nonimmigrant Visas before their last date of arrival;

Nonimmigrants with Form I-94 or I-94W (paper or electronic), even if the period of admission has expired;

Foreign Nationals Paroled into the U.S., even if the period of parole has expired;

Foreign Nationals in Removal Proceedings;

Foreign Nationals with an Employment Authorization Document (EAD);

Foreign Nationals Who Have Applied for Lawful Permanent Residence using specific forms and provided fingerprints (unless waived);

Foreign Nationals Issued Border Crossing Cards.

Who is Not Considered Registered?

The following groups are not considered to be registered:

Undocumented Individuals who entered without inspection and admission, or admission and parole, and have not registered.

Canadians who entered at a land port or ferry crossing and were not issued evidence of registration (Form I-94).

Applicants for Immigration Relief like asylum, DACA, TPS, U visas, T visas, S visas, and VAWA self-petitions, who have not been issued evidence of that status.

Exemptions from the Registration Requirement

Exempt individuals include:

Officials of Foreign Governments and International Organizations with A or G visas;

Native Americans Born in Canada who possess at least 50% blood of the American Indian race and are present in the U.S. under the authority of 8 USC 1359;

Foreign Nationals Staying Less Than 30 Days.

How to Register

To register, individuals must:

Create a USCIS Online Account. Parents or guardians must set up an account for children under 14.

Complete Form G-325R after creating the account.

Penalties for Noncompliance

Failure to comply with registration and fingerprinting requirements can result in:

A fine of up to $5,000, imprisonment for up to six months, or both.

For those 18 years or older, failure to carry proof of registration can lead to a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $5,000, imprisonment of not more than 30 days, or both.

This reorganization provides a clear structure for understanding the new USCIS registration requirement, including who is affected, how to register, and the penalties for noncompliance.


USCIS Registration, Immigration Updates, Non-U.S. Citizens, DHS Interim Final Rule

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