The Supreme Court Lets the Texas Consent Judgment Stand, and Immigration Judges Lose Administrative Closure

On October 27, 2026, the Supreme Court refused to stay the judgment that erased administrative closure from the immigration regulations. The order in City of Baltimore v. Texas, No. 26A500, runs a single sentence. It gives no reasons and records no dissent. It leaves in force a consent judgment that Texas and the Justice Department asked a federal judge to enter on the day Texas filed suit, and that the judge entered the same day.

The order decides far less than its effect suggests. The Court did not hold the 2024 rule unlawful, and it did not approve the way the rule died. It held only that three cities and a legal aid group could not freeze the judgment while they appeal. The practical consequence is still severe. An immigration judge can no longer rely on the 2024 rule to set a case aside over the government’s objection, and people waiting years for a visa have lost the device that kept them in the country while they waited.

What administrative closure does

Administrative closure takes a removal case off a judge’s active calendar without deciding it. The noncitizen remains here while USCIS adjudicates a U visa, a family petition, or another application the immigration court has no power to decide. Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals used the device for decades under general regulations. In 2024 the Justice Department codified it in Efficient Case and Docket Management in Immigration Proceedings, 89 Fed. Reg. 46,742 (May 29, 2024), which placed the standards at 8 C.F.R. 1003.18(c) for immigration judges and 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(l) for the Board. The same rule wrote termination standards into 8 C.F.R. 1003.18(d) and 1003.1(m).

The device has serious critics, and the government’s brief states their case well. Closed cases rose from about 172,000 in January 2013 to more than 268,000 in January 2017, and the government reports that a closed case stays closed an average of 15 years before an immigration judge and 29 years before the Board. The Sixth Circuit reduced the objection to one sentence: in hundreds of thousands of cases, “administrative closure has amounted to a decision not to apply the Nation’s immigration laws at all.” Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 2020). That objection deserves an answer. The answer is a rule with standards, which the 2024 rule supplied, and not a repeal that no court ever examined.

How the rule died

Texas filed suit on June 22, 2026, in the Wichita Falls Division of the Northern District of Texas, where Chief Judge Reed O’Connor is the only district judge. Its theory rested on 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(1)(A), which provides that at the conclusion of the proceeding the immigration judge “shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United States.” The Justice Department did not contest the complaint. It joined Texas that same day in a motion for a consent judgment, and Judge O’Connor entered final judgment. Texas v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 7:26-cv-00070-O (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2026).

The judgment does three things. It declares that no statute authorizes immigration judges to close cases indefinitely. It vacates the 2024 rule nationwide under 5 U.S.C. 706. And it permanently enjoins the Department from enforcing the rule or promulgating a new one that permits closure “absent an express statutory basis.” In a later opinion, Judge O’Connor described the judgment as vacating the entire Final Rule, which also governed termination, briefing schedules, background checks, and sua sponte reopening.

On August 7, Baltimore, New Haven, Columbus, and Centro Legal de la Raza moved to intervene so that someone could defend the rule on appeal. On August 21, Judge O’Connor denied the motion for lack of standing. He held that the cities’ lost tax revenue depended on a chain of later decisions by judges and enforcement officers, and that Centro Legal’s heavier caseload was no injury under Fifth Circuit precedent. The Fifth Circuit, in No. 26-10794, refused a stay. The Supreme Court has now done the same.

What the order does

The 2024 rule stays vacated while the appeal proceeds. Immigration judges cannot rely on it to close new cases. Cases already closed remain closed until DHS moves to recalendar them.

Question Where it stands
Is the 2024 closure rule in effect? No. Judge O’Connor vacated it on June 22, 2026.
Did the termination standards survive? Probably not. The judgment reaches the whole 2024 rule.
Did the Supreme Court hold the rule unlawful? No. It denied a stay and gave no reasons.
Does the judgment reopen closed cases? No. DHS must file a motion to recalendar each one.
Can a judge still grant a continuance? Yes, for good cause under 8 C.F.R. 1003.29.
Did the judgment overrule Meza Morales? No. A district court cannot overrule the Seventh Circuit.

Green rows favor the noncitizen. Red rows favor the government.

Where the judgment goes wrong

These are my views, strongest first.

  1. No adversary, no adjudication. Federal courts decide disputes. Here the defendant agreed with the plaintiff before any answer was due, and the judge entered judgment the day the complaint arrived. The rule passed through notice and comment, and its repeal passed through nothing. The challengers named the danger: if this works, any agency can shed a regulation by announcing that it will not defend it and consenting to nationwide relief. The next administration can use that tool as easily as this one.
  2. A remedy the government calls unlawful. The Justice Department maintains that the Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize universal vacatur. It agreed to universal vacatur anyway, citing Data Marketing Partnership, LP v. U.S. Department of Labor, 45 F.4th 846 (5th Cir. 2022), and it has asked the Supreme Court to reject that remedy in HHS v. Texas Medical Ass’n, No. 26-491. The Solicitor General conceded that a ruling for the government in that case could expose this judgment to collateral attack.
  3. An injunction aimed at the future. The judgment forbids the Department to write any rule permitting closure without express statutory authority. A future Attorney General who wants closure back must first persuade a court to modify a decree that nobody ever litigated.
  4. Standing that runs one way. Texas claimed injury because immigrants stay. The cities claimed injury because immigrants leave. The courts accepted the first theory without contest and rejected the second. The government answers that standing is not reciprocal, and as doctrine it is right. The asymmetry still shows how a consent judgment can shield itself from review.

The Seventh Circuit and Meza Morales

Yeison Meza Morales came to the United States as a child in 2002. In 2013, as he ran from a group of men, one of them shot him in the ankle. He cooperated with the police and applied for a U visa in 2017. Before USCIS acted, ICE charged him as removable. Appearing without a lawyer, he asked the judge to continue his case or close it. The judge refused closure, holding himself bound by Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), and ordered him removed. USCIS later found him eligible and placed him on the waiting list.

The Seventh Circuit reversed. Meza Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2020). Judge Amy Coney Barrett, now Justice Barrett, wrote for the panel. The court read 8 C.F.R. 1003.10(b), which lets an immigration judge “take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases,” and held that administrative closure is “plainly within an immigration judge’s authority.” The Third and Fourth Circuits agree. Arcos Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2021); Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019). The Sixth Circuit does not. Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d 459.

Meza Morales rests on a regulation. It depends on no statute, and it predates the 2024 rule by four years. The Texas judgment declares that no statute authorizes closure. It says nothing about 1003.10(b), and a district court in Texas has no power to overrule the Seventh Circuit. The Solicitor General also told the Supreme Court that noncitizens denied closure “may be able to collaterally challenge the consent judgment” in their own cases. Nonparties are not bound by a consent decree. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).

The limits

The Attorney General may amend the regulations, and the government tried in 2020 when it added language to 1003.10(b) denying any general closure power. 85 Fed. Reg. 81,588 (Dec. 16, 2020). A federal court in California preliminarily enjoined that rule, Centro Legal de la Raza v. EOIR, 524 F. Supp. 3d 919 (N.D. Cal. 2021), and the 2024 rule rescinded it. Expect the government to argue that vacating the 2024 rule revived the 2020 text. U visa petitioners face a further limit. In Matter of Ibarra-Vega, 29 I&N Dec. 476 (BIA 2026), the Board held closure over DHS objection inappropriate when no U visa is available and none is likely in the reasonably near future.

What changes for motions to recalendar

DHS began filing motions to recalendar closed cases by the thousands in May 2025, as I described last August. Lawyers answered with the eight factors in 8 C.F.R. 1003.18(c) and 1003.1(l), and clients with a pending waiver could seek termination under 1003.18(d). The Texas judgment took all of it. In that post I predicted the 2024 regulations would make closure “more difficult for future administrations to eliminate this discretionary tool.” It took one afternoon in Wichita Falls. Any opposition built on the 2024 text needs rewriting before it is filed.

What survives is older, and in this circuit it is sturdier. Meza Morales found the judge’s authority in 1003.10(b), not in the 2024 rule. The Board then supplied the standard by accident. In Matter of Cahuec Tzalam, 29 I&N Dec. 300 (BIA 2025), decided last November, it wrote that Avetisyan “has been superseded by the regulations.” Seven months later a federal court vacated those regulations, and a rule that no longer exists supersedes nothing. The test Attorney General Garland restored in Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326 (A.G. 2021), governs again. Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), asks the judge to weigh the reason for closure, the basis for the opposition, the likelihood of success on the outside application, the expected length of the closure, each side’s responsibility for delay, and the likely outcome of the case. Most of the analysis survives. Only the regulation that housed it is gone. Expect a fight over even that much: a footnote in Cahuec Tzalam calls Avetisyan vague and invites DHS to argue that closure trespasses on its enforcement authority.

The Board will judge these motions on proof and time. Matter of B-N-K-, 29 I&N Dec. 96 (BIA 2025), made the reason for a case to proceed the primary consideration and demanded a foreseeable end within a reasonably short period. Cahuec Tzalam reversed closure for a young man who filed nothing but a receipt notice and stood five years back in the visa line. Ibarra-Vega did the same for U visa applicants with no visa in sight. Think of Juan Carlos, the hypothetical landscaper in that August post: an approved I-130, a business with six employees, thirteen years of roots. That is the record these decisions demand. A bare receipt notice no longer carries a motion.

The procedural objections never depended on the 2024 rule, and they still hold. DHS still files template motions with no individual facts, defective service, and no attempt to confer. Object to each defect, and ask for more time when service arrives late. Consider strategic non-opposition, too. When a client has accrued ten years of presence under Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021), and has a qualifying relative, recalendaring may open the door to cancellation of removal.

Where closure fails, ask for a continuance in the alternative under 8 C.F.R. 1003.29. In this circuit, prima facie eligibility for a U visa is the most important factor in that decision. Guerra Rocha v. Barr, 951 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2020).

Then build the record for appeal. Get a written decision. Preserve the point that your client was never a party to the Texas case, and quote the government’s own concession that such clients “may be able to collaterally challenge” the judgment. Preserve the universal vacatur objection while No. 26-491 is pending. A denial in Chicago goes to the Seventh Circuit, which has answered the authority question once already.

Where this goes next

The Supreme Court has not blessed what happened in Wichita Falls. It has declined, for now, to stop it. Three roads remain open: the Fifth Circuit appeal on intervention, the universal vacatur question in No. 26-491, and petitions for review brought by the people the judgment actually affects.

My prediction is that the Justice Department will propose a rule, through notice and comment, that forbids closure outright. The injunction bars rules that permit closure and leaves the Department free to write one that prohibits it. That would be the lawful way to end administrative closure. A regulation that took notice and comment to write should take notice and comment to repeal.

This post provides general information, not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney client relationship. If you face removal proceedings, consult a lawyer about your own case.

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