Trump v. Slaughter: The Court Uncaged the Presidency. Everyone watched birthright citizenship. The Court’s real blast came the day before — and it rewired the executive branch.

They wanted you to watch birthright citizenship. That was the bright object, the thing waved in front of the crowd. On June 30, 2026, the Court told the country that a child born on American soil is American, whatever the parents’ papers say — Trump v. Barbara, No. 25–365 — and the headlines roared. The immigration bar cheered. The administration seethed. Everybody looked.

The blast that will outlast this decade came the day before, in a case almost nobody read. Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25–332 (June 29, 2026). Six to three, Roberts writing. The Court overruled Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), and with it the ninety-year-old rule that let Congress shield the heads of independent agencies from a President’s whim. In its place the Court laid down a single line of doctrine, blunt as a hammer: anyone who wields executive power serves at the President’s pleasure. Fire them at will. No cause. No notice. No hearing. The architecture of the Republic, rewired in an afternoon — while the crowd watched birthright citizenship.

⚖️ The Two Firings

Meet the people before you meet the law.

Rebecca Slaughter sat on the Federal Trade Commission. President Trump appointed her in his first term; President Biden reappointed her. In March 2025 she got word that her service was “inconsistent” with the administration’s priorities, and she was gone — no cause, no charge, no hearing. The statute that built the FTC in 1914 said a commissioner could be removed only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 15 U. S. C. §41. The President ignored the statute. The Court blessed the ignoring.

Lisa Cook sat on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. On August 25, 2025, the President fired her by letter over mortgage paperwork she signed in 2021, before she ever took the seat. She sued. And here the same Court that freed the President’s hand in Slaughter stayed it in Trump v. Cook, No. 25A312 (June 29, 2026), and let Cook keep her chair. Two firings. Two directions. That split is the whole story, and most of the country read it backwards.

⚖️ The Ruling, In Plain Words

Start with what Slaughter actually holds, stripped of robes. Any officer who exercises executive power is the President’s to fire. As Justice Thomas recounted in Cook, quoting the Slaughter majority word for word, the President may now “remove his subordinates at will,” and he may do it “without cause, without notice, and without a hearing, so long as they exercise any executive power.” Slaughter, slip op., at 13. The rule admits no soft edges. When an agency executes a congressional mandate against private parties, the Court said, it wields executive power — “no ifs, ands, or quasis about it.” Slaughter, slip op., at 22.

Then the statutory frame. In Slaughter the Court struck the FTC’s for-cause clause, 15 U. S. C. §41, as an unconstitutional leash on the President. In Cook, the survivor was 12 U. S. C. §242, which provides that each Governor “shall hold office for a term of fourteen years from the expiration of the term of his predecessor, unless sooner removed for cause by the President.” Same words — “for cause.” Different outcome. The only thing that saved the Fed was 235 years of history — from Hamilton’s First Bank in 1791 to the marble building on Constitution Avenue — and a majority willing, this once, to honor it.

The Court did not pretend the country agreed. Justice Sotomayor read her dissent from the bench — a rare, deliberate act of protest — and warned of a President who walks away with more power than any before him. The founders feared a king and wrote a Constitution to cage that fear. Three branches. Each watching the others. Slaughter filed down the bars.

📌 What This Actually Does

The Bottom Line

After Slaughter, every federal officer who exercises executive power — from cabinet secretaries to the adjudicators who decide asylum claims — holds office at the sufferance of one person. The President may remove them at will. And under Trump v. United States, 603 U. S. 593 (2024), he answers to no court for how he does it.

That second half is the part nobody is saying out loud. Slaughter hands the President the switch. The immunity decision cuts the wire that ran to the courthouse. Two years ago, in Trump v. United States, the Court placed the removal power inside the President’s “conclusive and preclusive” authority — “no different from his power to issue pardons or Congress’s power to impeach.” 603 U. S., at 608–609. Inside that sphere, the Court said, “courts cannot examine” what the President does, and “his discretion in exercising such authority cannot be subject to further judicial examination.” Id., at 608–609. Control without cause. Insulation without review. Put them in the same hand and you have built something the framers spent a summer in Philadelphia trying to prevent.

  Before Slaughter After Slaughter
Heads of independent agencies (FTC, NLRB, and the rest) Removable only for cause Removable at will
The President’s reason for firing Had to fit a statutory standard Any reason, or none at all
Judicial review of the firing Courts could test the cause “Courts cannot examine” it — conclusive and preclusive
Immigration judges & the BIA DOJ employees — but reform toward independence was on the table Slaughter‘s logic forecloses insulating them at all
The check on the President Congress could insulate; courts could reinstate No branch may look

🔥 The Deeper Danger

Here is where I stop reporting and start arguing. Four things about this decision deserve more attention than they are getting, strongest first.

  1. The immunity multiplier

    A removal power without a check is not new. Presidents have fired people since Washington. What is new is the pairing. Slaughter gives the President total command of the people who run the government; Trump v. United States tells the courts they may not ask how he uses it. Neither alone is a monarchy. Together they are close enough that King George would recognize the outline — and might envy the paperwork. Loosen the limits on power and power does not thank you. It expands. Once it expands far enough, it stops asking permission.

  2. The Cook carveout is a promise written in sand

    Everyone exhaled when the Fed survived. Read the dissents before you do. Justice Barrett, dissenting in Cook, put the knife in plainly: “How can history support both a categorical rule and a carveout?” Justice Thomas went further — he sees no principled line at all, and he says so for twenty pages. Justice Kavanaugh, concurring, framed the whole thing as a fork: “After Slaughter, there is a clear choice: Either the Federal Reserve may remain independent . . . or it may not.” The Fed is not the ceiling on presidential power. It is the single exception a bare majority could not stomach — resting on five votes and a story about the First and Second Banks. Exceptions that rest on five votes do not rest easy.

  3. Appearance is the whole game

    The Cook majority understood something the country keeps forgetting. Independence is not only a fact; it is a perception, and the perception is load-bearing. Hamilton warned that even the “suspicion” that an institution sat “at the disposal of the Government” could corrode it from within. The Court quoted him to save the Fed. But the same logic indicts the new order everywhere else. When every official knows the President can end his career tomorrow, for any reason, with no court to hear about it, the official governs with one eye on the door. Nothing corrodes faster than that.

  4. The power did not vanish — it moved

    Overruling Humphrey’s Executor did not shrink the administrative state by an inch. Every rule the FTC can write, every enforcement action, every adjudication, still exists. The concurrence’s own logic concedes it: the fourth branch’s authority was not abolished. It was reassigned — upward, to one desk in one building. A government that was already vast did not get smaller on June 29. It got a single owner.

🇺🇸 Birthright Citizenship: The Win That Is Really 5–4

Here is the case the country read as a wall. In Trump v. Barbara, No. 25–365 (June 30, 2026), the Court struck down the President’s order to end birthright citizenship, six to three, Roberts writing. The immigration bar exhaled. Read the vote before you do.

The fight is over fourteen words written after a war.

The Citizenship Clause — U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”

Everything turns on one phrase: subject to the jurisdiction thereof. The President’s Executive Order No. 14160 read it to mean allegiance, or lawful status, or domicile — anything that would keep the children of the undocumented out. The Court read it the way the men who wrote it did: the power of the United States to govern those within its borders. Nothing more exotic than that.

The history runs one direction. At common law, a child born in the sovereign’s dominions owed allegiance and earned protection from birth — “natural-born,” Blackstone wrote, however “momentary and uncertain” the parents’ presence. Calvin’s Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1a (1608). Then came Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which held that a Black man could not be a citizen and helped light the fuse of the Civil War. The Fourteenth Amendment was written to bury Dred Scott and salt the earth over it. Its principal author, Senator Howard, called the Citizenship Clause “simply declaratory of . . . the law of the land already.” Senator Trumbull said the purpose was to put the question of citizenship “once and forever [to] rest.” Not to leave it to a President’s pen. To end it.

The precedents held that line for a century and a quarter. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 (1884), marked the narrow exceptions — tribal members owing allegiance to a separate sovereign, like the children of foreign ambassadors, were not “subject to the jurisdiction.” And United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898), settled the rest: a child born in San Francisco to Chinese nationals — themselves barred by law from ever naturalizing — was a citizen the day he drew breath. The Amendment, the Court said, was “declaratory” of the ancient rule of citizenship by birth. Soil, not blood. The Barbara majority did nothing more radical than refuse to unsettle it. “Citizenship,” the Court wrote, “then and now, was the right to have rights — to freely participate in our political community.”

So far, a wall. Now the crack.

The Vote Is 6–3. The Constitution Is 5–4.

Only five Justices — Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson — held that the Constitution guarantees birthright citizenship. The sixth vote, Justice Kavanaugh, agreed only with the result. “I respectfully disagree with the Court’s constitutional holding,” he wrote. “In my view, the Executive Order does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” He would strike the order on a statute — 8 U. S. C. §1401(a) — and then he drew the map: Congress “could — consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment — amend §1401(a) or otherwise enact new legislation establishing exceptions.” The President said the same thing from the podium that afternoon.

Count it again. Four Justices — Thomas, joined by Gorsuch, then Alito and Gorsuch writing alone — would have upheld the order on the merits today. Thomas spent ninety-seven pages arguing the Clause reaches only the children of the domiciled. Alito would limit it to those “not subject to any foreign power.” Gorsuch called Wong Kim Ark “sprawling.” That is four votes to end birthright citizenship outright — plus a fifth, Kavanaugh, who would end it by statute tomorrow if Congress moved.

Stop here, because Kavanaugh’s move is the hardest thing in either opinion to grasp. How does one Justice read the same fourteen words two ways? Because two documents carry them. Congress repeated the Amendment’s language in a statute — 8 U. S. C. §1401(a) — with Wong Kim Ark already on the books, and the Court treats a meaning Congress adopts and leaves untouched as locked in: Congress can fix a statute any Tuesday it wants, so eighty years of silence is ratification. The Constitution carries no such lock — only the Court can revise it, so the Court revises it freely. So the same fourteen words lead two lives. In the statute they are frozen broad — Congress’s silence welded Wong Kim Ark in. In the Amendment they are open — and Kavanaugh would read them narrow.

Now look at it from his chair, because from his chair it is not a trick — it is candor. He tells you the Amendment does not reach these children. He strikes the order anyway, because the statute does reach them and no President repeals a statute by memo. He enforces the law he has, he flags the law he doubts, and he leaves the policy to Congress, where he believes it belongs. On his account he is the most honest man in the building: six Justices voted to kill the order, and only he showed his full hand doing it.

Now look at what is really happening. In his scheme, Congress never overrides the Amendment — that is the step that seems impossible, and it is impossible, and it never occurs. The override happens earlier, at the reading. His interpretation shrinks the fence of the Fourteenth Amendment until the children of the undocumented stand outside it, protected only by a tent Congress pitched in 1940. Congress cannot move the fence. Congress can always take down its own tent. So the statute does not defeat the Constitution; it walks through territory his reading vacated. Restraint in the result. Revolution in the reasoning. Instructions in the footnote. The 6–3 conceals the 5–4, and the concealment is manufactured, not accidental.

And now look at it from the maternity ward. A mother without papers holds her newborn in a Chicago hospital, and under either reading, her daughter is a citizen today. She cannot see the difference. The passport looks the same. But under the majority’s five votes, that citizenship is bedrock — beyond the reach of any election. Under Kavanaugh’s reading, it is a lease, held at the pleasure of the next Congress, revocable by 218 votes, 51 votes, and a signature. The bill would not even need to touch the famous words — it would simply define them, declaring a child “subject to the jurisdiction” only if a parent holds status. The difference is invisible until the day it is everything. I walk the full needle — every step, with a hypothetical that follows one girl through both doors — in The Referee Problem.

The wall is one Barrett vote deep. And the moat behind it is a single statute — a statute the newly uncaged executive was built to drive through Congress. Slaughter handed the President the machinery of government. Barbara left the last constitutional protection for my clients’ children resting on one seat and one Act of Congress. That is not a wall. That is a fuse.

📚 The Architect’s Read

You do not have to take the alarm from a critic. Take it from a builder. Three years before Slaughter, two scholars laid out its blueprint in the pages of the Harvard Law Review — Aditya Bamzai and Saikrishna Prakash, The Executive Power of Removal, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 1756 (2023). Prakash has spent a career arguing for exactly the presidency the Court just recognized: the strong unitary executive, the whole of it, in one set of hands. Read what he and his co-author wrote. The Court did not invent this doctrine last month. It adopted a theory that its champions had already thought all the way through — and had already described where it leads.

Their central move is the one that should stop you. If Congress may limit the President’s grounds for firing an officer, they ask, then “what prevents Congress from likewise limiting the grounds for executive pardons, judicial judgments, and impeachment removals?” Removal, pardons, impeachment — bound together as powers no other branch may touch. That is not a fringe framing. It is the through-line of the whole project, and it surfaces again in Trump v. United States, where the same three powers reappear as the President’s “conclusive and preclusive” authority, beyond the reach of any court.

Now mark the asymmetry the analogy hides. Pardons are in the text — Article II, Section 2, in words anyone can read. Impeachment is in the text — Article I hands it to Congress alone. Judicial judgments stand on the express structure of Article III. Removal appears nowhere. The Constitution never mentions a firing power. The unitary theorists infer it — they read it into the Vesting Clause, “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President,” and ask you to treat the inference as equal in dignity to the written three. That is the premise doing all the work in the parity argument. Elegant, yes. But an inference is not a clause, and the historians below will show you what the men who wrote the Vesting Clause actually built with it: officers their own first President could not fire.

The Word, Turned Around

Here is the tell. Bamzai and Prakash close their argument with a warning — not about presidents, but about bureaucrats. If their opponents prevail, they wrote, Congress could “transform the executive branch into a perpetual and unaccountable bureaucratic machine,” with “the Chief Executive reduced to the Chief Bystander.”

Their fear was an unaccountable bureaucracy. Read the word again now that their side has won. Slaughter did not free the country from an unaccountable machine. It built one — and handed the keys to a single person the courts have been told they may not question. The same word points the other way. The unaccountability the architects warned of did not disappear. It moved to the top.

These are not the words of an alarmist. They are the words of the winning side, describing the machine it built. And Prakash has not gone quiet since the decisions came down. In a conversation with Jack Goldsmith after Slaughter and Cook issued, he pressed the same logic into the present tense: the machinery does not stop at the heads of famous agencies. It reaches downward — to inferior officers, to the civil service, and to the non-Article III adjudicators who are not judges under the Constitution at all, but employees of the Executive Branch. That last category is the ground my clients stand on every day they walk into immigration court.

📜 The Historians’ Answer

The architects did not go unanswered. They were answered in the same journal, in the same volume, and the answer names the problem in its title: Andrea Scoseria Katz and Noah A. Rosenblum, Removal Rehashed, 136 Harv. L. Rev. F. 404 (2023). Katz teaches at Washington University in St. Louis. Rosenblum teaches at NYU. Both are legal historians, and they took The Executive Power of Removal apart cache of evidence by cache of evidence. Their verdict is blunt. Fifty years of unitary-executive scholarship has leaned on the same set pieces, the same sources, the same argument. Nothing new. And, on the history, nothing proven.

They also called the shot. Three years before Slaughter, they warned that a Court already committed to a new removal doctrine, and hungry for a historical pedigree to hang on it, might “embrace it as a new originalist defense of its new jurisprudence.” That, they wrote, would be a mistake. The Court made it anyway, on June 29.

Set their history against the majority’s and watch what happens.

The History the Majority Walked Past

The state constitutions never handed removal to the executive. Delaware did not. South Carolina did not. Pennsylvania’s 1776 charter wrote removal of certain officers into the Assembly’s hands — the legislature’s — more than once. There was no shared “conceptual core” of executive power at the Founding with a firing power tucked inside it.

Philadelphia fixed the presidency late, and by horse trade. The Convention did not lock the President’s powers into place until mid-September 1787 — two weeks before it disbanded — and only after the Electoral College broke the deadlock over how to pick him. The Framers were politicians, not philosophers. They split the appointment power between the President and the Senate. They handed Congress the power to create offices. Powers followed deals, not a fixed blueprint of what “executive” meant.

The Decision of 1789 decided nothing. The First Congress splintered over removal. The camp that read a removal power into the Constitution itself was one camp among several, and on the recent nose counts a minority one. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 77 that the Senate’s concurrence would be needed to displace officers — then reversed himself once he sat inside Washington’s administration. A profusion of views is fatal to a theory that demands consensus.

The same First Congress built officers the President could not fire. The Sinking Fund Commission managed the federal debt with commissioners beyond Washington’s removal power. Congress planted boards and commissions outside the departments to run the Mint, buy back the public debt, and rule on patent applications. The early Presidents respected every one of those arrangements. The men who ratified the Constitution then turned around, in their very first Congress, and built the independence the Slaughter majority now calls unconstitutional.

And “executive power” itself was an empty vessel. Julian Davis Mortenson’s reconstruction of Founding-era usage — the deepest anyone has done, thousands of pages of the era’s legal and political writing — finds that the phrase meant the power to execute the laws. That and no more. Congress filled the vessel by legislation, and Congress could shape the offices it created — including how their holders left them. Not a reservoir of royal prerogatives. A job description.

Put me down with the historians. I hold no brief for the project of shrinking Congress to grow the President, and the record Katz and Rosenblum assemble says the Founders held none either. The unitary executive is not the Founding restored. It is a twentieth-century invention wearing a powdered wig — born in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), the work of the only President ever to become Chief Justice; cabined by Humphrey’s Executor within nine years; dormant for two generations; and revived by this Court in 2010. Slaughter is the revival’s crowning act.

The genre now has a name, and it comes from the academy’s front rank. In a draft forthcoming in the Supreme Court Review, Cass Sunstein calls these opinions restoration narratives — Cass R. Sunstein, Restoration Narratives (July 2, 2026) — and he writes out the script: at the founding, the provision meant X; the Court itself then blundered and read it as Y; now the Court restores X and declares it was X all along. Eden, the fall, the return to grace. His lead specimen is Slaughter — Roberts’s opening line about the Framers, the scoffing at Humphrey’s Executor, the whole arc. And Sunstein names the two facts that matter here. The story form works whether or not the history is true. And the form is the power: restorationists, he writes, “can control the future because they control the past.” Note whom the draft thanks for comments on an earlier version: Prakash himself. The architect read the field guide to his own genre. Lawrence Solum, on his Legal Theory Blog, reads even Barbara — the case the restorationists lost — as fought entirely on their chosen ground, all nine Justices arguing history. Mark that. The battlefield itself was the victory.

Katz and Rosenblum closed with a warning about method, and Slaughter now gives it teeth. A Court that wraps itself in history and tradition owes the history a real fight — sources weighed, counterarguments answered, the scholarly record engaged on the merits. What we got instead was a contested history announced as settled. The architects supplied the blueprint. The historians supplied the rebuttal. The majority built from the blueprint and left the rebuttal on the table, unanswered in kind. That is not originalism doing the deciding. That is a decision shopping for its history.

🚩 What This Means Where I Practice

For the Immigration Bar

Here is the quiet part, and I will say it plainly because someone should. The people who decide whether my clients live in this country or return to the ones they fled are not Article III judges. Immigration judges and the members of the Board of Immigration Appeals are employees of the Department of Justice. They are hired by the Attorney General. They are removable by the Attorney General. And the Attorney General serves at the pleasure of the President.

Slaughter does not rewrite that structure — the immigration courts were never independent to begin with. What Slaughter does is bless the theory behind it, and pour concrete around it. Every argument for an independent immigration court — an Article I tribunal insulated from enforcement politics, a reform this bar has wanted for a generation — now runs straight into a Supreme Court that says officers wielding executive power cannot be insulated from the President at all. The Fed got a historical shield. Immigration adjudication has none. There is no First Bank of the United States in our corner of the law.

I stood in a Chicago immigration courtroom not long ago beside a man who had crossed two borders ahead of the people who killed his brother. The judge who would decide his fate was a careful lawyer and, plainly, a decent human being. She was also, in the eyes of the law, an employee — hired up a chain that ends at one man’s desk. Every safeguard my client had that morning ran, eventually, to the will of a single person. Before Slaughter, that was an uncomfortable fact you could argue around. After Slaughter, it is settled constitutional design.

A Word of Proportion

I am not telling you the sky fell on your caseload this week. It did not. Removal doctrine is not a ground of relief, and no client’s hearing changed because the FTC lost a commissioner. What changed is the horizon. The direction of travel is now fixed, and it runs away from independence and toward a single accountable — and unaccountable — executive. Plan for the horizon, not the headline.

🔍 What To Watch

  1. Watch Article I immigration-court proposals stall or die. Slaughter‘s logic is the strongest argument yet against insulating immigration judges from the executive — expect it cited against reform.
  2. Preserve the record on impartiality and due process. If the adjudicator answers, ultimately, to the party prosecuting your client, that is an argument worth building and protecting for appeal.
  3. Watch the Cook carveout. If the Fed exception falls in a future case — and Justices Thomas and Barrett are already pushing — the last historical shield in the federal system falls with it, and the theory becomes truly total.

⚖️ The Verdict

The real story was never the case everyone watched. Birthright citizenship survived — by one vote that holds the Constitution. The Fed survived — by a carveout the dissents are already circling. The crowd went home reassured. But the ground moved under all of it. In Slaughter the Court gave the President command of the executive branch, and in Trump v. United States it told the courts to look away from how he uses it.

Watch where the last check goes — the pattern shows up even in the victories. Barbara held by one vote. The Fed held by a carveout. And in Moore v. Harper, 600 U. S. 1 (2023), the Court refused the independent-state-legislature theory and kept judicial review over state legislatures — a win with a trapdoor, because the Court reserved to itself, undefined, the power to decide when a state court strays “the ordinary bounds of judicial review.” Three wins. None pure. Each keeps the final say at the center. That is the pattern: the intermediate checks dissolve — the statute, the carveout, the state court — and everything comes to rest on apex discretion. After Slaughter, the apex answers to one person. When the middle is gone, the last check standing is not a court, and not a Congress, but the voters.

We should not draw comfort from the calendar. Fifty years ago the country limped through its Bicentennial in worse shape than this — nineteen seventy-six, stagflation and gas lines, a war just lost, a President freshly resigned in disgrace. It felt as if the floor had gone. But the test then was economic and it was military, and the constitutional order held. In that same era the Court had refused to let a President gag the press — New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971) — and had forced a President to give up his own tapes — United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). The system bent and did not break.

This year we mark two hundred and fifty. We are richer, softer, more comfortable than the country that limped through 1976 — and it feels worse. It feels worse because the thing under strain now is not the economy, and not a war a world away. It is the rule of law itself, and the rule of law is the one asset worth more than any balance sheet. Prosperity is anesthesia. Do not let it work on you.

Power that has been uncaged does not pace the yard. It spreads. It concentrates. It hardens. The paper guardrails are nearly spent. What is left is the character of the people who vote — and whether they still believe the law is worth more than the comfort. That is the whole of it now. It always was.

Disclaimer: This post is commentary and analysis, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship. The Slaughter quotations above are reproduced as they appear in the published Trump v. Cook opinion; verify against the Slaughter slip opinion before relying on them. If you are facing removal proceedings or any immigration matter, consult qualified counsel about your specific facts. Law Offices of Michael D. Baker, 111 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 1700, Chicago, IL 60604.

Update — July 2, 2026

The litigation this post promised to track has arrived, and it arrived on the immigration bench. On February 14, 2025, the Justice Department fired Assistant Chief Immigration Judges Megan Jackler and Brandon Jaroch — career employees, both veterans — with no notice, no charge, no hearing, and Article II of the Constitution cited as the sole authority. An MSPB administrative judge ordered them reinstated. On March 20, 2026, the full Board reversed itself twice over: it declared immigration judges “inferior officers” removable at will, and it surrendered its own jurisdiction whenever an agency invokes the Constitution to justify a firing. Jackler and Jaroch Consolidation v. Department of Justice, 2026 MSPB 3. In June the Federal Circuit took the appeal en banc, Jackler v. DOJ, No. 26-1575 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 2026) — the full court on first hearing, expedited — making it the first test of how far down Slaughter reaches.

Mark what the Slaughter majority did not do. It never defined who counts as an officer. It never mentioned Seila Law‘s protection for inferior officers with limited duties. It never said one word about the civil service. Justice Sotomayor named the silence from the bench: the ruling carries “major implications for inferior officers and civil-service employees, which the majority studiously ignores.” That is not robust analysis. That is an opinion that removed the ceiling and refused to look at the floor — and the Board has already accepted the invitation. Full analysis in a companion post on this blog: The Referee Problem.

This section will also track any move to extend Slaughter to the Federal Reserve. Check back as the doctrine develops.

Sources & further reading: Aditya Bamzai & Saikrishna Prakash, The Executive Power of Removal, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 1756 (2023); the response, Andrea Scoseria Katz & Noah A. Rosenblum, Removal Rehashed, 136 Harv. L. Rev. F. 404 (2023); and, more current, Professor Prakash’s post-decision conversation with Jack Goldsmith on the implications of Slaughter and Cook; and Lawfare’s post-decision analysis of the majority’s unanswered questions, Slaughter’s Silence.

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