USCIS Registration Requirement for Non-U.S. Citizens: What You Need to Know

Posted on March 31, 2025 by Mike Baker
USCIS Registration Requirement

On March 12, 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published an Interim Final Rule requiring certain non-U.S. citizens to register with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). This rule is set to take effect on April 11, 2025. Individuals who are not registered and lack proof of inspection from their last entry should consult legal counsel for specific advice.
Who is Subject to the Registration Requirement?

The registration requirement applies to:

Foreign Nationals Aged 14 and Older: Non-U.S. citizens who were not fingerprinted or registered when applying for a U.S. visa and plan to stay in the U.S. for 30 days or longer must register before the expiration of the 30 days.

Foreign National Children Under 14: Parents or legal guardians must register children who were not registered upon visa application and who will remain in the U.S. for 30 days or longer. Registration must occur within 30 days of reaching the age of 14.

Previously Registered Foreign National Children Turning 14: Children turning 14 must re-register and provide fingerprints within 30 days after their 14th birthday.

Who is Already Registered?

Individuals considered to be registered already include:

Lawful Permanent Residents (“green card” holders);

Foreign Nationals with Immigrant or Nonimmigrant Visas before their last date of arrival;

Nonimmigrants with Form I-94 or I-94W (paper or electronic), even if the period of admission has expired;

Foreign Nationals Paroled into the U.S., even if the period of parole has expired;

Foreign Nationals in Removal Proceedings;

Foreign Nationals with an Employment Authorization Document (EAD);

Foreign Nationals Who Have Applied for Lawful Permanent Residence using specific forms and provided fingerprints (unless waived);

Foreign Nationals Issued Border Crossing Cards.

Who is Not Considered Registered?

The following groups are not considered to be registered:

Undocumented Individuals who entered without inspection and admission, or admission and parole, and have not registered.

Canadians who entered at a land port or ferry crossing and were not issued evidence of registration (Form I-94).

Applicants for Immigration Relief like asylum, DACA, TPS, U visas, T visas, S visas, and VAWA self-petitions, who have not been issued evidence of that status.

Exemptions from the Registration Requirement

Exempt individuals include:

Officials of Foreign Governments and International Organizations with A or G visas;

Native Americans Born in Canada who possess at least 50% blood of the American Indian race and are present in the U.S. under the authority of 8 USC 1359;

Foreign Nationals Staying Less Than 30 Days.

How to Register

To register, individuals must:

Create a USCIS Online Account. Parents or guardians must set up an account for children under 14.

Complete Form G-325R after creating the account.

Penalties for Noncompliance

Failure to comply with registration and fingerprinting requirements can result in:

A fine of up to $5,000, imprisonment for up to six months, or both.

For those 18 years or older, failure to carry proof of registration can lead to a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $5,000, imprisonment of not more than 30 days, or both.

This reorganization provides a clear structure for understanding the new USCIS registration requirement, including who is affected, how to register, and the penalties for noncompliance.


USCIS Registration, Immigration Updates, Non-U.S. Citizens, DHS Interim Final Rule

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Immigration backlogs

Posted on August 2, 2023 by Mike Baker

Immigration backlogs refer to delays and many pending cases in the immigration system[1]. These backlogs can affect various categories of immigrants, including asylum seekers, DACA recipients, spouses of U.S. citizens, and high-skilled immigrants in the tech industry[1]. Backlogs can occur at different stages of the immigration process. At the end of the process, when an immigrant visa is available, there may be administrative backlogs due to insufficient resources to handle the workload[2]. Family-based immigration avenues have also experienced significant backlogs, leading to delays in family reunification and creating barriers for individuals trying to immigrate through authorized immigration pathways[3].

One factor contributing to backlogs is the COVID-19 pandemic, which has impacted the immigration system and caused delays as processes slowed down[4]. In addition, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has been facing challenges in keeping up with its growing responsibilities, and some of its backlogs have increased[5]. These backlogs not only affect the immigration process but also have implications for families, job opportunities, and overall efficiency in the system[6].

Efforts are being made to address immigration backlogs and streamline the system. There are calls for increased congressional funding to address the issue and improve the processing of immigration cases[1]. Furthermore, there have been proposals for reforming the immigration system to reduce backlogs, improve efficiency, and provide more accessible pathways for legal immigration[6].

It’s essential to stay informed about the latest developments in immigration reforms and changes in policies to understand the current situation regarding immigration backlogs better.

Sources:

Bipartisan Policy Center
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/explainer/immigration-backlogs/

U.S. Department of StateL https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/visas-backlog.html

National Immigration Forum: https://immigrationforum.org/article/immigration-backlogs-separating-american-families/

Los Angeles Times: https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-08-04/la-na-pol-backlogs-immigration-system

Government Executive: https://www.govexec.com/management/2023/07/biden-boosts-legal-immigration-pathways-implementing-agency-pushed-brink/388856/

Cato Institute: https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/streamlining-end-immigration-backlogs

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Expunging, sealing criminal records, Illinois

Posted on January 5, 2023 by Mike Baker

EXPUNGEMENT: When a record is expunged, it is physically destroyed by each law enforcement agency, as if it never existed.

SEALED: When an Illinois State Police record is sealed, it is no longer available to your employer or other members of the public, but can still be seen by law enforcement agencies. When a clerk’s office record is sealed it is no longer available to employers or other members of the public, but can be viewed by members of the public if a judge specifically orders that they can see it.

CASES THAT CAN BE EXPUNGED:

1. Cases in which you were acquitted, released without conviction (including cases in which you were not charged), there was a not guilty finding or no probable cause finding, or nolle prosequi –Petitions to expunge may be filed immediately. If, however, your case was stricken off the call with leave to reinstate (“SOL”) or a non-suit, Petitions to expunge can only be granted 120 days (if demand for trial) or 160 days (if no demand for trial) after the case was SOL, and only if the prosecutor did not reinstate your case during this time period.

2. Cases, other than those listed in section 3, below, in which an Order of supervision was entered and two (2) years have passed since discharge and dismissal of supervision.

3. Cases in which an Order of supervision was entered and five (5) years have passed since termination of supervision for the following charges:

Retail Theft – 720 ILCS 5/16 A-3
Reckless Driving – 625 ILCS 5/11-503
Display of False Insurance – 625 ILCS 5/3-710
Suspended Registration for Non-Insurance – 625 ILCS 5/3-708
Uninsured Motor Vehicle – 625 ILCS 5/3-707

4. Cases in which an Order was entered terminating probation and at least five (5) years have passed since the order of termination was entered, under the following statutes:

Controlled Substance Act (410 Probation) – 720 ILCS 570/410
Cannabis Control Act (First Offender Only) – 720 ILCS 550/10

CASES THAT CANNOT BE EXPUNGED

Convictions, including:

1. A guilty plea, guilty finding, or guilty verdict resulting in a sentence other than probation under the Cannabis or Controlled Substances Acts.

2. Probation (except if you received 410 probation under the Controlled Substance Act or under the Cannabis Act)

3. Cases where the defendant was granted supervision for or was convicted of a sexual offense committed against a minor under 18 years of age (20 ILCS 2630/5(g))

4. Conditional Discharge

5. Time Considered Served

6. DUI/DWI Supervision

Once your record has been expunged, it “may not be considered by any private or public entity in employment matters, certification, licensing, revocation or certification or licensure, or registration,” (20 ILCS 2630/12) Employers are not allowed to ask you if you have had records expunged, and you are not required to disclose this information on employment applications. (20 ILCS 2630/12)

CASES THAT CAN BE SEALED

1. You are an adult or minor prosecuted as an adult for a misdemeanor, or municipal ordinance violation in which you were acquitted; released without being convicted (including cases where you were not charged), your conviction was reversed; or you received a sentence of supervision for a misdemeanor AND you have not been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor or placed on supervision for a misdemeanor for three (3) years after being acquitted, or released, or your conviction being reversed, or having completed the terms and conditions of your supervision.

2. You are an adult or minor prosecuted as and adult for a qualifying Class 4 Felony or misdemeanor which resulted in a conviction AND you have not been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor or placed on supervision for a misdemeanor for four (4) years after completing your sentence.

Once your record has been sealed, it “may not be considered by any private or public entity in employment matters, certification, licensing, revocation or certification or licensure, or registration,” (20 ILCS 2630/12) Employers are not allowed to ask you if you have had records expunged, and you are not required to disclose this information on employment applications. (20 ILCS 2630/12).

______________________________________________________________

Expunging and Sealing Criminal Records in Illinois

Cases that CAN be expunged:

a. Cases in which you are acquitted or released without being convicted
(including cases in which you have not been charged). Petitions to
Expunge may be filed immediately upon acquittal or release without
conviction.

b. Cases, other than those listed in section c. below, in which an Order of
supervision was entered and two (2) years have passed since discharge
and dismissal of supervision.

c. Cases in which an Order of supervision was entered and five (5) years
have passed since termination of supervision for the following charges:

• 625 ILCS 5/3-707 – Uninsured Motor Vehicle
• 625 ILCS 5/3-708 – Suspended Registration for Non-Insurance
• 625 ILCS 5/3-710 – Display of False Insurance
• 625 ILCS 5/5-401.3 – Scrap Processor to Keep Records
• 625 ILCS 5/11-503 – Reckless Driving
• 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2 – Domestic Battery
• 720 ILCS 5/12-15 – Criminal Sexual Abuse
• 720 ILCS 5/12-4.3 – Aggravated battery of a Child
• 720 ILCS 5/16 A-3 – Offense Retail Theft

d. Cases in which an Order was entered terminating probation and at
least five (5) years have passed since the order of termination was
entered, under the following statutes

• 720 ILCS 550/10 – Cannabis Control Act (First Time Offender
Only)
• 720 ILCS 570/410 – Control Substance Act (First Time Offender
Only)
• 720 ILCS 570/312(j) – Steroid Control Act
• 20 ILCS 305/10-102 or 301/40-10 – Alcohol and Drug Dependency
Act

e. Cases in which the Governor has issued a pardon that specifically
states that your records should be expunged.

Cases that CANNOT be expunged:
Convictions, including:

a. A guilty plea, guilty finding, or guilty verdict which results in a sentence
other than probation under the Cannabis, Controlled Substances, Steroid
Control, and Alcohol and Drug Dependency Acts (720 ILCS 550/10, 720
ILCS 570/410, 720 ILCS 570/312(j), and 20 ILCS 305/10-102 or 301/40-
10),

b. Probation (except under the Cannabis, Controlled Substances, Steroid
Control, and Alcohol and Drug Dependency Acts);

c. Cases where the defendant was granted supervision for or was
convicted of a sexual offense committed against a minor under 18 years
of age (20 ILCS 2630/5(g));

d. Conditional Discharge; and

e. D.U.I. Supervision (20 ILCS 2630/5).

Cases that CAN be Sealed:

Adult or minor prosecuted as an adult for misdemeanors or municipal
ordinance violations which result in an acquittal, release without
conviction, conviction reversed, or a sentence of supervision for
misdemeanor AND Defendant/Petitioner was not convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor or placed on supervision for a misdemeanor for 3 years
after the acquittal; or release or reversal of conviction, or completion of
the terms and conditions of the supervision.
Adult or minor prosecuted as an adult which results in a conviction for a
misdemeanor AND Defendant/Petitioner was not convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor or placed on supervision for a misdemeanor for 4 years
after the completion of the sentence.

Cases that CANNOT be Sealed:

Pursuant to 20 ILCS 2630/5, the following case types and dispositions are
not eligible for sealing of records:

DUI, 625 ILCS 5/11-501
Article 11, Criminal Code
Criminal Sexual Abuse, 720 ILCS 5/12-15
Violation of Order of Protection, 720 US 5/12-30
Dog Fighting, 720 US 5/26-5
Misdemeanor Crime of Violence under Section 2, Criminal Victims
Compensation Act
Class A Misdemeanor, Humane Care of Animals Act
Sex Offender Registration Act Offenses
_______________________________________________________________________

20 ILCS 2630/5
(g) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c-5) of this Section, the court shall not order the sealing or expungement of the arrest records and records of the circuit court clerk of any person granted supervision for or convicted of any sexual offense committed against a minor under 18 years of age. For the purposes of this Section, “sexual offense committed against a minor ” includes but is not limited to the offenses of indecent solicitation of a child or criminal sexual abuse when the victim of such offense is under 18 years of age.

(h)(1) Applicability. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act to the contrary and cumulative with any rights to expungement of criminal records, this subsection authorizes the sealing of criminal records of adults and of minors prosecuted as adults.

(2) Sealable offenses. The following offenses may be sealed:

(A) All municipal ordinance violations and misdemeanors, with the exception of the following:

(i) violations of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance;

(ii) violations of Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or a similar provision of a local ordinance, except Section 11-14 of the Criminal Code of 1961 as provided in clause B(i) of this subsection (h);

(iii) violations of Section 12-15, 12-30, or 26-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or a similar provision of a local ordinance;

(iv) violations that are a crime of violence as defined in Section 2 of the Crime Victims Compensation Act or a similar provision of a local ordinance;

(v) Class A misdemeanor violations of the Humane Care for Animals Act; and

(vi) any offense or attempted offense that would subject a person to registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act.

(B) Misdemeanor and Class 4 felony violations of:

(i) Section 11-14 of the Criminal Code of 1961;

(ii) Section 4 of the Cannabis Control Act;

(iii) Section 402 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act; and

(iv) Section 60 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act [720 ILCS 646/60]

However, for purposes of this subsection (h), a sentence of first offender probation under Section 10 of the Cannabis Control Act, Section 410 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or Section 70 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act [720 ILCS 646/70] shall be treated as a Class 4 felony conviction.

(3) Requirements for sealing. Records identified as sealable under clause (h) (2) may be sealed when the individual was:

(A) Acquitted of the offense or offenses or released without being convicted.

(B) Convicted of the offense or offenses and the conviction or convictions were reversed.

(C) Placed on misdemeanor supervision for an offense or offenses; and

(i) at least 3 years have elapsed since the completion of the term of supervision, or terms of supervision, if more than one term has been ordered; and

(ii) the individual has not been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor or placed on supervision for a misdemeanor or felony during the period specified in clause (i).

(D) Convicted of an offense or offenses; and

(i) at least 4 years have elapsed since the last such conviction or term of any sentence, probation, parole, or supervision, if any, whichever is last in time; and

(ii) the individual has not been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor or placed on supervision for a misdemeanor or felony during the period specified in clause (i).

(4) Requirements for sealing of records when more than one charge and disposition have been filed. When multiple offenses are petitioned to be sealed under this subsection (h), the requirements of the relevant provisions of clauses (h)(3)(A) through (D) each apply. In instances in which more than one waiting period is applicable under clauses (h)(C)(i) and (ii) and (h)(D)(i) and (ii), the longer applicable period applies, and the requirements of clause (h) (3) shall be considered met when the petition is filed after the passage of the longer applicable waiting period. That period commences on the date of the completion of the last sentence or the end of supervision, probation, or parole, whichever is last in time.

(5) Subsequent convictions. A person may not have subsequent felony conviction records sealed as provided in this subsection (h) if he or she is convicted of any felony offense after the date of the sealing of prior felony records as provided in this subsection (h).

(6) Notice of eligibility for sealing. Upon acquittal, release without conviction, or being placed on supervision for a sealable offense, or upon conviction of a sealable offense, the person shall be informed by the court of the right to have the records sealed and the procedures for the sealing of the records.

(7) Procedure. Upon becoming eligible for the sealing of records under this subsection (h), the person who seeks the sealing of his or her records shall file a petition requesting the sealing of records with the clerk of the court where the charge or charges were brought. The records may be sealed by the Chief Judge of the circuit wherein the charge was brought, any judge of that circuit designated by the Chief Judge, or in counties of less than 3,000,000 inhabitants, the presiding trial judge at the defendant’s trial, if any. If charges were brought in multiple jurisdictions, a petition must be filed in each such jurisdiction. The petitioner shall pay the applicable fee, if not waived.

(A) Contents of petition. The petition shall contain the petitioner’s name, date of birth, current address, each charge, each case number, the date of each charge, the identity of the arresting authority, and such other information as the court may require. During the pendency of the proceeding, the petitioner shall promptly notify the clerk of the court of any change of address.

(B) Drug test. A person filing a petition to have his or her records sealed for a Class 4 felony violation of Section 4 of the Cannabis Control Act or for a Class 4 felony violation of Section 402 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act must attach to the petition proof that the petitioner has passed a test taken within the previous 30 days before the filing of the petition showing the absence within his or her body of all illegal substances in violation of either the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or the Cannabis Control Act.

(C) Service of petition. The clerk shall promptly serve a copy of the petition on the State’s Attorney or prosecutor charged with the duty of prosecuting the offense, the Department of State Police, the arresting agency and the chief legal officer of the unit of local government effecting the arrest.

(D) Entry of order. Unless the State’s Attorney or prosecutor, the Department of State Police, the arresting agency or such chief legal officer objects to sealing of the records within 90 days of notice the court shall enter an order sealing the defendant’s records.

(E) Hearing upon objection. If an objection is filed, the court shall set a date for a hearing and notify the petitioner and the parties on whom the petition had been served, and shall hear evidence on whether the sealing of the records should or should not be granted, and shall make a determination on whether to issue an order to seal the records based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

(F) Service of order. After entering the order to seal records, the court must provide copies of the order to the Department, in a form and manner prescribed by the Department, to the petitioner, to the State’s Attorney or prosecutor charged with the duty of prosecuting the offense, to the arresting agency, to the chief legal officer of the unit of local government effecting the arrest, and to such other criminal justice agencies as may be ordered by the court.

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Relief Application Waived if Not Filed by IJ’s Deadline, BIA Rules

Posted on September 11, 2020 by Mike Baker

Matter of R-C-R-, 28 I&N Dec. 74 (BIA 2020) (pdf)

(1) After an Immigration Judge has set a firm deadline for filing an application for relief, the respondent’s opportunity to file the application may be deemed waived, prior to a scheduled hearing, if the deadline passes without submission of the application and no good cause for noncompliance has been shown.

(2) The respondent failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was deprived of a full and fair hearing where he has not shown that conducting the hearing by video conference interfered with his communication with the Immigration Judge or otherwise prejudiced him as a result of technical problems with the video equipment.

An application for relief from removal may be deemed waived if the applicant fails to file by an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) firm deadline, even if the applicant also has a subsequent hearing scheduled, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) ruled in Matter of R-C-R-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 74 (B.I.A. 2020). The Board also found that the respondent was not deprived of a full and fair hearing by technical problems in conducting his hearing by interactive video.

Respondent R-C-R-, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the U.S. in March 2019 and was charged with removability as an alien present without admission or parole and for lacking valid entry documents. In November 2019, R-C-R- appeared at a hearing without counsel, conceded removability, and expressed a desire to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.1 The BIA deemed the hearing held, for jurisdictional purposes, in Richwood, Louisiana, where the respondent was in detention. The IJ communicated through video conference from the Batavia Immigration Court in New York.

R-C-R- was given a Form I-589 relief application. Although the respondent’s next hearing was scheduled for January 14, 2020, the IJ instructed him to submit his relief application no later than December 6, 2019, or it would be deemed waived.
A week past the deadline, after receiving no application from the respondent, the IJ found that R-C-R- had waived his opportunity to apply and ordered him removed.
The respondent argued to the BIA that the IJ violated his due process rights both by setting an application deadline in advance of his next hearing and by not allowing him to explain why he missed the deadline. R-C-R- also argued that he was denied a full and fair hearing because he was unrepresented, detained, and forced to communicate through a Spanish interpreter after saying he understood “more Spanish than Mam”

The BIA held, first, that the IJ did not abuse her discretion in ordering R-C-R- to file his relief application before his next hearing date. The Board noted that 8 CFR § 1003.31(c) provides:

The Immigration Judge may set and extend time limits for the filing of applications and related documents and responses thereto, if any. If an application or document is not filed within the time set by the Immigration Judge, the opportunity to file that application or document shall be deemed waived.

The BIA found the waiver authority upheld by its own precedents and an unpublished decision of the circuit within which the hearing was held.2 R-C-R- had not moved to extend the deadline and obtain more time to complete his application, the Board further noted, nor did he use a motion to reconsider or reopen as an opportunity to explain his failure to file on time. “Had the respondent filed either type of motion and provided good cause for missing the deadline, reconsideration or reopening by the Immigration Judge would likely have been appropriate,” the BIA said.

Even on appeal, appearing with counsel, R-C-R- still offered no explanation and did not submit a completed relief application as part of a motion to remand, the Board added. He also did not allege facts that would show a prima facie case of eligibility for any form of relief from removal.

The BIA next found that the respondent had not explained why his case was prejudiced by the conditions of his hearing. The hearing was conducted in Spanish because the respondent stated that it was the language he understood best, the BIA noted. He did not object during the hearing that he could not understand his interpreter, and the BIA found no signs of confusion in the hearing transcript.

The use of interactive video for hearings is authorized by the INA and regulations, as several courts of appeals have recognized, and thus is not a per se due process violation, the BIA said, noting that these authorities include two unpublished Fifth Circuit decisions.3 In this case, the BIA found that R-C-R- failed to explain how his hearing was deficient, given that he was advised of his procedural rights and right to be represented, declined the IJ’s offer to ask questions, and indicated that he understood the charges and could hear the IJ’s questions. The respondent also did not allege any dropout of the audio or video or any other technical problems.
The BIA dismissed the respondent’s appeal.

David J. Rozas, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, appeared for the respondent. Dawn M. Carter appeared for the Department of Homeland Security.

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BIA Precedent Decisions Volume 27 (3887 – 3984) Executive Office for Immigration Review 2017-2020

Posted on September 11, 2020 by Mike Baker
MIRANDA-CORDIERO, 27 I&N Dec. 551 (BIA 2019) ID 3953 (PDF)

Pursuant to section 240(b)(5)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B) (2012), neither rescission of an in absentia order of removal nor termination of the proceedings is required where an alien who was served with a notice to appear that did not specify the time and place of the initial removal hearing failed to provide an address where a notice of hearing could be sent. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), distinguished.

PENA-MEJIA, 27 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 2019) ID 3952 (PDF)

Neither rescission of an in absentia order of removal nor termination of the proceedings is required where an alien did not appear at a scheduled hearing after being served with a notice to appear that did not specify the time and place of the initial removal hearing, so long as a subsequent notice of hearing specifying that information was properly sent to the alien. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), distinguished.

MENDOZA-HERNANDEZ and CAPULA-CORTES, 27 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2019) ID 3951 (PDF)

A deficient notice to appear that does not include the time and place of an alien’s initial removal hearing is perfected by the subsequent service of a notice of hearing specifying that missing information, which satisfies the notice requirements of section 239(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012), and triggers the “stop-time” rule of section 240A(d)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A) (2012). Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), distinguished; Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), followed.

M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019) ID 3950 (PDF)

(1) Matter of X-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 731 (BIA 2005), was wrongly decided and is overruled.

(2) An alien who is transferred from expedited removal proceedings to full removal proceedings after establishing a credible fear of persecution or torture is ineligible for release on bond. Such an alien must be detained until his removal proceedings conclude, unless he is granted parole.

A. VASQUEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 2019) ID 3949 (PDF)

Under the plain language of section 101(a)(43)(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(H) (2012), kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) is not an aggravated felony.

A.J. VALDEZ and Z. VALDEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) ID 3948 (PDF)

(1) An alien makes a willful misrepresentation under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012), when he or she knows of or authorizes false statements in an application filed on the alien’s behalf.

(2) An alien’s signature on an immigration application establishes a strong presumption that he or she knows of and has assented to the contents of the application, but the alien can rebut the presumption by establishing fraud, deceit, or other wrongful acts by another person.

CASTILLO-PEREZ, 27 I&N Dec. 495 (A.G. 2018) ID 3947 (PDF)

The Acting Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review of issues relating to:

(1) In connection with an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), what is the appropriate legal standard for determining when an individual lacks “good moral character” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)?

(2) What impact should multiple convictions for driving while intoxicated or driving under the influence have in determining when an individual lacks “good moral character” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)?

(3) What impact should multiple such convictions have in determining whether to grant discretionary relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).

The Acting Attorney General ordered that the case be stayed during the pendency of his review.

L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 494 (A.G. 2018) ID 3946 (PDF)

The Acting Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review of issues relating to whether, and under what circumstances, an alien may establish persecution on account of membership in a “particular social group” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) based on the alien’s membership in a family unit, ordering that the case be stayed during the pendency of his review.

SONG, 27 I&N Dec. 488 (BIA 2018) ID 3945 (PDF)

An applicant for adjustment of status who was admitted on a K-1 visa, fulfilled the terms of the visa by marrying the petitioner, and was later divorced must submit an affidavit of support from the petitioner to establish that he or she is not inadmissible as a public charge under section 212(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2012).

J-R-G-P-, 27 I&N Dec. 482 (BIA 2018) ID 3944 (PDF)

Where the evidence regarding an application for protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988), plausibly establishes that abusive or squalid conditions in pretrial detention facilities, prisons, or mental health institutions in the country of removal are the result of neglect, a lack of resources, or insufficient training and education, rather than a specific intent to cause severe pain and suffering, an Immigration Judge’s finding that the applicant did not establish a sufficient likelihood that he or she will experience “torture” in these settings is not clearly erroneous.

NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018)

 ID 3943 (PDF)

The Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review of issues relating to whether coercion and duress are relevant to the application of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s persecutor bar. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i)(2012).

M-A-C-O-, 27 I&N Dec. 477 (BIA 2018) ID 3942 (PDF)

An Immigration Judge has initial jurisdiction over an asylum application filed by a respondent who was previously determined to be an unaccompanied alien child but who turned 18 before filing the application.

M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 476 (A.G. 2018)

 ID 3941 (PDF)

The Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review of issues relating to the authority to hold bond hearings for certain aliens screened for expedited removal proceedings, ordering that the case be stayed during the pendency of his review.

M-G-G-, 27 I&N Dec. 475 (A.G. 2018) ID 3940 (PDF)

The Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review. As the respondent had been removed and was no longer in the United States, the Attorney General decided not to review the Board’s determination that the respondent was eligible to be released on bond. The Attorney General remanded the case to the Board for any administrative action the Board deems necessary.

VELASQUEZ-RIOS, 27 I&N Dec. 470 (BIA 2018)

 ID 3939 (PDF)

The amendment to section 18.5 of the California Penal Code, which retroactively lowered the maximum possible sentence that could have been imposed for an alien’s State offense from 365 days to 364 days, does not affect the applicability of section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012), to a past conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude “for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.”

M-G-G-, 27 I&N Dec. 469 (A.G. 2018) ID 3938 (PDF)

The Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review of issues relating to the authority to hold bond hearings for certain aliens screened for expedited removal proceedings, ordering that the case be stayed during the pendency of his review.

S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 462 (A.G. 2018) ID 3937 (PDF)

(1) Consistent with Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), immigration judges have no inherent authority to terminate or dismiss removal proceedings.

(2) Immigration judges may dismiss or terminate removal proceedings only under the circumstances expressly identified in the regulations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c), (f), or where the Department of Homeland Security fails to sustain the charges of removability against a respondent, see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(c).

(3) An immigration judge’s general authority to “take any other action consistent with applicable law and regulations as may be appropriate,” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(1)(iv), does not provide any additional authority to terminate or dismiss removal proceedings beyond those authorities expressly set out in the relevant regulations.

(4) To avoid confusion, immigration judges and the Board should recognize and maintain the distinction between a dismissal under 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) and a termination under 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f).

VALENZUELA GALLARDO, 27 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2018) ID 3936 (PDF)

(1) An “offense relating to obstruction of justice” under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012), encompasses offenses covered by chapter 73 of the Federal criminal code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012), or any other Federal or State offense that involves (1) an affirmative and intentional attempt (2) that is motivated by a specific intent (3) to interfere either in an investigation or proceeding that is ongoing, pending, or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, or in another’s punishment resulting from a completed proceeding. Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I&N Dec. 838 (BIA 2012), clarified.

(2) A conviction for accessory to a felony under section 32 of the California Penal Code that results in a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year is a conviction for an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act.

BERMUDEZ-COTA, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (BIA 2018) ID 3935 (PDF)

A notice to appear that does not specify the time and place of an alien’s initial removal hearing vests an Immigration Judge with jurisdiction over the removal proceedings and meets the requirements of section 239(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012), so long as a notice of hearing specifying this information is later sent to the alien. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), distinguished.

J. M. ACOSTA, 27 I&N Dec. 420 (BIA 2018) ID 3934 (PDF)

(1) A conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until the right to direct appellate review on the merits of the conviction has been exhausted or waived.

(2) Once the Department of Homeland Security has established that a respondent has a criminal conviction at the trial level and that the time for filing a direct appeal has passed, a presumption arises that the conviction is final for immigration purposes, which the respondent can rebut with evidence that an appeal has been filed within the prescribed deadline, including any extensions or permissive filings granted by the appellate court, and that the appeal relates to the issue of guilt or innocence or concerns a substantive defect in the criminal proceedings.

(3) Appeals, including direct appeals, and collateral attacks that do not relate to the underlying merits of a conviction will not be given effect to eliminate the finality of the conviction.

L-A-B-R- et al., 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018) ID 3933 (PDF)

(1) An immigration judge may grant a motion for a continuance of removal proceedings only “for good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29.

(2) The good-cause standard is a substantive requirement that limits the discretion of immigration judges and prohibits them from granting continuances for any reason or no reason at all.

(3) The good-cause standard requires consideration and balancing of multiple relevant factors when a respondent alien requests a continuance to pursue collateral relief from another authority—for example, a visa from the Department of Homeland Security. See Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 790 (BIA 2009).

(4) When a respondent requests a continuance to pursue collateral relief, the immigration judge must consider primarily the likelihood that the collateral relief will be granted and will materially affect the outcome of the removal proceedings.

(5) The immigration judge should also consider relevant secondary factors, which may include the respondent’s diligence in seeking collateral relief, DHS’s position on the motion for continuance, concerns of administrative efficiency, the length of the continuance requested, the number of hearings held and continuances granted previously, and the timing of the continuance motion.

MEDINA-JIMENEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 2018)

 ID 3932 (PDF)

The categorical approach does not govern whether violating a protection order under 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2012), renders an alien ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012); instead, Immigration Judges need only decide whether the alien has been convicted within the meaning of the Act and whether that conviction is for violating a protection order under section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii). Matter of Obshatko, 27 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2017), followed.

ORTEGA-LOPEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 2018)

 ID 3931 (PDF)

(1) The offense of sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) (2006) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2013), reaffirmed.

(2) An alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012), for having “been convicted of an offense under” section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012), irrespective of both the general “admission” requirement in section 237(a) and the temporal (within 5 years of admission) requirement in section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Matter of Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010), reaffirmed.

NEGUSIE, 27 I&N Dec. 347 (BIA 2018) ID 3930 (PDF)

(1) An applicant who is subject to being barred from establishing eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based on the persecution of others may claim a duress defense, which is limited in nature.

(2) To meet the minimum threshold requirements of the duress defense to the persecutor bar, an applicant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he acted under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; (2) he reasonably believed that the threatened harm would be carried out unless he acted or refrained from acting; (3) he had no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) he did not place himself in a situation in which he knew or reasonably should have known that he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) he knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others.

A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) ID 3929 (PDF)

(1)Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 338 (BIA 2014) is overruled. That decision was wrongly decided and should not have been issued as a precedential decision.

(2)An applicant seeking to establish persecution on account of membership in a “particular social group” must demonstrate: (1) membership in a group, which is composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, is defined with particularity, and is socially distinct within the society in question; and (2) that membership in the group is a central reason for her persecution. When the alleged persecutor is someone unaffiliated with the government, the applicant must also show that her home government is unwilling or unable to protect her.

(3)An asylum applicant has the burden of showing her eligibility for asylum. The applicant must present facts that establish each element of the standard, and the asylum officer, immigration judge, or the Board has the duty to determine whether those facts satisfy all of those elements.

(4)If an asylum application is fatally flawed in one respect, an immigration judge or the Board need not examine the remaining elements of the asylum claim.

(5)The mere fact that a country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes or that certain populations are more likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum claim.

(6)To be cognizable, a particular social group must exist independently of the harm asserted in an application for asylum.

(7)An applicant seeking to establish persecution based on violent conduct of a private actor must show more than the government’s difficulty controlling private behavior. The applicant must show that the government condoned the private actions or demonstrated an inability to protect the victims.

(8)An applicant seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group must clearly indicate on the record the exact delineation of any proposed particular social group.

(9)The Board, immigration judges, and all asylum officers must consider, consistent with the regulations, whether internal relocation in the alien’s home country presents a reasonable alternative before granting asylum.

A-C-M-, 27 I&N Dec. 303 (BIA 2018) ID 3928 (PDF)

(1) An alien provides “material support” to a terrorist organization if the act has a logical and reasonably foreseeable tendency to promote, sustain, or maintain the organization, even if only to a de minimis degree.

(2) The respondent afforded material support to the guerillas in El Salvador in 1990 because the forced labor she provided in the form of cooking, cleaning, and washing their clothes aided them in continuing their mission of armed and violent opposition to the Salvadoran Government.

DING, 27 I&N Dec. 295 (BIA 2018) ID 3927 (PDF)

(1) The term “prostitution” in section 101(a)(43)(K)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) (2012), which provides that an offense relating to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business is an aggravated felony, is not limited to offenses involving sexual intercourse but is defined as engaging in, or agreeing or offering to engage in, sexual conduct for anything of value.

(2) The offense of keeping a place of prostitution in violation of section 944.34(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes is categorically an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(K)(i) of the Act.

CASTRO-TUM, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018) ID 3926 (PDF)

(1) Immigration judges and the Board do not have the general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration proceedings by administrative closure. To the extent the Board’s decisions in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), and Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017), are inconsistent with this conclusion, those decisions are overruled.

(2) Immigration judges and the Board may only administratively close a case where a previous regulation or a previous judicially approved settlement expressly authorizes such an action.

(3) Neither 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) nor 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) confers the authority to grant administrative closure. Grants of general authority to take measures “appropriate and necessary for the disposition of . . . cases” would not ordinarily include the authority to suspend cases indefinitely. Additionally, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(1), which authorizes immigration judges to take actions that “may be appropriate” in removal proceedings, and 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(c), which empowers immigration judges to “otherwise regulate the course of the hearing,” do not entail an authority to grant indefinite suspensions. Finally, regulations empowering the Chief Immigration Judge and the Chairman of the Board to manage dockets—8 C.F.R. § 1003.9(b)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(2)(i)(A)—grant no express authority to administratively close cases, and cannot reasonably be interpreted to implicitly delegate such authority.

(4) Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department of Homeland Security has the exclusive authority to decide whether and when to initiate proceedings. Once the Department of Homeland Security initiates proceedings, immigration judges and the Board must proceed “expeditious[ly]” to resolve the case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.12.

(5) For cases that truly warrant a brief pause, the regulations expressly provide for continuances. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29.

(6) The Immigration and Nationality Act unambiguously states that, with respect to in absentia proceedings, so long as the Department of Homeland Security adequately alleges that it provided legally sufficient written notice to an alien, the alien “shall be ordered removed in absentia if [the Department of Homeland Security] establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the written notice was so provided and that the alien is removable.” INA § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). The Immigration and Nationality Act thus imposes an obligation to proceed expeditiously to determine whether the requisite evidence supports the removal charge.

(7) Where a case has been administratively closed without the requisite authority, the immigration judge or the Board, as appropriate, shall recalendar the case on the motion of either party.

L-M-P-, 27 I&N Dec. 265 (BIA 2018) ID 3925 (PDF)

(1) The Department of Homeland Security has the authority to file a motion to reconsider in Immigration Court.

(2) An applicant in withholding of removal only proceedings who is subject to a reinstated order of removal pursuant to section 241(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012), is ineligible for asylum.

SANCHEZ-LOPEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 256 (BIA 2018) ID 3924 (PDF)

The offense of stalking in violation of section 646.9 of the California Penal Code is not “a crime of stalking” under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012). Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 2012), overruled.

MARQUEZ CONDE, 27 I&N Dec. 251 (BIA 2018) ID 3923 (PDF)

The Board of Immigration Appeals’ holding in Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006), regarding the validity of vacated convictions for immigration purposes, is reaffirmed, and the decision is modified to give it nationwide application. Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2002), not followed.

A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 247 (A.G. 2018) ID 3922 (PDF)

The Attorney General denied the request of the Department of Homeland Security that the Attorney General suspend the briefing schedules and clarify the question presented, and he granted, in part, both parties’ request for an extension of the deadline for submitting briefs in this case.
L-A-B-R- et al., 27 I&N Dec. 245 (A.G. 2018) ID 3921 (PDF)

The Attorney General referred the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review of issues relating to when there is “good cause” to grant a continuance for a collateral matter to be adjudicated, ordering that the cases be stayed during the pendency of his review.

CERVANTES NUNEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 2018) ID 3920 (PDF)

The crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter in violation of sections 192(a) and 664 of the California Penal Code, which requires that a defendant act with the specific intent to cause the death of another person, is categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012), notwithstanding that the completed offense of voluntary manslaughter itself is not such an aggravated felony.

ROSA, 27 I&N Dec. 228 (BIA 2018) ID 3919 (PDF)

(1) In deciding whether a State offense is punishable as a felony under the Federal Controlled Substances Act and is therefore an aggravated felony drug trafficking crime under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012), adjudicators need not look solely to the provision of the Controlled Substances Act that is most similar to the State statute of conviction.

(2) The respondent’s conviction under section 2C:35-7 of the New Jersey Statutes for possession with intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of school property is for an aggravated felony drug trafficking crime because his State offense satisfies all of the elements of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) and would be punishable as a felony under that provision.

A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 227 (A.G. 2018) ID 3918 (PDF)

The Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review of issues relating to whether being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable “particular social group” for purposes of an application for asylum and withholding of removal, ordering that the case be stayed during the pendency of his review.

E-F-H-L-, 27 I&N Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018) ID 3917 (PDF)

The Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2014), to himself for review and vacated that decision.

MENDEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2018) ID 3916 (PDF)

Misprision of felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Robles, 24 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006), reaffirmed. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012), followed in jurisdiction only.

J-C-H-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 2018)

 ID 3915 (PDF)

When deciding whether to consider a border or airport interview in making a credibility determination, an Immigration Judge should assess the accuracy and reliability of the interview based on the totality of the circumstances, rather than relying on any one factor among a list or mandated set of inquiries.

SINIAUSKAS , 27 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2018) ID 3914 (PDF)

(1) In deciding whether to set a bond, an Immigration Judge should consider the nature and circumstances of the alien’s criminal activity, including any arrests and convictions, to determine if the alien is a danger to the community, but family and community ties generally do not mitigate an alien’s dangerousness.

(2) Driving under the influence is a significant adverse consideration in determining whether an alien is a danger to the community in bond proceedings.

CASTILLO ANGULO, 27 I&N Dec. 194 (BIA 2018) ID 3913 (PDF)

(1) In removal proceedings arising within the jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, an alien who was “waved through” a port of entry has established an admission “in any status” within the meaning of section 240A(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (2012). Tula-Rubio v. Lynch, 787 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2015), and Saldivar v. Sessions, 877 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2017), followed in jurisdiction only.

(2) In removal proceedings arising outside the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, to establish continuous residence in the United States for 7 years after having been “admitted in any status” under section 240A(a)(2), an alien must prove that he or she possessed some form of lawful immigration status at the time of admission.

W-Y-C-& H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA 2018) ID 3912 (PDF)

(1) The Department of Homeland Security is not precluded by res judicata from initiating a separate proceeding to remove an alien as one convicted of an aggravated felony burglary offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012), based on the same conviction that supported a crime of violence aggravated felony charge under section 101(a)(43)(F) in the prior proceeding. Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir. 2007), not followed.

(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals generally will not address a newly articulated particular social group that was not advanced before the Immigration Judge.

CASTRO-TUM, 27 I&N Dec. 187 (A.G. 2018) ID 3911 (PDF)

The Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review of issues relating to the authority to administratively close immigration proceedings, ordering that the case be stayed during the pendency of his review.

JASSO ARANGURE, 27 I&N Dec. 178 (BIA 2017) ID 3910 (PDF)

(1) The Department of Homeland Security is not precluded by res judicata from initiating a separate proceeding to remove an alien as one convicted of an aggravated felony burglary offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012), based on the same conviction that supported a crime of violence aggravated felony charge under section 101(a)(43)(F) in the prior proceeding. Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir. 2007), not followed.

(2) Home invasion in the first degree in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws section 750.110a(2) is a categorical burglary offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act.

J-A-B- & OBSHATKO, 27 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2017) ID 3909 (PDF)

Whether a violation of a protection order renders an alien removable under section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)(2012), is not governed by the categorical approach, even if a conviction underlies the charge; instead, an Immigration Judge should consider the probative and reliable evidence regarding what a State court has determined about the alien’s violation. Matter of Strydom 25 I&N Dec. 507 (BIA 2011), clarified.

J-A-B- & I-J-V-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 2017) ID 3908 (PDF)

An Immigration Judge does not have authority to terminate removal proceedings to give an arriving alien an opportunity to present an asylum claim to the Department of Homeland Security in the first instance.

KEELEY, 27 I&N Dec. 146 (BIA 2017) ID 3907 (PDF)

(1) The term “rape” in section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2012), encompasses an act of vaginal, anal, or oral intercourse, or digital or mechanical penetration, no matter how slight. Perez-Gonzalez v. Holder, 667 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2012), not followed.

TAVDIDISHVILI, 27 I&N Dec. 142 (BIA 2017) ID 3906 (PDF)

Criminally negligent homicide in violation of section 125.10 of the New York Penal Law is categorically not a crime involving moral turpitude, because it does not require that a perpetrator have a sufficiently culpable mental state.

VELLA, 27 I&N Dec. 138 (BIA 2017)

 (PDF)

An alien “has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” within the meaning of section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012), if he or she was inspected, admitted, and physically entered the country as a lawful permanent resident at any time in the past, even if such admission was not the alien’s most recent acquisition of lawful permanent resident status.

PANGAN-SIS, 27 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 2017)

 ID 3904 (PDF)

An alien seeking to qualify for the exception to inadmissibility in section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii) (2012), must satisfy all three subclauses of that section, including the requirement that the alien be “a VAWA self-petitioner.”

REHMAN, 27 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2017)

 ID 3903 (PDF)

Where a petitioner seeking to prove a familial relationship submits a birth certificate that was not registered contemporaneously with the birth, an adjudicator must consider the birth certificate, as well as all the other evidence of record and the circumstances of the case, to determine whether the petitioner has submitted sufficient reliable evidence to demonstrate the claimed relationship by a preponderance of the evidence.

D-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 105 (BIA 2017)

 ID 3902 (PDF)

(1) A misrepresentation is material under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012), when it tends to shut off a line of inquiry that is relevant to the alien’s admissibility and that would predictably have disclosed other facts relevant to his eligibility for a visa, other documentation, or admission to the United States. Forbes v. INS, 48 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 1995), not followed.

(2) In determining whether an alien assisted or otherwise participated in extrajudicial killing, an adjudicator should consider (1) the nexus between the alien’s role, acts, or inaction and the extrajudicial killing and (2) his scienter, meaning his prior or contemporaneous knowledge of the killing. Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006), not followed.

DELGADO, 27 I&N Dec. 100 (BIA 2017)

 ID 3901 (PDF)

Robbery under section 211 of the California Penal Code, which includes the element of asportation of property, is categorically an aggravated felony theft offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012), regardless of whether a violator merely aided or abetted in the asportation of property stolen by a principal.

MOHAMED, 27 I&N Dec. 92 (BIA 2017) ID 3900 (PDF)

Entry into a pretrial intervention agreement under Texas law qualifies as a “conviction” for immigration purposes under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012), where (1) a respondent admits sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt at the time of his entry into the agreement, and (2) a judge authorizes an agreement ordering the respondent to participate in a pretrial intervention program, under which he is required to complete community supervision and community service, pay fees and restitution, and comply with a no-contact order.

(2)The restrictions on removal in section 208(c)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A) (2012), do not apply to an alien granted asylum whose status is adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence pursuant to section 209(b) of the Act.

J-G-D-F-,, 27 I&N Dec. 82 (BIA 2017) ID 3899 (PDF)

Burglary of a dwelling in violation of section 164.225 of the Oregon Revised Statutes is a crime involving moral turpitude, even though the statute does not require that a person be present at the time of the offense, provided that the dwelling is at least intermittently occupied.

(2)The restrictions on removal in section 208(c)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A) (2012), do not apply to an alien granted asylum whose status is adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence pursuant to section 209(b) of the Act.

N-A-I-, 27 I&N Dec.72 (BIA 2017) ID 3898 (PDF)

1) An alien who adjusts status under section 209(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2012), changes his or her status from that of an alien granted asylum to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, thereby terminating the alien’s asylee status. Matter of C-J-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 284 (BIA 2014), clarified.

(2)The restrictions on removal in section 208(c)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A) (2012), do not apply to an alien granted asylum whose status is adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence pursuant to section 209(b) of the Act.

IZAGUIRRE, 27 I&N Dec. 67 (BIA 2017) ID 3897 (PDF)

An offense may be a “specified offense against a minor” within the meaning of section 111(7) of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 592, even if it involved an undercover police officer posing as a minor, rather than an actual minor.

DEANG, 27 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 2017) ID 3896 (PDF)

An essential element of an aggravated felony receipt of stolen property offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012), is that an offender must receive property with the “knowledge or belief” that it has been stolen, and this element excludes a mens rea equivalent to a “reason to believe.

A conviction for receipt of a stolen motor vehicle under section 32-4-5 of the South Dakota Codified Laws categorically does not define an aggravated felony receipt of stolen property offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act because it is indivisible with respect to the necessary mens rea and only requires, at a minimum, that an offender have a “reason to believe” that the vehicle received was stolen.

FALODUN, 27 I&N Dec. 52 (BIA 2017) ID 3895 (PDF)

Unlike a Certificate of Naturalization, a certificate of citizenship does not confer United States citizenship but merely provides evidence that the applicant previously obtained citizenship status.

ALDAY-DOMINGUEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 48 (BIA 2017) ID 3894 (PDF)

The aggravated felony receipt of stolen property provision in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012), does not require that unlawfully received property be obtained by means of common law theft or larceny.

L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017)

 ID 3893 (PDF)

(1) Whether a particular social group based on family membership is cognizable depends on the nature and degree of the relationships involved and how those relationships are regarded by the society in question.

(2) To establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of membership in a particular social group composed of family members, an applicant must not only demonstrate that he or she is a member of the family but also that the family relationship is at least one central reason for the claimed harm.

M-B-C-, 27 I&N Dec. 31 (BIA 2017) ID 3892 (PDF)

Where the record contains some evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that one or more grounds for mandatory denial of an application for relief may apply, the alien bears the burden under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2016) to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.

J.M. ALVARADO, 27 I&N Dec. 27 (BIA 2017) ID 3891 (PDF)

The persecutor bar in section 241(b)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2012), applies to an alien who assists or otherwise participates in the persecution of an individual because of that person’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, without regard to the alien’s personal motivation for assisting or participating in the persecution.

CHAIREZ, 27 I&N Dec. 21 (BIA 2017)

 ID 3890 (PDF)

In determining whether a statute is divisible under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), Immigration Judges may consider or “peek” at an alien’s conviction record only to discern whether statutory alternatives define “elements” or “means,” provided State law does not otherwise resolve the question.

W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017) ID 3889 (PDF)

(1) The primary consideration for an Immigration Judge in evaluating whether to administratively close or recalendar proceedings is whether the party opposing administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the case to proceed and be resolved on the merits. Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), clarified.

(2) In considering administrative closure, an Immigration Judge cannot review whether an alien falls within the enforcement priorities of the Department of Homeland Security, which has exclusive jurisdiction over matters of prosecutorial discretion.

WU, 27 I&N Dec. 8 (BIA 2017) ID 3888 (PDF)

Assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury under California law is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), distinguished.

JIMENEZ-CEDILLO, 27 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2017) ID 3887 (PDF)

(1) A sexual offense in violation of a statute enacted to protect children is a crime involving moral turpitude where the victim is particularly young—that is, under 14 years of age—or is under 16 and the age differential between the perpetrator and victim is significant, or both, even though the statute requires no culpable mental state as to the age of the child. 26 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2016), clarified.

(2) Sexual solicitation of a minor under section 3-324(b) of the Maryland Criminal Law with the intent to engage in an unlawful sexual offense in violation of section 3-307 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

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